Examining the EU’s Sanctions on Syria

natalie hamill, 29 February 2012

By Anna Sonny

While the rest of the world struggles to agree on a coherent plan of action for Syria, Bashar al-Assad’s troops continue to lay siege to Homs, mercilessly suppressing opponents to his regime. More than 7,500 civilians have been killed since the uprising began last March and the government is still refusing to allow relief organisations into the country. The EU’s latest round of sanctions, agreed on Monday, aim to block the Syrian government’s funding and dry up its resources. But, are these measures enough to force Assad’s exit from power?

EU officials have established a visa ban and an asset freeze for seven Syrian government officials and frozen the assets of the Syrian central bank within the EU. They also banned the trade of gold, precious metals and diamonds with the country and banned Syrian cargo flights from the European Union. Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said: “The measures target the regime and its ability to conduct the appalling violence against civilians.”

A closer look at Syria’s trade patterns, however, shows that these sanctions could be tougher. A ban on phosphate imports for example, as pushed for by Britain and other countries, would most certainly have a deeper impact; phosphates are Syria’s sixth-largest export industry, with 40 per cent of trade accounted for by the EU. But Greece, one of the main buyers of Syrian phosphates in Europe, opposed the ban due to its troubled economy. One of the benefits of a supranational body is that it has a louder voice on the global stage. But this voice needs to be homogenous in order to have an impact and as the disagreement over a phosphate ban highlights, it can, at times, be impossible for 27 very different governments to speak and act in unison.

This is not the first time the EU will face criticisms about the speed and adequacy of its reaction. In the midst of past unfurling crises, the EU has been accused of reacting too slowly and too disjointedly, resulting in an inability to provide an effective response. The Lisbon Treaty attempted to address this problem by creating the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, designed to provide a coherent and co-ordinated response to foreign affairs. Catherine Ashton assumed this position in 2009, and the role faced its first major test with the uprisings in Libya. But, despite Ashton’s call for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya in order to put an end to the Gaddafi regime last year, the EU’s response was notably fragmented and in the end it was the France and UK-led coalition that took action. Whilst unanimity is a safety-net against unilateral and ill-thought out action, and must be the desired way forward when deciding military and defence action at the EU level, it can be overly cumbersome and heavily bureaucratic. One has to question whether, when lives are being lost, timely decisiveness is not more crucial?

In the case of Syria, international progress on the whole has been blocked by Russia and China’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution, which has given Assad licence to carry on with his brutal campaign. But the Arab awakening has exposed a two-pronged problem with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy; bureaucracy causes delays as the death toll rises and many feel that with the Eurozone crisis casting a shadow over European affairs, the EU’s power and influence at an international level is waning. The question is whether the EU can assert itself on the global stage and form a common policy to respond appropriately to crises before it is too late.