The undoing of the pragmatic President?
Civitas, 17 June 2009
At tomorrow’s European Union summit, Heads of State and Government from the EU’s 27 member states are likely to back the incumbent EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso for another 5 year term, writes Luke Clark. Barroso will then need to be endorsed by the European Parliament (EP). This will be more problematic…
In March, the European People’s Party [EPP] – the largest group in the European Parliament (EP) after the 2009 Euro elections – endorsed Barroso for a second term. However, the recent elections left the EP more politically fragmented. The Greens’ “Stop Barroso” campaign has gathered momentum and Barroso’s opponents are starting to coalesce around former Luxembourg Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt as an alternative candidate.
Last week, Barroso received an underwhelming endorsement from France and Germany, having already received support from Britain and Spain. That the large EU member states are supporting Barroso is no surprise; as Commission President Barroso has been guided by pragmatism and he has not made bold statements nor taken bold initiatives to significantly push for further EU integration. As a former Prime Minister of Portugal, Barroso is well-schooled in the workings of the EU Council and the growing wariness of EU leaders, not to mention the European public, to transfer yet more powers to Brussels.
Barroso’s pragmatic qualities and his unwillingness to alter the balance of power have also been the source of some harsh criticism of Barroso’s Presidency. The Leader of the Socialist group in the EP, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, complained that Barroso “represents the lowest common denominator and reduces the EU to an intergovernmental association”. Barroso’s opponents also accuse him of a passivity that has left the Commission emasculated and unable to stand up to the Council or even the big states of the EU.
Mr. Barroso’s Presidential style may mark a new chapter for the Commission in which it accepts that the EU is suffering from ‘integration fatigue’ and that an ‘activist’ Commission risks alienating the EU elite further from the European public.
While similar criticisms of a lack of political leadership were levelled against the previous Commission President, Romano Prodi, a difference this time is that Barroso’s opponents argue that it is his personal ambition to gain a second term that has led Barroso to adopt a deferential approach towards European leaders. In other words, they charge that Barroso’s personal ambition has overridden his responsibility to represent the ‘European interest’.
Critics point to what they perceive to be the Commission’s limited response to the financial crisis as proof of the impotence to which Barroso has led the EU executive. For example, they claim that Barroso left France, Germany, Britain and Italy to define the EU strategy for economic recovery at the G20, at precisely the time when the Commission should have stepped forward with bold initiatives to stimulate the economy.
The Commission President’s role is a difficult balancing act; he or she must satisfy the many demands of the diverse interests groups and actors that make up the EU. The EP will want to see a President who asserts the Commission’s independence from the Council, the Council will want the Commission to remain pragmatic and to not be over-ambitious, large states will want a Commission President who is willing to work closely with them on issues of major importance and who will grant their Commissioner a high-value portfolio, while small states will not want a President who is too close to the big states to consider their concerns.
In the great balancing act of the European Commission Presidency, Barroso has been somewhere in the middle. Should Barroso fail to be re-appointed as President it will be a result of his failure to really satisfy anyone. However, given the failed attempts to ratify the European Constitution and the famed difficulties of the Lisbon Treaty, any alternative candidate to Barroso is unlikely to steer the Commission away from the ‘managerial’ role of Prodi and Barroso. At least one thing is clear; there will not be a return to the Jacques Delors model of the Commission as a ‘motor’ of EU integration.