Tension in Crimea: What will Putin do next?
Anna Sonny, 7 March 2014
Much of the comment on events in Ukraine has been discussed through a push and pull narrative between the East and West; on one side, the EU is pushing for a modern, westward-facing Ukraine, and on the other Russia is desperately trying to pull the ex-Soviet state back into its orbit, using political puppet strings such as bailout loans and gas threats. The beginning of the domino effect was Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU deal in favour of closer ties with Russia, which triggered anti-government protests – the East vs West battle was then confused by the apparent involvement of Ukrainian far-right groups in the protests – maybe this really was just about Ukraine? But the tension in Crimea, sparked by Yanukovych’s departure, and Putin’s decision to send Russian troops into the autonomous region, have placed the West’s response to Russian aggression at the heart of the debate again.
Yanukovych, despite being democratically elected, played with power and Ukrainian state money in such a way that his rule could only be described as oligarchic and autocratic; his removal from government by the protest movement shows that Ukraine is capable of fighting its own corner and installing democracy where corruption previously dictated. What has happened in Ukraine is a great example of how people mobilising against corruption can succeed and shows that the ex-Soviet state is not a puppet to be played with. But the tension in Crimea is now proving to be an example of what Putin does to recoup influence when he loses an ally to democracy.
Close attention should be paid to Putin’s designs on Crimea and his motives behind sending in troops. A look at Russia’s previous interventions shows that playing on ethnic tensions in ex-Soviet states is something Russia has done more than once before. In 1991, Moldova declared independence from the USSR – a year later a conflict between the Moldovan government and a secessionist movement escalated into war, in which Russia intervened, forming the internationally unrecognised republic of Transnistria. In 2008, ethnic tension in Georgia resulted in Russia assuming control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Although the Soviet Union transferred Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, it is home to an ethnic Russian majority who now wish to hold a referendum on uniting with Russia at the end of this month.
Putin claims that he wishes to protect Russians wherever they are, and he is worried that fascists are threatening the safety of Russian-speakers in Ukraine. The Budapest memorandum of 1994 which guarantees Ukraine’s borders is, of course, no longer valid according to the Russian President, because the government in Kiev has been overthrown.
It seems that if Putin, famous for his autocratic regime and suppression of dissent, loses influence over one region, Russia will flex its military muscle and seek to exert it elsewhere.
Arguably the most fissile situation involving Russia and the West since the Cuban Missile crisis and of crises involving Europe directly, perhaps the most important since the Berlin Airlift in 1949. I say since the Berlin airlift rather than Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968 because in 1949 there was a very real possibility of war for the atomic age had barely begun and the USA had neither the number of bombs nor the delivery systems to readily do Russia mortal damage. Nor is it probable that the USA would have used atomic weaponry simply to defend Europe.
There really should be no debate over the position of Crimea. It is not Ukrainian having been gifted to Ukraine by Khrushchev. If it wishes to secede from the Ukraine it should be allowed to do so without any Western huffing and puffing.
There is also the broad strategic mistake of continually trying to expand NATO and the EU towards Russia. Any state would get twitchy if powers at best neutral and at worst hostile to you acted in such a way. Russia has its natural interests and defence concerns and the West would do well to remember that.
I am a great believer in natural spheres of influence. Ukraine including the Crimea are indubitably part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Western interference can only be futile at best and dangerous at worst.
The most nauseating part of this affair is the absurd posturing of Britain, the EU, the UK and the USA.
I’m not sure I agree.
“No debate over the position of Crimea”
– Surely international law and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum are worthy of some respect? If Russia can ignore it, general respect for international law is eroded.
– It seems quite arbitrary to focus on Khrushchev’s gift of the Crimea as a reason for its being part of the Ukraine being invalid. We could argue equally that it should be a Tartar Khanate, or an Ottoman vassal (in which case it would presumably fall under Turkey’s sphere of influence)
– I agree that if Crimea strongly wishes to secede then it should be allowed to, but that is currently being forced through against the Ukrainian constitution and due process. If Russia had not invaded and instead implored Kiev to offer the autonomous region a referendum, that would be considerably fairer than rushing on a plebescite while the peninsula is under de facto occupation.
– I agree that Western leaders should bear Russian fears and concerns in mind when acting, but I think your ‘spheres of influence’ point is overstated: it would justify Germany or Brussels having hegemony over the UK, for example.