Stockholm riots and EU populism

Jonathan Lindsell, 24 May 2013

Riots have plagued Stockholm satellite-towns over the last five days. Youths set fire to over 30 cars plus state buildings including a nursery, Rågsved police station and a school.

Reports suggest the initial spark came when police shot a 69-year-old migrant, wielding a machete, in a possible siege situation. The anonymous man had emigrated from Portugal and lived in Husby district, where over 85% of the population are not of Swedish origin. Sweden has high immigration – up to 15% of its population could be described as migrants. Many settle in suburbs removed from city centres, and there have been reports of police discrimination (including needless stop-and-searches and slurs such as ‘monkey’ and pig’) since the similar 2010 Rinkenby riots.

However, just as the summer 2011 London riots started with a localised response to police shooting Mark Duggan but escalated into general unrest, so here it’s impossible to reduce the situation to one of ethnic tension. Over half of those arrested are white, and Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt’s centre-right Moderate Party government is coordinating with local mosques in their response. Indeed, parties from nearby mosques patrol the districts to quell violence. Stockholm police are restrained, largely protecting fire services.

This measured response suggests lessons were learned from the heavy-handed initial shooting, and from incendiary police standoffs in London in 2011. In comparison, the UK police’s response to the Woolwich murder of Drummer Lee Rigby, which posed a more immediate threat to the public, shows the importance of moderation to avoid provoking further conflict. Mirror footage shows the police apprehending Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale in a professional manner despite the men’s aggressive charge – the suspects are alive, in hospital and to face trial.

Security forces can only react to such spontaneous street threats – the wider causes must be examined. Since the 1980s consensus to embrace neoliberalism and reduce the role of the state, Sweden has seen the fastest-growing inequality in the OECD. Whilst its income and tax policies remain progressive, real wealth remains polarised thanks to historic inheritance and ‘cultural capital’, with migrant prospects limited by their education.

Such structural problems have contributed to the rise of Sverigedemokraterna, the ‘Sweden Democrats’, who first gained seats in the Riksdag (Parliament) in 2010. The party, led by Jimmie Akesson, pursues a strong anti-migrant policy. SD face historic neo-Nazi allegations and their growing popularity has polarised the country. SD oppose the European Monetary Union (Sweden retains the Krona), support renegotiation of the EU, and oppose Turkish EU-accession, fearing another influx if Turks gain free movement under the single market or Schengen Agreement.

The riots thus highlight the populist/right-wing European trend including Marine Le Pen’s Front National, Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom), Farage’s UKIP and Greece’s Golden Dawn. The issues on which they focus are not limited to Sweden, and could have serious implications for the EU’s future.