



The Strategic Dependence of UK Universities on China – and where should they turn next?

Robert Clark
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55 Tufton Street

London SW1P 3QL

Email: books@civitas.org.uk

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'United Front Work is an important magic weapon for the victory of the party's cause.'

Xi Jinping, October 2017

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Author

Robert Clark is the Director of the Defence and Security Unit (DSU) at Civitas. Robert coauthored the following Civitas papers: 'A Long March Through the Institutions: Understanding and responding to China's influence in international organisations'; 'Inadvertently Arming China? The Chinese military complex and its exploitation of scientific research at UK universities'; 'China's presence in NHS supply chains'; and 'The Next Front? Sino-Russian Expansionism in the Arctic and a UK response'.

Robert has also authored 'Inadvertently Arming China: One Year One'; 'In Defence of Global Britain'; and 'China's increasing influence in the Commonwealth of Nations'. Robert has also published for the NATO Defence College, as well as having peer-reviewed papers published in leading journals highlighting the Chinese genocide in Xinjiang, as well as the British military response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Robert has served in the British military for 16 years, and has an MA in International Conflict Studies from King's College London.

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Executive Summary

Between 2017 and 2022/23, UK higher education institutions received between at least £122-£156 million from Chinese sources. This figure is determined from the returned Freedom Of Information (FOI) requests this study received from 46 UK universities.

Some universities chose to refute the request, including prominent research-based universities King's College London, Imperial College London, and the University of Nottingham – the last two of which maintain extensive links with Chinese universities and have active research collaborations.

The figure is for all research collaborations funded by Chinese entities, one-off and or multiple donations, and other such funding related to an educational, scientific, research-based project or otherwise, such as charitable payment. This figure does not include international student fees from Chinese students studying at UK universities, which is worth approximately £2.2 billion per year.

The figure is bracketed due to some UK universities bracketing their data from Chinese entities. The low-end bracket of £122,355,749.26 is the minimum received by the 46 universities, whilst the top-end bracket of £156,019,834.21 is the maximum received. There are over 160 higher education institutions across the UK, in addition to many research-based companies which will also receive Chinese funding.

This figure includes between £19,917,835.87 and £30,504,835.82 of funding from Chinese sources which were subjected to US sanctions at the time of funding. These sanctions include the US Department of Commerce's Entity List for companies controlled by the Chinese military, and also Executive Order 13959, a ban on trade with Chinese companies controlled by, or are a part of the Chinese military. This figure represents between 16 per cent and 20 per cent of all Chinese funding to UK universities.

Furthermore, when combined with additional Chinese entities which aren't subjected to US sanctions, but which nevertheless maintain demonstrable links with the Chinese military, that figure rises to between £36,123,532.16 and £50,709,010.32 – or between 30 per cent and 33 per cent of all Chinese funding to UK universities.

Three UK universities received 100 per cent of their declared funding from Chinese sources, having come from Chinese defence entities; either military companies, PLA institutions, or entities heavily linked to China's Military-Civil Fusion strategy. A further five received 90 – 99 per cent of their funding from People's Liberation Army- (PLA) linked entities, with 10 altogether receiving 75 per cent or more.

This research has also uncovered that 40 per cent of all declared Chinese funding to Confucius Institutes hosted at UK universities derives from Chinese entities involved in Beijing's military industrial complex.

The most extreme cases of UK universities receiving funding from either entities of the Chinese military, or companies directly linked to the Chinese military include:

- £1,810,000.00 from China's primary nuclear warheads research facility;

- £468,200.00 from China's largest military aviation manufacturer;
- £10,000.00 from China's largest hypersonic missile technology testing institute;
- £132,317.00 from the PLA's largest supplier of precision guided missiles;
- Up to £4,900,000.00 from a military aerospace research institute; and
- Up to £5,026,561.00 from members of China's Seven Sons of National Defence – key drivers and architects of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) militarisation.

The largest single source for Chinese funding into UK universities is from Huawei Technologies and its subsidiaries, funding between £27,430,788.25 and £37,973,788.20, representing between 22 per cent and 24 per cent of all Chinese funding.

The UK government moved to ban Huawei from any continued role in the nation's 5G infrastructure in July 2020, for the company's links to the Chinese military and it not being in the national interest to allow it control of critical national infrastructure. UK universities accepted at least £13,903,764.63 from Huawei after the government announced the end of the company's involvement in UK networks due to security concerns.

In order to end the inherent national security consideration of continued financial collaborations with entities directly linked to the Chinese military, in addition to ending the financial overreliance on Chinese students, the government should studiously consider this report's recommendations.

First, the government must better align its sanctions policies and regimes with the those of the United States. The US maintains an exhaustive Entity List, detailing Chinese (amongst others) entities which are either controlled by or a part of the PLA, or those which maintain active and intrinsic links in support of the PLA's nefarious activities.

Second, in an effort to reduce the UK's dependency on Chinese students, this report is recommending the establishment of two new special international fees programmes. The first is for students from Hong Kong, to be incorporated within the government's existing British Nationals (Overseas) (Hong Kong) scheme, and in line with broader existing government policy.

The second new scheme is for students from the Commonwealth of Nations, many of whom are some of the UK's strongest allies and partners, and already add a rich contribution to UK higher education institutions. Such a scheme to better enable students from Commonwealth nations attend UK universities would also align with broader government thinking of strengthening relations with Commonwealth partners.

Third, the government must once and for all end the UK's relationship with the Confucius Institutes. A campaign promise from 2022 to do so, now is the time to end hosting this Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) propaganda institution. In doing so, the UK will become a beacon of academic freedom once again, for students which the CCP actively discriminate against and target, here in British campuses.

Fourth, as part of Beijing's 'United Front' strategy targeting overseas nationals and foreign elites, the government must end its relationships with the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC).

UK universities are losing millions of pounds every year subsidising lucrative international student fees in some of the most sought after institutions, to enable CCP-politically and ideologically trained students to study in the UK, only to return immediately after to China. The current arrangement with the CSC is the definition of a one-way relationship, and even worse, it is actively detrimental to national security. These must end, and allow universities to recoup millions of pounds lost every year to help the CCP, for very little benefit to the UK.

Note: *None of the academics, researchers, or other staff whose research at UK universities or centres is discussed in this report are accused of knowingly assisting the development of the Chinese military, of knowingly transferring information to that end, or of committing any breach of their university regulations. Nor are they accused of any other wrongdoing, or improperly accepting funds, or breach of national security, or any criminal offence.*

In some cases, research may be used solely for non-military ends; the purpose of the examples mentioned in this report is not necessarily to demonstrate that they risk being used for military purposes, but in some cases that the research may simply help improve the business or academic position of a People's Republic of China (PRC) military-linked conglomerate or institution; where research may be put to use by the military of the PRC or organisations which are linked to it, we assume that researchers in the UK will have carried out this research without intending this to happen.

None of the UK universities, institutes or funding bodies mentioned in this report are accused of knowingly contributing to the development of China's military or its military industries, as we believe that these universities have developed the sponsorship and research relationships we describe in good faith and in the belief that their scientific outputs will have purely civil ends.

The purpose of this report is simply to draw attention to the risk that specific Chinese funding may pose to the university system – and that UK research may be exploited by the Chinese military in a way the researchers could never have envisaged. It is our belief that shedding light on this risk is unquestionably a matter of pressing and vital public interest. We have initially published this in online form only to provide more opportunity for possible corrections.

Introduction

This project is concerned with examining two overarching, interlinked phenomena. The first is the ability for UK higher education institutions, universities and academics, to financially de-risk from the People's Republic of China (PRC), in order to end the reliance on Chinese funding both in terms of international student fees, and research grants and donations made from Chinese entities which will often have a capacity to significantly harm and compromise national security.

The second phenomenon this research is concerned with is highlighting how this reliance on the PRC negatively affects many aspects on British campuses, including academic freedoms, safeguards for students, very high risk research collaborations with Chinese entities linked to the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and intellectual property theft.

Whilst the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attempts to extend its overseas intelligence gathering and foreign policy agenda on to British campuses, harming academic freedoms and endangering student safeguards, it's the CCP's 'Military-Civil Fusion' (MCF) strategy which further endangers national security, as the CCP attempts to rapidly expand its military modernisation programs, and attempt regional military hegemony across the Indo-Pacific – a critical region for UK foreign policy and national security.

De-risking UK universities from Chinese reliance

Symptomatic of the so-called 'Golden Era' of relations between the UK and China, numbers of Chinese students at UK higher education institutions quadrupled between 2006 and 2019, and since 2012/13 the number of entrants from the PRC each year has exceeded the number from all EU countries combined.¹ By 2020, China was the number one origin for international students studying in the UK, with 119,275 recorded by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) and the Office for Students (OfS), representing 23.6 per cent of all overseas students in Britain.²

The exposure of the UK higher education system to being so heavily reliant on Chinese money comes at a sensitive time for the sector, as a recent report by the King's College London's Policy Institute, led by the former universities minister Lord Jo Johnson, called on the government to provide clearer guidance to universities on how to manage their research engagement with China 'in a period of increasing geopolitical instability'.³

In particular, the report stated that the government must urgently help universities with a framework for, amongst other issues, managing the downsides of student mobility and collaborations, including the risks to national security from bad-faith actors, and the dangers of over-reliance on a single country.

This report came only months after the OfS warned that an over-reliance on tuition fees from overseas students – especially those from a single country such as China – was a financial risk

¹ [Where do HE students come from? | HESA](#)

² Office for Students. 2023. P.20.

³ Adams et al. 2021.

for English universities.⁴ The OfS subsequently wrote to 23 institutions with high levels of student recruitment from China, in order to determine whether or not they had contingency plans to protect them from any decline in income from overseas students, with an emphasis on a possible deterioration in relations between the UK and China in the future.

Both the Johnson report and the OfS were accurate to describe the situation as one of (over)reliance on a single country regarding international students – and China in particular. Of the 601,000 international students in the UK in 2021-22, data from the HESA showed that there were 124,385 Chinese students at English institutions alone,⁵ representing approximately 22 per cent of all international students, and 151,690 across the UK.⁶

Next highest in the international student list were students from India and Nigeria, making up approximately 19 per cent and six per cent, respectively. Both countries are strong Commonwealth partners, with a combined reliance slightly heavier than China's, posing very little in the way of similar geopolitical threats and thus, a far lower risk to UK higher education institutions.

After Pakistan and the United States, the next largest demographic for foreign students in the UK is Hong Kong, with around 15,000 students, representing approximately three per cent of all international students.⁷ As a treaty signatory to the security and integrity of Hong Kong's political sovereignty under the 'one country, two systems' separation of both political and economic control from the PRC, the UK maintains a duty-bound inherent moral and arguably legal responsibility to ensure the political and economic freedoms of Hong Kong.

This ought to be particularly salient to the 15,000 Hong Kongers currently studying in UK universities. If the UK government cannot safeguard their political freedoms whilst on UK soil, then the CCP can, in effect, take comfort in their assertion that the Sino-British Joint Declaration no longer holds any legal merit – a position which the UK cannot afford to take, and nor one should it aspire to.

Whilst the international fees paid by Chinese students will be worth millions to the UK economy, there remains a significant inherent risk to both higher education providers, but also to the economies of towns and cities which host large Chinese student populations: London (15,945 Chinese students just at the three largest London institutions),⁸ Manchester (8,645 Chinese students), and Edinburgh (6,375 Chinese students), have notably large populations of Chinese students.⁹

Whilst these cities are some of the largest in the UK, other towns and cities with a proportionally far higher Chinese student population (as a proportion of the city's population itself) warrant further study. In particular, the small town of Warwick with 5,485 Chinese

⁴ Office for Students. 2023.

⁵ [Higher Education Student Data 2021/22 | HESA](#)

⁶ [Chinese International Student Guide to Studying in the UK | SI-UK \(studyin-uk.com\)](#)

⁷ Office for Students. 2023. p.20.

⁸ University College London - 9,840; Imperial College London - 6,105; and London School of Economics – 2,242. See [Chinese International Student Guide to Studying in the UK | SI-UK \(studyin-uk.com\)](#) also [China \(lse.ac.uk\)](#)

⁹ A Step-by-step Chinese Student Guide to UK Universities (universityliving.com)

students in a town of only 37,267,¹⁰ and Nottingham, with a Chinese student population of 2,723.¹¹ The adverse financial affects to these towns and cities hosting large populations of Chinese students is significant enough to warrant further examination and study, in line with the OfS' concerns on geopolitical risks threatening the financial sustainability of hosting students from one dominant country.

China's Military-Civil Fusion strategy

Linking the UK's overreliance to China in the education sector to a cause for national security concern is the CCP's 'Military-Civil Fusion' (MCF) strategy, which has become a central focus of Xi Jinping's regime. It is an aggressive national strategy which ultimately seeks to establish China as the most technologically advanced military in the world. This is part of Xi's desire for Chinese 'national reunification' of Taiwan, the reassertion of China on the global stage, and to atone for China's 'century of humiliation' immediately prior to the 1949 revolution. At the heart of all three of these strategic goals lies the PLA as the most technologically advanced military in the world, a core CCP strategy to be achieved by 2049 – the centenary of the 1949 revolution. Xi personally oversees the MCF strategy's implementation, chairing the CCP's Central Military Commission and the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development.

A central focus of implementing MCF is the eradication of barriers between China's civilian research and commercial sectors, and its defence industrial base, including military research and development, fusing both sectors together in order to advance the PLA's militarisation. In order to achieve this military dominance the CCP implements a strategy of intellectual property theft through careful and considered research and development collaborations spanning the globe, in order to acquire and divert the world's cutting-edge technologies.

The CCP covet, above all technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), which they believe will drive the next revolution in military affairs, and that the first country to apply AI to next generation warfare will achieve military dominance.¹² Other key technologies being targeted by Beijing include quantum computing, big data, semiconductors, 5G, advanced nuclear technology, and advanced aerospace technology. Often the CCP seeks to especially exploit 'dual-use' technologies, which have both military and civilian applications.¹³

In order to achieve these goals, the CCP actively target overseas interests. These include by legal means, including private and public investment in targeted industries, and talent recruitment programs. Other means are legal but have potentially malign intent, including academic and research collaborations for military gain. Finally, there are illegal means, including forced technology transfer, intelligence gathering, and outright theft.

Overseeing these operations is a part of the broader 'National Front' work programme, directed by the United Front Workers Department (UFWD). As an organ of the Central

¹⁰ West Midlands (United Kingdom): Settlements in Counties and Unitary Districts - Population Statistics, Charts and Map (citypopulation.de)

¹¹ Population as at 2018/19 top25countriesInt.xlsx (nottingham.ac.uk)

¹² Allen. 2019.

¹³ Clark and Tylecote. 2021.

Committee designed for intelligence-gathering, the UFWD remain incredibly active across academia, especially targeting British universities for their rich history as a global science and technology hub.

The US State Department assess that the CCP exploits the open and transparent nature of international research enterprises in order to bolster its own military capabilities, particularly through Chinese bodies like the CSC, which the US State Department acknowledge requires scholarship recipients to report on their overseas research to PRC diplomats.¹⁴

As previous research conducted at Civitas has demonstrated, joint research institutions at UK universities, collaborations with academia, and private firms are frequently being inadvertently adopted to build the PLA's future military systems.¹⁵ This will occur without their knowledge or consent, whilst the UK collaborator often insists that all due processes are followed, and thorough checks and balances are conducted, whenever financial transactions or research collaborations are established.

The research conducted in this report – in particular Chapter One, which presents the findings from this project's freedom of information (FOI) enquires with universities and their Chinese funding – indicates that this cannot always be the case. How else can it be explained that two universities received 100 per cent of their Chinese funding from entities linked to the PLA, whilst a further four received over 90 per cent? This includes one university receiving £468,200.00 from China's largest military aviation manufacturer, and another receiving £10,000.00 from China's largest hypersonic missile technology testing institute, to name just two remarkable cases.

The purpose of this research is not to publicly name and shame any particular university, academic, or other, but rather, in building upon previous work conducted at Civitas, demonstrate, through evidenced-based research, that such financial and research collaborations with the PRC carry far higher inherent risks than UK universities currently comprehend. Accordingly, the final chapter suggests robust policy recommendations in order to comprehensively grapple with the CCP's malign influence across British campuses, safeguard in particular Hong Kongers studying in the UK against the CCP's United Front work, and ultimately improving both UK universities' ability to financially de-risk from the PRC whilst also improving national security.

¹⁴ [The Chinese Communist Party's Military-Civil Fusion Policy - United States Department of State](#)

¹⁵ Clark. 2022.

Methodology

Our research built upon FOI requests sent out to 88 universities across the UK: 68 from England, 12 from Scotland, six from Wales, and two from Northern Ireland. These were initially sent throughout the first half of 2023, and asked for information regarding the names, dates, and reasons behind all funding to the universities from entities based in the PRC.

All FOIs relied upon for this study have, in the interests of critical scholarship and further research, been published in full by UK-China Transparency (UKCT), a British charity. They can be accessed at UKCT's online library.

Ten universities refused to provide funding information to us from Chinese entities, citing various sections of the Freedom of Information Act (2000). This was primarily that responding to our requests would take longer than the 18 hour 'Appropriate Limit', as defined in the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004 (Section 12 (1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000), in addition to citing potential harm to corporate interests. These universities were: University of East London; De Montfort; University of Leicester; Liverpool John Moores University; London School of Economics; University of Manchester; University of Nottingham; University of Plymouth; University of Wolverhampton; and University of York. These universities do not feature hereafter in this research.

Of the 88 universities which were approached as part of this project, 27 declared that they had received zero funding, research grants, or donations from Chinese entities, between 2017 and 2022-2023. These universities do not feature hereafter in this research.

The remaining seven universities' FOI replies were subsequently discarded from the results for unusable data. This included from Chinese entities where the value of donation or funding fell below the amount deemed to be in the public interest (below £10,000.00), unless the entity was a Chinese defence company, had links to the PLA, or was subject to US sanctions regimes. These universities do not feature hereafter in this research.

Chapter Two details these findings from the FOI inquiries. It briefly lays out each UK university, with a short description of where Chinese funding originated from. It further breaks down this funding by Chinese entities sanctioned by the US at time of funding, those companies with links to the PLA, those taking part in the CCP's military-civil fusion strategy, and/or who are defence companies or defence universities. These FOIs are footnoted accordingly for each university, with the full FOI replies available online.

To determine whether a UK university is undertaking risky research with a Chinese entity or not, this paper utilises the risk rating devised by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), whose analysis of cooperation between the Chinese military nexus and western universities first drew attention to some of the university centres discussed in the author's previous research.

The database which ASPI designed in 2019 determined the risk that relationships with defence related entities in China could be leveraged for military or security purposes, including in ways that contribute to human rights abuses. The ASPI database provides

overviews of Chinese entities defence and security links, records any known involvement in espionage or cyberattacks, inclusion on end-user lists that restrict exports, and several measures of their involvement in defence research. This research, in line with previous reports, uses the ASPI risk-rating scale when determining the risk to UK universities dealing with Chinese institutions and entities. Graded from low, medium, high, and very high risk, this research is primarily concerned with those rated as high and very high risk. These entities all have very strong links and associations with the PLA, have large defence research budgets, and are often involved in joint research collaborations for the Chinese military industrial complex, including actively pioneering civil-military fusion for the benefit of the PLA. This work therefore also discusses funding for UK universities or research collaborations which fall under the categories of Chinese entities that are members of the Seven Sons of National Defence, all rated 'Very High Risk' by ASPI.

Additionally, this project sought to understand more about the funding sources for those universities operating Confucius Institutes (CI). Accordingly, this project sent further FOI requests to all UK universities hosting CIs, asking them to provide information regarding which Chinese entities fund them, and how much for. Many had not yet returned these FOI replies before this report went to publication in November 2023, despite being sent in August and September. Any additional replies returned after publication will be added to the online version of this report. Chinese funding of the CIs is listed in 'Chapter Three: Chinese threats on British campus – The United Front'.

Throughout this research, the term 'PLA-linked entity' appears frequently to describe Chinese entities funding UK universities who have either: demonstrable and active links to the Chinese military; been subjected to US sanctions regimes for being linked or controlled by the Chinese military; are Chinese defence universities engaging in defence research for the Chinese military; Chinese companies involved in the defence manufacturing and or defence research base for the Chinese military; or who are otherwise engaged in the CCP's military-civil fusion strategy.

Chapter One: Chinese funding in UK Universities

The total amount of funding received by British universities which returned the FOIs back with usable data stood between **£122,355,749.26** and **£156,019,834.21** between 2017 and summer 2023 (not including the 2023-2024 academic year).

The bracketed amounts allow for both the lowest sum given by the universities in their returned FOIs declaring Chinese funding, and the highest sum given. Often, particularly the larger universities including the University of Cambridge, University of Oxford, and the University of Edinburgh, chose to bracket their amounts of Chinese funding, sometimes by as much as £1,000,000.00 – £4,999,999.00 for some entities. This data is measured as a low-end bracket sum, and a high-end bracket sum, based upon the brackets some universities chose to provide in their FOI returns.

Huawei Technologies and its subsidiaries, including HiSilicon, were by far the largest single entity for Chinese funding in UK universities during this period, with funding between £27,430,788.25 and £37,973,788.20. This represents between 22 per cent (Figure 1.1) and 24 per cent (Figure 1.2) of all declared Chinese funding.

These figures are from the 46 UK universities which replied to this project's FOIs, and chose not to redact their figures nor refuse to supply the information, or who simply ignored the FOIs. The overwhelming majority of responses were helpful.

Additionally, any data which is still yet to return from any of the universities shall be incorporated to the online version of this report, with any relevant figures amended.

The rest of this chapter lays out the universities which replied to the FOIs and who had actionable data, which was subsequently processed to determine the levels of funding from Chinese entities.

Below are a series of graphs which help illustrate the nature of this funding from China. Funding from entities sanctioned by the US at time of funding, those with links to the PLA, those complicitous with the CCP's military-civil fusion strategy, and those who are either defence companies or defence universities, are all recorded below, to show the extent to which Chinese funding into UK universities actually has a demonstrably negative impact to the UK's national security.

As can be evidenced from the below data, the university's funding from PLA-linked entities¹⁶ makes up a significant element of all Chinese funding, per university. There are 10 universities which received 75 per cent or more of their funding from Chinese entities, coming from PLA-linked entities. This is displayed in Table 1.1, below.

¹⁶ Defined throughout this research as Chinese entities sanctioned by the US federal government; companies with links to the PLA; or are complicit in China's military-civil fusion.


Table 1.1 Top universities with PLA-linked funders

University	%age all Chinese funding from PLA-linked entities
Cranfield University	100
University of Westminster	100
University of Huddersfield	100
University of Edinburgh	96
Aston University	96
University of Southampton	91
University of Exeter	90
University of Sheffield	91
Royal Holloway	87
University of Kent	75

Source: Civitas FOI request.


Of all Chinese entities funding UK universities, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd, and any Huawei subsidiaries, account for the single largest. Due to some of the universities choosing to bracket their funding, the low-end bracket for all Huawei funds accounts for 22 per cent of all Chinese funding, whilst the high-end bracket for all Huawei funding accounts for 24 per cent. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 display this below.

Figure 1.1 Huawei low-end bracket



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Figure 1.2 Huawei high-end bracket



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Huawei is one of China's largest telecommunications multinationals, operating globally and with extensive ties to the leadership in Beijing and to the PLA. In 2019, the Trump administration placed export controls on Huawei, deeming the company to pose a threat to national security. This was followed in 2020 with Executive Order 13959, which declared Huawei a Chinese military-controlled company, and prohibiting all US trade.

In July 2020, the UK government announced that all existing Huawei infrastructure would be removed from the UK's telecommunications systems by 2027, and a ban from all new infrastructure by the end of 2020, based on national security concerns.¹⁷

The charts below detail the proportion of Chinese funding which was from entities sanctioned by the US at time of funding and the highest funded universities this applies to, university funding received from Chinese entities who have active collaborations with the Chinese

¹⁷ Huawei to be removed from UK 5G networks by 2027 - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)


military, and finally, university funding received from Chinese entities with active collaborations with the Chinese military, and who were under US sanctions at the time of funding. The data for Figures 1.3 and 1.4 can be viewed in the Appendices.

Chinese entities under US sanctions

Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show both the low-end and high-end brackets for all Chinese funding which has come from entities subjected to US sanctioned at the time of funding.


Chinese entities under US sanctions donated, gifted, or otherwise funded between £19,917,835.87 and £30,504,835.82 to UK universities between 2017 and 2022/23.

Figure 1.3



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Figure 1.4



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Chinese entities under US sanctions, in addition to those with PLA links

Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show the proportion of all Chinese funding made from both entities subjected to US sanctions for being part of China's defence military complex, in addition to those not subjected to sanctions but still have demonstrable links to the PLA, and are complicit in MCF (as evidenced throughout the rest of this chapter).

Figure 1.5





Figure 1.6



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Even taken at the low-end brackets, 16 per cent of all Chinese funding to UK universities has come from entities subjected to US sanctions for being controlled by or linked to the PLA, whilst US-sanctioned firms combined with those with links to the PLA but not subjected to US sanctions accounts for 30 per cent of all Chinese funding – or £36,123,532.16 – rising to almost one third (33 per cent) at the high-end bracket, or £50,709,010.32.

NB: In the following, when we discuss some of the possible dual uses of technology types, we do not imply that any UK-based researcher working in a technological field is knowingly contributing to the potential military uses we outline here. We believe that all research carried out in the UK and/or by UK-based researchers is intended by parties within the UK for civil use only. The purpose is simply to discuss the potential risks that their research may be exploited for these types of ends. The aim is also not to show that any piece of research by a UK-based researcher is being put towards China's military development, but that some research may exist in a general area of potential dual use, and the way that universities are asked to assess the related risks may therefore need to change. None of the fields or projects discussed in this paper need directly contribute to a military programme, but they may improve the state of knowledge in general in a particular field in the PRC that may later help generate dual use outputs, or the business position of military-linked companies, or the capacities of military-linked universities.

University of Aberdeen

Since 2017, the University of Aberdeen has received £496,577,00 from state-owned Chinese oil and gas companies. These include from conglomerates directly controlled by the Chinese military, ones sanctioned by the US Department of Defence and US Treasury Department for Military-Civil Fusion, links to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the military junta in Myanmar, and actively pursuing the CCP's military and territorial expansion across the South China Sea, declared as unlawful under a landmark United Nations ruling at The Hague dating back to 2016.

China National Petroleum Company

2017 – £35,000.00

2020 – £105,000.00 [Triassic JIIP Phase 3]

China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) is a classic example of the common misperception of the true nature of private ownership within the PRC. CNPC's predecessor was the Chinese Ministry of Petroleum. In 1988, the State Council disbanded the Ministry, replacing it with CNPC, thus turning an executive branch of the government into a state-owned enterprise.

CNPC has been monitored by the US Treasury Department since early 2019, based on suspicions of sanctions evasion through the shipment of Iranian crude oil by a subsidiary, the Bank of Kunlun, which was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in 2012 for dealing with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force¹⁸—activity that the bank has formally denied.¹⁹

PetroChina

2019 – £64,809.00 [Pore-scale investigation]

Pore-scale heat storage, and technologies for thermal energy storage (TES), are of great practical importance due to their potential to store intermittent energy sources, such as solar and wind energy. TES has been extensively developed in recent years, especially the latent heat thermal energy storage (LHTES). There have been a wide range of additional applications for LHTES, including potentially for infrared stealth technology for advanced military applications.²⁰ Infrared stealth focuses on using various techniques to disguise military vehicles, including main battle tanks and other armoured vehicles, to confuse and deceive the enemy, who don't think that they are looking at a threat.²¹

PetroChina Company Limited is a Chinese oil and gas company, and Asia's largest producer, controlled by state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). In 2020, PetroChina recorded revenues of just under US\$300 billion.

Since 2011, PetroChina has been accused of human rights abuses in Myanmar, where the company has constructed pipelines reportedly largely built with slave labour practices.²² In addition PetroChina have been widely suspected of supplying oil and gas to Myanmar's military junta since 2021.²³ Whilst the US and the UK have applied sanctions to Myanmar, there are no international measures to prohibit sales of oil and gas, despite the widespread human rights abuses the military regime are alleged to have committed against their own people.

¹⁸ Exclusive: Iran uses China bank to transfer funds to Quds-linked companies – report | Reuters

¹⁹ US sanctions several Chinese shipping and energy firms (eiu.com)

²⁰ Pore-scale investigation on the heat-storage characteristics of phase change material in graded copper foam - ScienceDirect

²¹ Helping QinetiQ develop next-gen military camouflage and stealth technology | Teledyne FLIR

²² Chinese pipelines in Myanmar cause rights abuses, graft -report | Reuters

²³ EXCLUSIVE PetroChina ships jet fuel to junta-ruled Myanmar, data shows | Reuters

By 2019, many of the US' largest oil producing states – including Alaska and Texas – banned investment and trade with PetroChina, placing it on the 'Companies Doing Business with the Iranian Petroleum/Natural Gas, Nuclear and Military Sectors, rendering it ineligible for investment and/or state contracting' list.²⁴

China National Offshore Oil Corporation

2020 – £135,000.00

China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is a state-owned oil and gas exploration conglomerate, listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, with extensive drilling, exploration, and extraction rights across the UK's offshore North Sea oil fields. This includes a 43.21 per cent interest in the Buzzard oilfield, one of the largest oilfields in the North Sea, and a 36.5 per cent interest in the Golden Eagle oilfield. CNOOC also holds 41.9 per cent, 80.4 per cent, and 79.3 per cent interests in Scott, Telford, and Rochelle oilfields of STaR production blocks, respectively. The Chinese state-owned company also holds a 50 per cent drilling operation interest in the P2215 exploration block.²⁵

Placed under US sanctions on 3 December 2020, the US Department of Defense designated CNOOC as 'owned or controlled by the Chinese military', listing it under Executive Order 13959; 'Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies'.

Furthermore, in January 2021, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in the US Department of Commerce added CNOOC to the Entity List, stating that the company threatens US national security, and that CNOOC helps China intimidate neighbours in the South China Sea. Highlighting this point, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross declared that:

*'China's reckless and belligerent actions in the South China Sea and its aggressive push to acquire sensitive intellectual property and technology for its militarization efforts are a threat to U.S. national security and the security of the international community. CNOOC acts as a bully for the People's Liberation Army to intimidate China's neighbors, and the Chinese military continues to benefit from government civil-military fusion policies for malign purposes.'*²⁶

The BIS report goes on to detail how CNOOC has 'repeatedly harassed and threatened offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction in the South China Sea, with the goal of driving up the political risk for interested foreign partners'.²⁷

The destabilising action caused by CNOOC across the Indo-Pacific can be witnessed since at least 2015, when Beijing moved the CNOOC-operated Haiyang Shiyou 981 drilling rig 80 miles into Vietnam's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), accompanied by over 100 vessels and military aircraft. In May 2012, CNOOC Chairman, Wang Yilin, described Haiyang Shiyou 981, China's

²⁴ PetroChina | UANI (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)

²⁵ [2304111316397083.pdf](https://www.cnooltd.com/2304111316397083.pdf) (cnooltd.com)

²⁶ Commerce Adds China National Offshore Oil Corporation to the Entity List and Skyrizon to the Military End-User List | U.S. Department of Commerce

²⁷ *Ibid.*

first domestically produced deep-water drill rig, as ‘mobile sovereign territory’, and as a ‘strategic weapon’.²⁸ Risk advisory firm Janes IntelTrak subsequently assessed in 2016 that the PLA had installed military radars and tracking equipment on Chinese offshore oil rigs close to the Japanese EEZ in the East China Sea, oil rigs most likely owned and operated by CNOOC.²⁹

In addition to being under US sanctions for ownership or control by the Chinese military, CNOOC has been implicated in the heroin trade, involving business ventures with Burmese entities (themselves subjected to US Treasury sanctions) categorised as heroin smugglers dating back to 2004.³⁰

The University of Aberdeen still lists CNOOC as a research funder under a senior lecturer’s online university bio,³¹ in addition to the Geology department still listing an active research and funding partnership with CNOOC, under the Triassic Research Group.³²

China Oilfield Services

2020 – £156,768.00 [Integrate Digital Rock Physics]

China Oilfield Services (COSL) is a majority-owned subsidiary of state-owned, PLA-controlled and US-sanctioned CNOOC. Since at least 2013, multiple US state bodies, including in Texas, California and Florida, have prohibited COSL and blacklisted investment due to their dealings with the Iranian regime.³³

The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, a US and UK-based human rights advocacy firm, alleges that COSL:

‘...supplied a semi-submersible rig to Myanmar, the Shen Lan Tan Suo, reported to have been contracted to drill at the Zawtika project for 15 months from October 2022.’

The report published in March 2023 further alleges that, ‘As of January 20, 2023, the Shen Lan Tan Suo was at the Yetagun gas field’, and that

“...oilfield services companies have made themselves complicit with the junta as it commits war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people of Myanmar.”³⁴

The main export pipelines for the Yetagun offshore gas fields run through an area associated with the Mon and Karen ethnic minorities. Various UK Parliamentary committees, including the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, have since at least 2012 been calling

²⁸ China Placed Military Radar on Offshore Drilling Platform - Janes IntelTrak (rwradvisory.com)

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Treasury Sanctions On Myanmar Traffickers Implicate CNOOC (forbes.com)

³¹ Dr Yukie Tanino | School of Engineering | The University of Aberdeen (abdn.ac.uk)

³² Triassic Research Group | School of Geosciences | The University of Aberdeen (abdn.ac.uk)

³³ China Oilfield Services (COSL) | UANI (unitedagainstinucleariran.com)

³⁴ China Oilfield Services Limited did not respond - Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (business-humanrights.org)

for the ongoing conflict against the Karen people to be categorised as genocide, as defined under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.³⁵

Links with Chinese defence universities

The University of Aberdeen's School of Geosciences maintains an undergraduate student exchange program with Zhejiang University,³⁶ designated as 'High Risk' by ASPI for its high number of defence laboratories, relationships with the Chinese defence industry, and for the institutions links to economic and cyber espionage.³⁷

University of Arts London

University of the Arts London received £5,309,690.00 between 2018 and 2021 from four separate Chinese entities.

China Xintiandi

2018 – £58,050.00

2021 – £68,760.00

Total: £126,810.00

JNBY Group

2018 – £58,050.00

2021 – £68,760.00

Total: £126,810.00

Trendy International Group

2018 – £5,000,000.00

Vi-Ein International Investment

2018 – £27,780.00

2019 – £28,290.00

Total: £56,070.00

Aston University

Aston University received £1,455,377.39 worth of funding between 2016 and 2021 from seven separate Chinese entities. This includes one company under US sanctions at the time

³⁵ House of Commons - Foreign Affairs - Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence (parliament.uk)

³⁶ Partnerships | China | In My Country | Study Here | The University of Aberdeen (abdn.ac.uk)


³⁷ Zhejiang University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

of funding, and three further companies with extensive links to the Chinese military, and who actively participate in the CCP's military-civil fusion strategy.

Aston University did not specify the amount each company or entity had given in research funding, rather supplied the figure for funding per academic year as a whole. Despite this, in all but one instance, each of the university's Chinese-based funders are either under US sanctions, maintain explicit links with the PLA, or engage in military-civil fusion doctrine. This includes funding from 2016-2017, with a US-sanctioned entity complicit in Uyghur labour transfers, in addition to a defence university active in China's nuclear weapons program. Aston received £1,402,934.64 of funding from PLA-linked companies, sanctioned firms, and military-civil fusion entities – 96 per cent of all declared Chinese funding.

An Aston University spokesperson said: *'The contracts highlighted in this report all ended between two and seven years ago. Furthermore, this funding represented a very small proportion - less than two per cent - of our total research income over the five year period covered by the report.'*

Figure 1.1.1 Aston University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

2016-2017 – £400,022.40

Xinjiang Goldwind Science and Technology Ltd.

Xinjiang Goldwind Science and Technology Ltd. is one of the world's largest wind turbine manufacturers, and China's largest. Referred to as the 'Huawei of green energy',³⁸ one of Goldwind's major shareholders is the China Three Gorges Corporation – listed under the US Department of State's 'Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under Executive Order 13959',³⁹ prohibiting US investment.⁴⁰ In 2022, it was implicated in a joint research report

³⁸ Clowes. 2020.

³⁹ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

⁴⁰ Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Certain Companies of the People's Republic of China | The White House

between UK advocacy group Hong Kong Watch and Sheffield Hallam University of conducting human rights abuses in Xinjiang autonomous province, China.⁴¹ The report asserted that Goldwind had ‘obtained Uyghur labourers through state-sponsored labour transfers – a type of forced labour.’⁴²

Institute of Molecular Medicine, Peking University

The Institute of Molecular Medicine (IMM) is located within Peking University’s College of Future Technology.⁴³ In addition to the IMM, Peking’s College of Future Technology encompasses the following research centres; Department of Big Data and Biomedical AI, Department of Biomedical Engineering, and the National Biomedical Imaging Center.⁴⁴ Big data, biomedical AI, and biomedical engineering are all areas which the Chinese military are actively pursuing.

Peking University is rated as ‘High Risk’ by ASPI, for its involvement in defence research and links to China’s nuclear weapons program,⁴⁵ and since 2013 has shared a strategic cooperation framework agreement with the PLA Navy, regarding sharing civil-military integration.⁴⁶

In 2022, a Chinese researcher at Aston Medical School was involved in a biomedical research project with Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences and the IMM at Peking University.⁴⁷ The project was part-funded by a National Natural Science Fund, from the National Natural Science Foundation of China,⁴⁸ which funds research conducted by the Central Military Commission, innovative research in Chinese defence and military and civilian integration, and funds special drugs research for military applications.⁴⁹ The National Natural Science Fund is overseen and controlled by the new Ministry of Science and Technology – the powerful Chinese ministry which oversees all civil-military integration,⁵⁰ and is a lynchpin of Xi Jinping’s strategy to dominate global technology advancements.

Novolife Biomedical Research Institute Beijing Co. Ltd.

Novolife Biomedical Research Institute is a high-tech enterprise based in Beijing, specialising in the clinical application of immune and stem cells. The institute includes a research centre,

⁴¹ (Updated) New Hong Kong Watch report finds that MSCI investors are at risk of passively funding crimes against humanity in Xinjiang — Hong Kong Watch

⁴² Citywire Selector | Multiple Article 9 funds exposed to firm allegedly using forced Uyghur labour

⁴³ 北京大学未来技术学院 (pku.edu.cn)

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Peking University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

⁴⁶ The Navy and Peking University signed a cooperation agreement on military-civilian integration innovation and development|China Military Network Navy Channel (archive.ph)

⁴⁷ The establishment of polypeptide PSMA-targeted chimeric antigen receptor-engineered natural killer cells for castration-resistant prostate cancer and the induction of ferroptosis-related cell death - Wu - 2022 - Cancer Communications - Wiley Online Library

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁴⁹ NationalNaturalScienceFundGuidetoPrograms2020.pdf (nsfc.gov.cn)

⁵⁰ Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China (most.gov.cn)

a genetic testing laboratory, a cell bank, and a rehabilitation centre. It was established in 2016 and set up a professor at the Institute of Regenerative Medicine at Aston University.⁵¹

2017/18 – £52,442.75

Guangdong Wanyin Technology Development Co. Ltd.

Wanyin is a high-tech research and development company specialising in energy conservation and low-carbon advanced technologies, and has a research and funding partnership with South China University of Technology (SCUT).⁵² SCUT holds secret-level security credentials, allowing it to participate in research and production for classified weapons and defence technology projects.⁵³ Furthermore, since 2008 SCUT has hosted a defence research laboratory on materials science, and in 2017, the university joined the Guangzhou Civil-Military Integration Industry Coalition.⁵⁴

One of the core areas for current research and development at Wanyin is composite desulfurization technology,⁵⁵ which has extensive military applications currently being researched by the US military.⁵⁶

Hisilicon Optoelectronics Co. Limited.

A telecommunications and semiconductor subsidiary of Huawei – itself subject to US trade restrictions for heavy involvement with China’s defence industry – Hisilicon was placed under the US Bureau of Industry and Security’s Export Administration Regulations in 2019, limiting US investment and trade, and tightening export controls.⁵⁷

2018/19 – £200,287.64

Xinjiang Goldwind Science and Technology Ltd.

Hisilicon Optoelectronics Co. Limited.

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2019/20 – £50,000.00

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2020/21 – £752,624.60

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

⁵¹ Novolife biomedical project settles in Tai'an - Taian (chinadaily.com.cn)

⁵² Company profile_Guangdong Wanyin Technology Development Co., Ltd. (wanykj.cn)

⁵³ The second working meeting of the confidentiality committee of South China University of Technology was held in 2009 (archive.org)

⁵⁴ Chenchuang Technology became a member unit of Guangzhou Civil-Military Integration Industry Alliance - Guangzhou Chenchuang Technology Development Co., Ltd (archive.org)

⁵⁵ Core technology_Guangdong Wanyin Technology Development Co., Ltd. (wanykj.cn)

⁵⁶ Desulfurization of JP-8 jet fuel: challenges and adsorptive materials - PMC (nih.gov)

⁵⁷ Federal Register :: Authorization of Certain “Items” to Entities on the Entity List in the Context of Specific Standards Activities

Hisilicon Optoelectronics Co. Limited.

Chongqing University of Technology


Chongqing University of Technology (CQUT) maintains strong historical links to the Chinese weapons industry, and is a member of the B8 Cooperation Innovation Alliance, a group of eight Chinese research institutions that specialises in armament science—the ‘B’ in ‘B8’ stands for the Chinese word for armaments, bingqi (兵器).⁵⁸

CQUT maintains extensive links to both Norinco Group and China South Industries Group, China’s two largest weapons manufacturers, whilst in 2017 and 2018 the university signed partnerships with four local defence companies to collaborate on research and training, including with Tellhow Military Industry Group⁵⁹ which supplies the PLA with weapons, ammunition, and advanced electronics.⁶⁰

University of Bath

The University of Bath received £198,135.00 between 2017 and 2020 from two separate Chinese entities, including £110,000.00 from an engineering company involved in military-civil fusion.

Figure 1.1.2 University of Bath



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Shenzhen YH Global Supply Chain Co. Ltd.

2017-2019 – £88,135.00 – Research.

Shanghai Electric Group Ltd.

⁵⁸ "B8 Collaborative Innovation Alliance" was established, and BIT was elected as the first rotating chairman unit_Beijing Institute of Technology News Network (archive.org)

⁵⁹ Tellhow Military Industry Group signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Chongqing University of Technology_National Nanchang Xiaolan Economic and Technological Development Zone (archive.ph)

⁶⁰ 泰豪科技 (tellhow.com)

2017-2020 – £110,000.00 – Research Multi-Energy Micro Grid Optimal Management System / Electronic & Electrical Engineering.

Shanghai Electric is a Chinese multinational power generation and electrical equipment manufacturing company, producing power generation equipment, wind turbines, power transmission and distribution equipment, amongst others. Shanghai Electric operates the nuclear-powered Shanghai Electric Power Station Auxiliary Equipment Plant. Within this plant is the Military Section Electric Welding team, which has ‘thirty years of producing military equipment’.⁶¹


Suzhou THVOW Co., Ltd is a subsidiary of Shanghai Electric, which has major business interests within China’s ‘military industry’ base and the CCP’s ‘military-civilian integration’, describing itself as ‘an important force in driving national defense industrial development’.⁶²

Shanghai Electric SHMP Pulverizing & Special Equipment Co., Ltd is a further Shanghai Electric subsidiary, specialising in ‘military products for radar, warships, and aerospace’ applications.⁶³

University of Bournemouth

The University of Bournemouth received £881,839.00 from 11 separate Chinese entities for 13 different research projects between 2017 and 2020, including from a university which hosts a major defence lab affiliated with the PLA.

Figure 1.1.3 University of Bournemouth



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Yunnan Yumingtang Technology Co. Ltd.

⁶¹ Figures (shanghai-electric.com)

⁶² Our Group (shanghai-electric.com)

⁶³ Company Profile (shanghai-electric.com)

2017-2018 – £24,000.00 – Research.

A rare metals recovery and technology research company.

Shuangchi Industrial Co. Ltd.

2017-2018 – £14,000.00 – Research.

Shenzhen University

2018-2018 – £25,500.00 – Research.

Shenzhen University hosts a major defence laboratory, the National Laboratory of Automatic Target Recognition, which is overseen by the PLA.⁶⁴ A core aspect of this PLA-run lab is intelligent information processing technology, which is then processed into military applications for the PLA, including advanced target recognition. The lab's director is heavily active in this research for the PLA.⁶⁵

Xi'an Polytechnic University

2017-2018 – £25,500.00

Project title: 'MFS 2018 - Virtual-Real Object Registration for Stable and Accurate Augmented Reality Technology'.

Other Chinese funding

£792,839.00

University of Brighton

The University of Brighton received £70,000.00 in 2019 from one Chinese entity.

Chinese Ministry of Education

2019 – £70,000.00

University of Bristol

The University of Bristol received £458,008.69 from five separate Chinese entities between 2017 and 2022. The University of Bristol chose to withhold the names of these Chinese entities.

2017-2018 – £55,000.00

2018-2019 – £346,307.69

⁶⁴ Shenzhen University ATR Key Laboratory of National Defense Science and Technology Intelligent Information Processing is recruiting postdoctoral fellows-Human Resources Department of Shenzhen University (archive.fo)

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*


2019-2020 – £45,341.00

2021-2022 – £11,360.00

Brunel University

Brunel University received £3,445,722.44 from six Chinese entities between 2017 and 2021. This includes two Chinese defence companies with links to the PLA, and a further entity with an active partnership with one of China’s biggest defence universities.

Figure 1.1.4 Brunel University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Sichuan Mingxin Investment Company

2017 – £2,311,194.29

Guangxi Yuchai Machinery Company Ltd.

2017 – £60,000.00

2019 – £150,000.00

2021 – £150,000.00

Total: £360,000.00

A subsidiary of Yuchai Group, a large Chinese construction firm which had business links with Russian UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) manufactures as recently as 2020.⁶⁶ Yuchai have also produced diesel generators for the Chinese military for over 50 years,⁶⁷ most recently

⁶⁶ Russian inventor revs up drone engine into powerful generator - news - Yuchai International Imp. & Exp. (yuchaie.com)

⁶⁷ China Yuchai International Limited (sec.gov)

providing the engines for the made-under-licence Russian Tigr 4×4 multipurpose all-terrain infantry mobility vehicle.⁶⁸

Shandong Huaya Alloy Materials Co. Ltd.

2019 – £156,527.08

Shandong Huaya is a metals and rare earth minerals subsidiary of Aluminium Corporation of China Ltd (Chalco).⁶⁹ Shandong Huaya supply dual-use transportation equipment and vehicles which are advertised by Shandong Huaya as having military logistics applications.⁷⁰ In turn, Shandong Huaya's majority owner Chalco is owned by state-run enterprise Aluminium Corporation of China (Chinalco), the world's largest aluminium producer and the largest lead and zinc producer in Asia. Chinalco makes 'irreplaceable contributions' to China's military and aerospace sectors, with Chalco accounting for approximately half of Chinalco's revenue.⁷¹

Chalco became an investor of the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), a Chinese state-owned aerospace manufacturer, when it split from Chinese state-run military aerospace manufacturer the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) in 2008. COMAC is classified by the US Department of Defense as a Chinese military company for its affiliation to the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).⁷²

magAssist inc.

2019 – £51,000.00

2020 – £34,000.00

Total: £85,000.00

magAssist is a leading Chinese biotechnology and experimental research organisation. One of its leading research streams focuses on extracorporeal ventricular assist device (extra-VAD),⁷³ which has both medical and military applications when treating battlefield trauma casualties.⁷⁴

Shandong East Engineering Tools Ltd.

2020 – £458,001.07

Jiangsu JITRI UPTech Ltd.

2021 – £75,000.00

⁶⁸ Song Nan exclusively reviews the Yanjing version of the "Tiger" armored assault vehicle_Chejia_Discovery Car Life_Auto Home

⁶⁹ P020220426596281012773.pdf (chalco.com.cn)

⁷⁰ Drilling Equipment/Oilfield Equipment/Construction, Machinery/Military Equipment Transportation Special Vehicle with 2axle Bogie Suspension - China Semi Trailer and Truck Trailer (made-in-china.com)

⁷¹ Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (fitchratings.com)

⁷² Clark and Tylecote. 2021.

⁷³ magAssist-Technology for life

⁷⁴ milmed.172.5.523.pdf (silverchair.com)

The Jiangsu Industrial Technology Research Institute (JITRI) is a Chinese government-funded consortium of applied research institutes, concerned with advanced science and technology divisions.⁷⁵ Comprising over 50 such specialised research divisions in the fields of advanced materials, energy & environment, manufacturing & equipment, biology and medicine, and ICT. A core focus of the institute is the R&D and manufacturing of third generation semiconductor equipment.⁷⁶

In its most recent annual report, the JITRI describes successes in ‘high-end manufacturing, internet of things, unmanned systems, and military equipment’.⁷⁷

Furthermore, the JITRI maintains an active research partnership with the Nanjing University of Science and Technology (NJUST), one of China’s Seven Sons of Defence universities, which enjoys a collaborative relationship with a PLA signals intelligence research institute, involving cooperation on unmanned combat platforms and information security. Alongside the Beijing Institute of Technology, the NJUST is ranked as China’s top university for armaments research.⁷⁸

University of Cambridge

The University of Cambridge received between £18,031,748.00, and £44,482,748.00, between 2017 and 2023, from 24 separate entities. This includes between £7,652,151.00 and £20,740,151.00 from US-sanctioned entities, received by Cambridge after US sanctions came into force. The figures includes an additional £1,887,460.00 from Chinese entities heavily involved in the CCP’s military-civil fusion strategy, and with links to the PLA.

Furthermore, Cambridge received between £6,462,768.00 and £15,650,768.00 from Huawei.

Additionally, Cambridge received between £1,000,000.00 and £4,900,000.00 from the Ningbo Institute of Technology, between 2017 and 2018. The Ningbo Institute is a military aerospace research institution affiliated with Beihang University – one of China’s Seven Sons of National Defence. Beihang was placed on the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) entity list in 2001, and its affiliated division, the Ningbo Institute of Technology, was placed on the entity list in 2023, listed as the ‘Beihang University Ningbo Innovation Institute’.

The University of Cambridge chose to bracket many of its funding amounts, with extreme divergences in brackets. Table 1.4 shows these brackets. These bracketed amounts account for the difference between the low-end bracket and the high-end bracket. The same applied to both the University of Edinburgh and to the University of Oxford. As per all university FOIs the full data sets can be viewed on the online version of this report.

⁷⁵ Jiangsu Industry Technology Research Institute - Products, Competitors, Financials, Employees, Headquarters Locations (cbinsights.com)

⁷⁶ About (jitri.cn)

⁷⁷ en.jitri.cn

⁷⁸ Clark. 2022. p.20

A spokesperson for the university told us that: *'The university paused all new arrangements with Huawei in 2022. This decision was reviewed, and the pause renewed in July 2023'. Furthermore, 'The Centre for Advanced Photonics and Electronics (CAPE) sought UK Government advice and review before entering the partnership with the Beijing Institute of Aerospace Control Devices (BIACD). Their participation was reviewed by the UK Trade and Investment office in the UK embassy in Beijing before their membership was approved. The partnership was with the civilian arm and on projects with civilian applications. No new projects with BIACD have been initiated since 2018 and their membership of CAPE ended on 30th September 2023. The University of Cambridge, like all other global research universities, relies on international collaboration to make possible the discoveries which improve the lives of people worldwide, from antimicrobial resistance and climate change mitigation to treatments for disease and sustainable finance.*

'All grants and donations from China are subject to robust scrutiny, backed by a specially formulated set of principles for managing risks in international engagements which include, where necessary, assessment against UK Government Export Controls. Less than one percent of our annual research spend is derived from China.'

Finally, that *'Our approach includes full consideration of and compliance with UK government export controls and a thorough due diligence process. This is a pragmatic risk-based approach and was put in place to be transparent.'*

Figure 1.1.5 University of Cambridge (low bracket)





Figure 1.1.6 University of Cambridge (high bracket)



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Beijing Northern Investment Group

2020-2021 – £5,686.00

2021-2022 – £69,107.00

2022-2023 – £81,230.00

Total: £156,023.00

Cultural and heritage research project.

Northern Investment Group Co. Ltd. is a large-scale privately owned and publicly traded investment corporation based in Beijing.⁷⁹

The Beijing Institute of Aerospace Control Devices (BIACD)

2017-2018 – £48,488.00

2018 -2019 – £23,196.00

2019-2020 – £9,179.00

2020-2021 – £14,825.00

2021-2022 – £15,351.00

2022-2023 – £21,278.00

Total: £132,317.00

The Beijing Institute of Aerospace Control Devices (BIACD) is involved in the development of fibre optic sensors, satellite communication system and IoT system, used in Chinese smart grid as well as in petroleum, emergency communication and intellectual manufacturing.⁸⁰

The BIACD is an institute within the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), China's largest space program developer, and are listed as the CASC's 13th Institute.⁸¹ CASC are leading suppliers of the PLA's missiles, carrier rockets, military satellites and precision-guided weapons. As leading players in China's nuclear weapons programme, they are involved in international nuclear proliferation, and are listed under the US Department of Defense's entity list, and categorised as a 'Chinese military company'.⁸²

In 2010, the US BIS added the BIACD, listed as an alias of the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), to their entity list, and subjected to US export controls.⁸³ A CASC subsidiary, CALT develops intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and produces the Long March series of rockets with dual civilian and military use, which help the Chinese military track US and other militaries' deployments.⁸⁴ CALT are listed as a Chinese military company by the US DOD.⁸⁵

In 2023, the US BIS added the BIACD, listed as an alias of the CASC, to their entity list, and subjected to export controls. The list categorises the BIACD as a division within CASC:

⁷⁹ Dr. Weichang Yang | Royal Roads University see also Project Funding | Cambridge Heritage Research Centre

⁸⁰ Beijing Institute of Aerospace Control Devices (BIACD) | Centre for Advanced Photonics and Electronics (cam.ac.uk)

⁸¹ Data view of China Aerospace Science And Technology Corporation (CASC) 9th Academy 13 Research Institute from US Entity List dataset (rlist.io)

⁸² Clark. 2022. p.27.

⁸³ Federal Register, Implementation of Additional Changes From the Annual Review of the Entity List

⁸⁴ Clark and Tylecote. 2021. p.41.

⁸⁵ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

*‘China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), 9th Academy 13 Research Institute, a.k.a., the following four aliases: -13th Institute; -Beijing Institute of Aerospace Control Devices (BIACD)’.*⁸⁶

Whilst apparently cancelling their work with BIACD as of September 2023, the University of Cambridge described its 2017-2023 collaborations with the BIACD as:

‘BIACD and CAPE (Centre for Advanced Photonics and Electronics, at Cambridge) jointly researched many projects such as smart in-building wireless system and smart manufacturing system. BIACD has dispatched more than 10 technical staff to CAPE to research. In the meantime, many experts from the University of Cambridge came to China to promote the cooperation projects and provide guidance for young technical staff.

*‘BIACD and CAPE worked together and efficiently finished the prototype and network test of smart in-building wireless system. At the present, this project is in industrial condition. At the same time, BIACD and CAPE strive to make technological breakthrough on fibre optic cable development, optoelectronic oscillator and smart manufacturing system’.*⁸⁷

Chinese Academy of Sciences – Institute of Geology and Geophysics

2018-2019 – £3,535.00

2019-2020 – £134,656.00

2020-2021 – £20,956.00

2021-2022 – £38,178.00

2022-2023 – £42,484.00

Total: £239,809.00

The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is the world’s largest research organisation, with over 100 institutions. Its principal university, the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences (UCAS), maintains a Military-Civil Fusion Development Research Centre,⁸⁸ which established a base located at the China Air-to-Air Missile Research Institute—an affiliate of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC)—in Luoyang. The base facilitates cooperation between UCAS and AVIC in science and technology development and personnel training,⁸⁹ while UCAS aims to establish a national-level technology trading platform for military-civil fusion.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Entity List (doc.gov)

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ The launching ceremony of the missile academy base of the Center for Military-Civil Integration Development of the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences was held (archive.ph)

⁸⁹ University of Chinese Academy of Sciences – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

⁹⁰ The Civil-Military Integration Development Research Center of the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Shunde Civil-Military Integration Innovation Industrial Park (archive.fo)

Confucius Institute Headquarters

2018-2019 – £10,000.00

Huawei Device Co Ltd.

2017-2018 – £112,303.00

2018-2019 – £259,094.00

2019-2020 – £186,170.00

2020-2021 – £289,173.00

2021-2022 – £135,095.00

2022-2023 – £73,205.00

Total: £1,055,040.00

Huawei Device is Huawei's mobile phone division, and is categorised by the US DOD as a 'Chinese military company'.⁹¹ It is placed under the US Department of Commerce's entity list⁹² and is subjected to US export controls.

Huawei Technologies Co Ltd.

2017-2018 – £246,990.00

2018-2019 – £248,029.00

2019-2020 – £293,871.00

2020-2021 – £287,667.00

2021-2022 – £334,113.00

2022-2023 – £156,351.00

Total: £1,567,021.00

Huawei is subjected to a number of US and UK security-related export controls, sanctions, and bans. In 2020, the UK government banned all future Huawei infrastructure in to the country's 5G network, and proposed to remove all existing Huawei network infrastructure by 2027.⁹³

Since the UK government announced this landmark policy in 2020, based on national security concerns that Huawei was a CCP-controlled entity with links to the Chinese military (the US

⁹¹ Entity List (doc.gov)

⁹² Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

⁹³ Huawei legal notices issued - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

Department of Defense categorise Huawei as a 'Chinese military company'),⁹⁴ the University of Cambridge has accepted £1,275,604.00 worth of research funding from Huawei.

Cambridge's Centre for Advanced Photonics and Electronics maintains an active research partnership with Huawei. Particular research collaborations and interest lay in the fields of long-distance imagery in both the ultraviolet and infrared spectra, augmented and virtual realities (AR and VR), battery technologies, and quantum computing – all of which have potential dual-use and military applications.⁹⁵

Infinitus (China) Company

2017-2018 – £170,285.00

2018-2019 – £209,100.00

2019-2020 – £109,909.00

2020-2021 – £177,834.00

2021-2022 – £245,528.00

2022-2023 – £138,029.00

Total: £1,050,685.00

Infinitus is a Chinese biomedical and pharmaceutical research company with links to the PLA. Infinitus's owners formed a partnership with the First Military Medical University, controlled by the PLA, in the early 1990s, before founding Infinitus in 1992.⁹⁶ Whilst the First Military Medical University was renamed Southern Medical University in 2004, it still maintains links with the Chinese military,⁹⁷ whilst Infinitus still maintain research links with the re-named university.⁹⁸

Nanjing Centre of Technology and Innovation Co. Ltd.

2019-2020 – £1,177.00

2020-2021 – £39,866.00

2021-2022 – £75,779.00

2022-2023 – £22,348.00

Total: £139,170.00

The Cambridge University-Nanjing Centre of Technology and Innovation established a:

⁹⁴ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

⁹⁵ Huawei | Centre for Advanced Photonics and Electronics (cam.ac.uk)

⁹⁶ Infinitus - News Details (infinitus-int.com)

⁹⁷ Southern Medical University Introduction | SMU Introduction | CUCAS

⁹⁸ Infinitus: Rooted in Chinese Tradition, Winning with Science - Direct Selling News

'[H]ome for joint research and innovation in collaboration with the Chinese government, industry and China's global research universities that is dedicated to the future of creating 'smart' cities'.⁹⁹

Cambridge and its 'Chinese partners' will share revenue derived from the commercialisation of intellectual property developed at the centre, whilst its funding will be from the Nanjing Municipality until 2024.¹⁰⁰

One of the centre's two principle research divisions is in collaboration with Southeast University.¹⁰¹ A report for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission identified the Southeast as involved in training Chinese military hackers, whilst it has a specific research funding stream dedicated to the PLA.¹⁰² Southeast University is rated as 'High Risk' by ASPI for its high level of defence research.¹⁰³ The joint Cambridge-Nanjing centre also has agreements and partnerships with Zhejiang University, Peking University, and Tsinghua – all rated either 'High Risk' or 'Very High Risk' by ASPI, for high levels of defence research, government and PLA oversight, and participation in China's nuclear weapons program and nuclear proliferation.¹⁰⁴

Ningbo Institute

2017-2018 – £1m - £4.9m

The Ningbo Institute of Materials Technology and Engineering, or the Ningbo Institute of Technology, is a military aerospace research institute affiliated with Beihang University – one of China's Seven Sons of National Defence. Beihang was placed on the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) entity list in 2001,¹⁰⁵ and its affiliated division, the Ningbo Institute of Technology, was placed on the entity list in 2023, listed as the 'Beihang University Ningbo Innovation Institute'.¹⁰⁶

A joint research institute was established between the University of Cambridge and Ningbo Institute in 2017. During the signing ceremony at the Ningbo Institute, a statement from their press release recorded that the agreement for the collaboration and research with Cambridge:

'[W]ill establish a high-end equipment industry research institute in Ningbo's Beilun district. Cambridge's first cooperation platform in the Chinese mainland, the institute will focus on improving Ningbo's manufacturing capabilities, especially in the areas of high-end and intelligent equipment manufacturing. It is expected to promote a

⁹⁹ Cambridge and Nanjing break ground on 'smart cities' Centre | University of Cambridge

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Wayback Machine (archive.org)

¹⁰³ Southeast University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹⁰⁴ Peking University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI see also Tsinghua University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI and Zhejiang University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹⁰⁵ Chinese Aerospace Institute Added to U.S. Export Control List after Years of Acquiring Western Technology (kharon.com)

¹⁰⁶ Entity List (doc.gov)

cooperative industry-university research chain by applying Cambridge's scientific and technological resources to Ningbo's development'.¹⁰⁷

Shanghai Turbine Works Co. Ltd.

2017-2018 – £67,933.00

2018-2019 – £10,415.00

2019-2020 – £77,342.00

2020-2021 – £65,954.00

2021-2022 – £72,085.00

2022-2023 – £44,541.00

Total: £338,270.00

Shanghai Turbine is owned by Shanghai Electric Group, which manufactures heavy industry and construction appliances designed for the Chinese military,¹⁰⁸ in addition to products for military radars, warships, and in aerospace.¹⁰⁹ Shanghai Electric in turn owns Suzhou THVOV Co., Ltd. THVOV has 13 subsidiaries itself, many involved in military-civilian fusion and military industry.¹¹⁰

Tianjin University

2020-2021 – £19,850.00

2021-2022 – £25,205.00

2022-2023 – £12,011.00

Total: £57,066.00

Tianjin University is designated as 'High Risk' by ASPI for its involvement in defence research and links to espionage. The university maintains two defence laboratories conducting classified military research on cutting-edge technologies such as optoelectronics, and propellants, whilst it carries out research for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), China's civilian intelligence agency.¹¹¹ Tianjin University was added to the US Department of Commerce's Entity List in December 2020.¹¹²

Zhejiang Laboratory

2020-2021 – £19,215.00

¹⁰⁷ Cambridge, Ningbo to jointly build research institute for high-end equipment (chinadaily.com.cn)

¹⁰⁸ 94645.pdf (shanghai-electric.com) p.29.

¹⁰⁹ Company Profile (shanghai-electric.com)

¹¹⁰ Our Group (shanghai-electric.com)

¹¹¹ Tianjin University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹¹² Federal Register :: Addition of Entities to the Entity List, Revision of Entry on the Entity List, and Removal of Entities From the Entity List

2021-2022 – £80,220.00

2022-2023 – £20,091.00

Total: £119,526.00

Zhejiang Lab is a joint research and development facility between Zhejiang University and the People's Government of Zhejiang Province, focusing on five main areas – including intelligent computing, artificial intelligence, intelligent perception, intelligent networks, and intelligent systems.¹¹³

Zhejiang University is designated as 'High Risk' by ASPI for its high number of defence laboratories, relationships with the Chinese defence industry, and links to economic and cyber espionage.¹¹⁴ Zhejiang has at least three defence laboratories involved in research on computer simulations, high-performance computing, and control science.¹¹⁵

Zhejiang also maintains the Zhejiang Provincial Key Laboratory for Network Multimedia Technology, established in 2011 to research and develop advanced network multimedia technologies, including machine vision, real-time sonar array signal acquisition and processing, 3-D acoustic real-time imaging – all of which were for Chinese national defence projects.¹¹⁶

The lab has active partnerships and agreements with both China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) – both of which are listed under Executive Order 13959, subjected to export controls, and are designated by the US DOD as 'Chinese military companies' under Executive Order 13959.¹¹⁷ The Zhejiang Provincial Key Laboratory for Network Multimedia Technology has developed and installed a series of military products on several key national defence projects around China, in partnership with both CETC and CSIC, dating back to 2018.¹¹⁸

Other research grants and funding

2017-2018 – £187,808.00

2018-2019 – £204,379.00

2019-2020 – £62,441.00

2020-2021 – £87,435.00

2021-2022 – £102,407.00

2022-2023 – £42,351.00

¹¹³ Home (zhejianglab.com)

¹¹⁴ Zhejiang University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹¹⁵ School Profile - School of Microelectronics, Zhejiang University (archive.org)

¹¹⁶ Zhejiang Provincial Key Laboratory for Network Multimedia Technology (zju.edu.cn)

¹¹⁷ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries – United States Department of State

¹¹⁸ Zhejiang Provincial Key Laboratory for Network Multimedia Technology (zju.edu.cn)

Total: £686,821.00

Table 1.4 Cambridge funding (bracketed)


FY	Name	Band	Description
FY2017/18	Ningbo Institute	f) £1m - £4.9m	CIBS - Centre for Entrepreneurship (General)
FY2018/19	SF Express	f)£1m - £4.9m	Trust Fund - The SF Express Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship
FY2019/20	Qingdao Agricultural University	b)£10k - £49k	Biochemistry(Centre for Stem Cell Biology & Medicine) - Unrestricted Donation
FY2021/22	Qingdao Agricultural University	b)£10k - £49k	Biochemistry - Research Support (Departmental General Funds)
FY2019/20	Naxau New Materials	c)£50k - £99k	Materials Science & Metallurgy - Donation For Research
FY2020/21	Beijing Institute of Collaborative Innovation (BICI)	c)£50k - £99k	Engineering - Donation For Research
FY2021/22	Tibet Spring Liquor Ltd	d)£100k - £499k	Museum of Arch. & Anth. - Donation For Research
FY2019/20	Min Zhao	b)£10k - £49k	Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology - In Memoriam John Davidson
FY2018/19	Envision Energy Limited	g)£5m - £9.9m	CISL - Entopia Building (establishment/refurbishment)
FY2018/19	Confucius Institute Headquarters	c)£50k - £99k	FAMES - Conference/Seminar/Lecture/Training/other (various programmes)
FY2019/20	Infinitus (China) Company Limited	f)£1m - £4.9m	Chemical Engineering & Biotechnology - Donation For Research
FY2021/22	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	d)£100k - £499k	DAMTP - Millennium Mathematics Project:NRICH programme
FY2020/21	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	d)£100k - £499k	Computer Science and Technology - Donation For Research
FY2020/21	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	d)£100k - £499k	Computer Science and Technology - Studentships + Other Support (various)
FY2020/21	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	d)£100k - £499k	Engineering - Donation For Research
FY2018/19	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	d)£100k - £499k	Computer Science and Technology - Student Support (Postgraduate)
FY2021/22	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	d)£100k - £499k	Engineering - Student Support (Postgraduate)
FY2018/19	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	d)£100k - £499k	Computer Science and Technology - Studentships + Other Support (various)
FY2018/19	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	e)£500k - £999k	MML - Student Support (Postgraduate)
FY2020/21	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	e)£500k - £999k	Engineering - Donation For Research
FY2018/19	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	e)£500k - £999k	Computer Science and Technology - Research Support (Named Recipient / Specific Project)
FY2018/19	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	e)£500k - £999k	Computer Science and Technology - Research Support (Named Recipient / Specific Project)
FY2018/19	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	e)£500k - £999k	Computer Science and Technology - Research Support (Named Recipient / Specific Project)
FY2018/19	Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (China)	f)£1m - £4.9m	Computer Science and Technology - Student Support (Postgraduate)

Source: Civitas FOI request.

Cardiff University

Cardiff University received £2,561,812.00 from 13 separate Chinese entities between 2017 and 2022. This includes £65,000.00 from entities under US sanctions (Huawei), and a further £488,417.00 from entities with close links to the Chinese military, and which engage in military-civil fusion, including from HiSilicon, Tencent, and Xiamen University.

Figure 1.1.7 Cardiff University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

CCCC Second Harbour Consultants Co. Ltd.

2018 – £200,000.00

2021 – £45,000.00

Total: £245,000.00

China Communications

2017 – £115,485.00

2018 – £111,597.00

2019 – £360,000.00

Total: £587,082.00

Hanban

2017 – £181,276.00

2018 – £126,642.00

2019 – £94,794.00

2020 – £78,406.00

Total: £481,118.00 – For Confucius Institute at Cardiff University.

Hisilicon Optoelectronics Co. Ltd.

2018 – £268,000.00

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2019 – £65,000.00

Hubei Zhican Internet Technology Co. Ltd.

2019 – £95,373.00

Lanzhou Jiaotong University

2022 – £30,000.00

RealCan Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd.

2017 – £165,000.00

2018 – £207,500.00

Total: £372,500.00

Shenzhen Tencent Computer System Co. Ltd.

2018 – £50,000.00

Subsidiary of Tencent.

Tencent

2018 – £50,000.00

Tianjin Chison Chemical Ltd.

2018 – £80,078.00

Youyang Shenghua Construction Engineering Co. Ltd.

2021 – £117,244.00

Xiamen University

2021 – £55,850.00

2022 – £64,567.00

Total: £120,417.00

City, University of London

City, University of London received £84,000.00 between 2018 and 2019 from one Chinese entity.

Chongqing Yoojin Machinery Plant Ltd.

2018-2019 – £84,000.00


Cooperative Research on High Efficiency and Low Noise Screw Pumps.

Cranfield University

Cranfield University received £616,902.00 from four separate Chinese entities between 2018 and 2021. This figure includes funding from China's largest military aerospace manufacturer, China's largest and most powerful defence conglomerate, and collaborations with entities linked to China's two largest military research institutions (including the PLA).

A spokesperson for Cranfield University said: *'Cranfield University adheres to all current UK Government guidance and regulations on academic and research collaborations with international institutions'.*

Figure 1.1.8 Cranfield University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

AVIC International Holding Corporation

2018 – £250,000.00

2019 – £124,000.00

2020 – £94,200.00

Total: £468,200.00

The Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) is China's leading civilian and military aviation supplier, supplying the PLA Air Force with the J-20 fifth generation stealth fighter jet amongst other military platforms.¹¹⁹ AVIC is listed under the US Department of Commerce's Entity List and subjected to sanctions and export controls,¹²⁰ categorised as a 'military end user' by the US government,¹²¹ and also as a 'Chinese military company' by the US DoD.¹²² The funding to Cranfield by AVIC was for research collaboration into civil aero gas turbine engines. The project started in 2016 and ended in 2020.

Norin Intelligent Aviation Software Co. Ltd.

2021 – £32,800.00

This project is based on a civil aviation project relating to airport ground movements and digital air traffic control towers.

Norin Intelligent Aviation Software Co Ltd appears to be a subsidiary wholly controlled by Norinco, the largest and most powerful defence conglomerate in China, and absolutely critical

¹¹⁹ Clark and Tylecote. 2021.

¹²⁰ Entity List (doc.gov)

¹²¹ file (doc.gov)

¹²² Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

to the PLA's militarisation, falling under Norinco subsidiary, Norin Digital Technology Group.¹²³

The company's Chinese name is (北京) 中兵智航软件技术有限公司 – which translated is 'Beijing [Norinco, IE the acronym for Norinco] Intelligent Aviation Software Technology Co Ltd.'¹²⁴ Although this is slightly different, there is no other Chinese company that 'Norin Intelligent Aviation Software Co Ltd' could be. Elsewhere, the head of Beijing Norinco Intelligent Aviation Software Technology Co Ltd. gives a speech where he says that the company is part of Norinco.¹²⁵

Norinco and its subsidiaries have been subjected to numerous US export controls and bans, starting in 1993, again in 2003 after Norinco sold missiles to Iran,¹²⁶ and again in 2020 with Executive Order 13959 and ratified by the Biden administration. Norinco are classified as a 'Communist Chinese Military Company' by the US federal government.¹²⁷

North East Industrial Materials & Metallurgy Ltd.

2018 – £40,000.00

North East Industrial Materials & Metallurgy Ltd is a metals and alloys research and development company. Both research grants for Cranfield were for wire + arc additive manufacturing. In 2019, researchers from North East Industrial Materials and Metallurgy, who are listed as also working at, and alongside researchers from, Northeastern University (NEU), published work developing wire + arc additive manufacturing.¹²⁸ The project was funded by the National Key R&D Program in China,¹²⁹ the largest state-controlled R&D program and overseen by the Ministry for Science and Technology. The National Key R&D Program often collaborates with the Academy of Military Sciences – or the People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences, to give it its full name – the highest-level research institute of the PLA.¹³⁰

NEU runs the National Defense Science and Technology Development Research Institute, whose deputy director received a China Industry-University-Research Cooperation Military-Civil Fusion Prize, in 2019.¹³¹

Zhuzhou Liulingba Technology & Science Co. Ltd.

2018 – £35,954.00

¹²³ <https://archive.vn/>

¹²⁴ CMMI Appraisal System (cmminstitute.com)

¹²⁵ The 19th Civil Aviation Informatization Development Forum (archive.vn)

¹²⁶ BBC NEWS | Business | US punishes firms in Iran and China

¹²⁷ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

¹²⁸ Investigation on high-temperature mechanical properties of Al-7Si-0.6Mg alloy by wire + arc additive manufacturing: Materials Science and Technology: Vol 36, No 14 (tandfonline.com)

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Controlling the innovation chain | Merics

¹³¹ Northeastern University won the 2018 China Industry-University-Research Cooperation Innovation Award and the Civil-Military Integration Award-Northeastern University News Network (archive.ph)

2019 – £39,948.00

Total: £75,902.00

Zhuzhou Liulingba Technology & Science, also known as Zhuzhou 608 Institute of Science and Technology Co., Ltd, is a subsidiary of the Hunan Power Machinery Research Institute, of the China Aviation Development Corporation (CADC).¹³² CADC is an alias of the sanctioned Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC),¹³³ one of China's leading civilian and military aviation engine manufacturers, including attack helicopters and ground attack aircraft.¹³⁴ Accordingly, both AECC and CADC are proscribed by the US DoD as a 'Chinese military company', and subject to export controls.¹³⁵

Furthermore, Zhuzhou Liulingba Technology & Science list the National University of Defence Technology (NUDT) as a cooperative partner,¹³⁶ in addition to the Beijing Institute of Technology, both of whom are rated as 'Very High Risk' by ASPI,¹³⁷ are both part of China's Seven Sons of Defence, and both heavily involved in China's military industrial complex – particularly NUDT, China's leading military research institution.¹³⁸ The funding was for one project for R&D of key technologies for the design of a low emissions civil combustor. The project ran from 2015 to 2019.

University of Dundee

The University of Dundee received £54,500.00 between 2019 and 2023 from six separate Chinese entities. This included £28,500.00 from two separate universities with strong links to the Chinese military, both of which are rated as 'High Risk' by ASPI for their high levels of defence research.

¹³² COMPANY-Zhuzhou Liulingba Technology & Science Co. Ltd. (zz608kj.com)

¹³³ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

¹³⁴ Clark and Tylecote. 2021. P.39.


¹³⁵ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

¹³⁶ Zhuzhou Liulingba Technology & Science Co.,Ltd. (zz608kj.com)

¹³⁷ Beijing Institute of Technology – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹³⁸ Clark and Tylecote. 2021. P.33.

Figure 1.1.9 University of Dundee



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Southwest University of Science and Technology

2021-2023 – £23,500.00

Southwest University of Science and Technology is designated 'High Risk' by ASPI for its links to China's nuclear weapons program and high level of defence research.¹³⁹

Zhejiang University

2020-2021 – £5,000.00

Zhejiang University is designated as 'High Risk' by ASPI for its high number of defence laboratories, relationships with the Chinese defence industry, and links to economic and cyber espionage.¹⁴⁰ Zhejiang has at least three defence laboratories involved in research on computer simulations, high-performance computing, and control science.¹⁴¹

Other Chinese research grants and funding

2019-2020 – £8,000.00

2019-2021 – £18,000.00

Total: £26,000.00

Durham University

Durham University received a total of £663,000.01 from three separate Chinese entities between 2018 and 2022. This includes £80,000.00 from one of China's most influential defence universities, rated 'Very High Risk' by APSI, in a research collaboration from 2022


¹³⁹ Southwest University of Science and Technology – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹⁴⁰ Zhejiang University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹⁴¹ School Profile - School of Microelectronics, Zhejiang University (archive.org)

which has distinct military applications. Separately and whilst not subjected to US federal government sanctions, SINOPEC are subjected to several US state-level export control orders, due to the company's links to the Iranian regime. SINOPEC funded Durham University £503,000.01.

Figure 1.1.10 Durham University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Jiexi Technologies

2022 - £80,000.00

Project title: Performance evaluation of integrated sensing & communication technologies.

Nanjing-based Jiexi Technologies is a telecommunications company specialising in 5G and 6G technology and automation testing.¹⁴²

Integrating sensing and communication (ISAC) is a cutting-edge technology aimed at achieving high-resolution target sensing and high data-rate communications using a shared spectrum. ISAC technologies are increasingly important for military research and development¹⁴³ as militaries seek to harness the latest technologies in order to streamline capabilities and increase lethality. Integrating a multitude of battlefield sensors, platforms, and communications systems is critical to achieving future military success.

SINOPEC

2018 – £216,000.000

Project title: Catalytic Materials For OCM.

2020 – £287,000.01

Project title: Catalytic Materials For OCM II.

¹⁴² Learn more about us—Topyoung e-commerce platform

¹⁴³ The Future Of Military Sensing And Communications Systems – Co-Packaged Optics Enable Converged RF Phased Arrays (semianalysis.com)

State-run China Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC Group) is China's largest supplier of petrochemical products, and its second largest oil and gas producer. It has been heavily linked to the continued US-sanction breaches against Iranian oil transportation,¹⁴⁴ with multiple US states banning investment into the company as a result.¹⁴⁵

Tsinghua University

2022 – £80,000.00

Project title: Magnetic effects in Kibble balance.


Tsinghua University is designated 'Very High Risk' by ASPI for its high level of defence research and alleged involvement in cyber-attacks, whilst Tsinghua's leadership has prominently highlighted their commitment to supporting China's national strategy of military-civil fusion.¹⁴⁶

Kibble balance is a mass-measuring equation, which the US Army are currently developing a replacement second generation device for military applications.¹⁴⁷

Edge Hill University

Edge Hill University received a total of US\$505,252.38 (or £414,242.00 in a 2023 UK currency conversion) from two separate Chinese entities between 2018 and 2022. This was from a university heavily involved in research collaboration with the PLA, and from the Confucius Institute.

Figure 1.1.11 Edge Hill University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Chongqing Normal University

¹⁴⁴ US Penalizes Chinese Companies for Aiding Iran's Oil Exports - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

¹⁴⁵ China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (CPCC) (Sinopec) | UANI (unitedagainstinucleariran.com)

¹⁴⁶ Tsinghua University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹⁴⁷ Mass Revolution: Kibble Balances for All | NIST

2021 – US\$106,991.62

2022 – US\$108,485.60

Total: US\$215,477.62

In the 2022-2023 academic year, Chongqing Normal University's third largest domestic research collaborator was recorded as the PLA, as defined by all the PLA's research output for that period.¹⁴⁸

Confucius Institute

2017-2018 – US\$110,101.37 (recorded as three separate payments).

2018-2019 – US\$99,494.35

2019-2020 – US\$80,179.44

Total: US\$289,775.16


University of Edinburgh

University of Edinburgh received between £12,694,684.00 and £13,894,683.95 from five Chinese entities between 2017 to 2022. This includes between £10,590,801.05 – £11,790,801.00 from Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. This figure also includes £39,866.95 from a key defence contractor for Chinese military satellites; and £1,552,066.00 for a research collaboration from an engineering and metals developer for a Graphene-based research project. That project was conducted with a Chinese entity which has an industrial partnership with China's semiconductor market in addition to a link with three members of the Seven Sons of National Defence.

University of Edinburgh responded in their Right of Reply that: *'Major prospective sources of income for the University, such as donations and research funding, always undergo a rigorous due diligence process'.*

¹⁴⁸ Chongqing Normal University (CQNU) | Institution outputs | Nature Index

Figure 1.1.12 University of Edinburgh



Source: Civitas FOI request.

99cloud Inc.

2020 – £404,018.00

Project title: Research collaboration in intelligent edge platforms.

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2017 – £100,000.01 – £250,000.00

Project title: Research collaboration in neural networks.

2018 – <£100,000.00

Project title: Research collaboration on query answering systems.

2018 – £1,000,000.00

Research collaboration.

2019 – £2,319,109.00

PhD sponsorships, research collaborations.

2019 – £100,000.01 – £250,000.00

Project title: Research collaboration on query answering systems.

2020 – £5,453,877.00

Research collaboration in machine learning, blockchain technologies.

2020 – £500,000.01 – £1,000,000.00

Research collaboration in machine learning.

2020 – £100,000.01 – £250,000.00

Research collaboration in operating systems.

2021 – £495,558.00

Advanced computer processing, machine learning.

2022 – £222,257.00

Advanced research in computer operating systems.

2022 – £200,000.01 – £450,000.00

Total: £10,590,801.05 – £11,790,801.00

Jiangsu Dingying New Material Co. Ltd.

2021 – £1,552,066.00

Research collaboration in graphene-based hybrid materials.

Development of hydrogel therapy for cancer treatment.

In 2022, Chinese aluminium-based materials company Jiangsu Dingying New Materials Co. Ltd. and researchers at the University of Edinburgh embarked on a six-year collaborative project to develop graphene-based materials for use in waste treatment and purification applications. The £1.19 million venture will allow Jiangsu Dingying IP ownership of the graphene-based research.¹⁴⁹

Graphene is a dual-use mineral which is highly desirable for China's civil-military fusion, with potential military applications including in semiconductors and batteries, whilst the PLA is interested in graphene coatings for uses from artillery and installations on artificial islands in the South China Sea, and for China's Z-10 attack helicopter, which has been equipped with graphene armour.¹⁵⁰

Jiangsu Dingying New Material has an industrial partnership with Jiangsu Industrial Technology Research Institute, a key MCF centre which manufactures semiconductors,¹⁵¹ and has multiple partnerships with China's military industrial complex, including with three members of the Seven Sons of National Defence.¹⁵²

Research Institute of Tsinghua University

2022 – £75,500.00

Research collaboration on multiphase flow measurement.

¹⁴⁹ Edinburgh Innovations | Jiangsu Dingying New Materials Co Ltd

¹⁵⁰ Clark and Tylecote. 2021. p.86.

¹⁵¹ 集萃体系 (jitri.cn)

¹⁵² Institutes & Partners (jitri.cn)

Tsinghua University is designated ‘Very High Risk’ by ASPI for its high level of defence research and alleged involvement in cyber-attacks, maintains at least eight defence laboratories, and is heavily involved in China’s military industrial complex and civil-military fusion.¹⁵³

Shenzhen Leengstar Technology Co. Ltd.

2019 – £32,432.00

Research collaboration in machine learning.

Tencent

2022 – £39,866.95


Project title: Serving Big Machine Learning Models.

Major tech company Tencent is a key partner to the deployment of China's BeiDou satellite navigation system. BeiDou is developed for both civilian and military applications, and allows for BeiDou terminals to be deployed throughout the PLA ground forces, PLA Navy ships, Second Artillery Force, and the PLA Air Force.¹⁵⁴ Tencent is a major investor into Beijing Navinfo Technology, which began mass production of semiconductors for the navigation systems using BeiDou in 2020.¹⁵⁵

University of Exeter

The University of Exeter received £1,999,795.00 from five separate Chinese entities between 2019 and 2021. This includes £1,800,000.00 from a university rated as ‘Very High Risk’ by ASPI, and with direct links to both the PLA and to the CCP’s military-civil fusion strategy.

Figure 1.1.13 University of Exeter



Source: Civitas FOI request.

¹⁵³ Tsinghua University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹⁵⁴ Putting Precision in Operations: Beidou Satellite Navigation System - Jamestown

¹⁵⁵ Baidu Maps supports BeiDou high-precision positioning system on China Mobile's 5G network - CnTechPost

Jiangxi Bofeng Refractory Ltd.

2019-2020 – £117,313.00

Tsinghua University

2021-2022 – £1,8000,000.00 – Digital Archive of the Middle East (DAME).


Other Chinese funding

£82,482.00

University of Glasgow

The University of Glasgow received a total of £1,572,008.00 in research grants from 10 separate Chinese entities between 2017 and 2021. This includes £264,988.00 from Chinese defence entities subjected to US sanctions at time of funding, in addition to £446,639.00 from Huawei Technologies, and a further £10,000.00 from China’s largest hypersonic missile technology testing institute.

Figure 1.1.14 University of Glasgow



Source: Civitas FOI request.

China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center

2019 – £10,000.00

The China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center (CARD C) is the largest research and testing institute of aerodynamics in China, involved in the development of hypersonic missile technology for the PLA, whilst the centre is run by a PLA Major General.¹⁵⁶ CARD C has

¹⁵⁶ China builds advanced weapons systems using American technology - The Washington Post

been listed on the US Department of Commerce's Entity List since 1999, and subjected to export controls.¹⁵⁷

Geosun Hi-technology Co. Ltd.

2017 – £93,000.00

Hunan Geosun Hi-technology Co., Ltd is an engineering and geophysical exploration equipment development company, and is a leading supplier and wholesaler of resource exploration equipment. It was founded in 2000 by the former president of Central South University (CSU),¹⁵⁸ rated as 'High Risk' by ASPI for its high level of defence research and close relationship with China's defence industry.¹⁵⁹ This includes reportedly receiving the most military research funding from the Ministry of Education of all Chinese defence universities, and was also the first to receive a weapons production license.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, CSU maintains three dedicated defence laboratories centred on materials and engineering, whilst a core defence research focus is materials and science engineering.¹⁶¹

Huawei Technologies

2018 – £191,651.00

2019 – £205,000.00

2020 – £49,988.00

Total: £446,639.00

Hooke Instruments Limited

2021 – £258,702.00

Ministry of Science and Technology

2021 – £164,830.00

China's Ministry of Science and Technology was restricted in 2023 in order to achieve self-reliance on critical and emerging technologies,¹⁶² and is driven from Xi Jinping's strategy for greater civil-military fusion – the promotion of which is stated in the second paragraph of the ministry's mission.¹⁶³

Other research grants

2017-2021 – £598,837.00

¹⁵⁷ file (doc.gov)

¹⁵⁸ Hunan Geosun Hi-technology Co., Ltd. Electronic Measuring Instruments Industrial Metal Detectors China (companyess.com)

¹⁵⁹ Central South University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹⁶⁰ Daily Express (archive.ph)

¹⁶¹ Central South University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

¹⁶² China to restructure sci-tech ministry to achieve self-reliance faster | Reuters


¹⁶³ Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China (most.gov.cn)

Heriot-Watt University

Heriot-Watt University received between £205,000.00 and £305,000.00 from four separate Chinese entities between 2017 and 2022. This included between £50,000.00 and £100,000.00 from Huawei Technologies one year after the British government announced a ban on using Huawei infrastructure in 5G networks, for research collaboration on a project which has potential military applications. In addition, it includes £50,000.00 from a Chinese university active in military research.

A spokesperson for Heriot-Watt University, said: *'The University works in line with the UK's National Protective Security Authority in its research and international research collaborations Trusted Research Guidance for Academia | NPSA and the UK's International Research and Innovation Strategy published by the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS), which sets out a goal for the UK to be the partner of choice for international research and innovation for the long term. All such partnerships are subject to a thorough due diligence process and consistent with academic freedom - which is enshrined in law in the UK - and institutional autonomy. None of the research funded by Huawei or the Chinese Universities referred to in the article were on defence applications.'*

Figure 1.1.15 Heriot-Watt University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

East China University of Science and Technology

2017-2022 – £50,000.00

The payment was provided for access to specialist knowledge, and for opportunities to engage with subject matter experts, in addition to the provision of shared resources. East China University of Science and Technology lists as a scientific achievement on their website

a long-lasting corrosion coating, designed to offer ‘corrosion protection of the outer shell of military equipment such as warships, submarines, tanks and missile launchers’.¹⁶⁴

Huawei Technologies

2021 – £50,000.00 - £100,000.00

Project title: Reconfigurable Analog Beamforming Network for C-band HBF Architecture.

HBF architecture has many potential military applications, particularly in UAV platforms and radars.¹⁶⁵

SINOPEC

2018 – £80,000.00 - £130,000.00

Other research funding

2019 – £25,000.00

University of Hertfordshire

The University of Hertfordshire received £1,322,892.00 between 2018 and 2022 from a Chinese university whose name the University of Hertfordshire chose to redact.

‘Chinese university’

2017-2020 – £290,000.00 – Short course funding.

2018-2022 – £1,032,892.00 – Research grant.


University of Huddersfield

The University of Huddersfield received £188,000.00 in 2017 from one Chinese entity, which is a subsidiary of a US-sanctioned Chinese military company.

¹⁶⁴ 科技成果 | 华东理工大学 - 技术转移东部中心 (netcchina.com)

¹⁶⁵ double.pdf (ucl.ac.uk)

Figure 1.1.16 University of Huddersfield



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Huanding Energy Services

2017 – £188,000.00

Condition monitoring of ships.

Huanding Energy Services declares itself as a subsidiary of China Ship Research and Development Academy on its website,¹⁶⁶ a known alias of the US-sanctioned China State Shipbuilding Corporation, Limited (CSSC).¹⁶⁷ The US DoD lists CSSC as a 'Chinese military company',¹⁶⁸ and the state-controlled military-designated company is subjected to US Executive Order 13959, prohibiting US investment. All CSSC ships are built to PLA specifications.¹⁶⁹

University of Hull

The University of Hull received £72,000.01 from one Chinese entity between 2014 and 2019. The principal Chinese researcher at Hull for this funding has extensive links to the Chinese defence industry, partnerships with a member of the Seven Sons of National Defence, and several other entities heavily involved in the CCP's military-civil fusion strategy.

Shanxi Jingxu Renewable Energy Co. Ltd.

2014-2017 – £28,000.00

2016-2019 – £44,000.01

¹⁶⁶ Company Profile (huanding.com)

¹⁶⁷ Entity List (doc.gov)

¹⁶⁸ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

¹⁶⁹ Chinese fleet of militarised ships 'a threat to trade' (thetimes.co.uk)

Total: £72,000.01

Shanxi Jingxu Renewable Energy Co. Ltd. was established in 2014 to manufacture and install advanced PV-T solar panels across China. The University of Hull has provided technical support to the company over this period.¹⁷⁰ The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) is in the process of developing PV-T systems at MOD sites as part of the UK government's net zero strategy,¹⁷¹ whilst the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have been researching and developing PV-T systems for defence and aerospace applications for the last decade.¹⁷²

A Chinese professor at the University of Hull, who is the lead investigator for projects with Shanxi Jingxu Renewable Energy Co. Ltd., also has research partnerships with Tsinghua University (rated 'Very High Risk' by ASPI), and the Harbin Institute of Technology (also rated 'Very High Risk', and one of China's 'Seven Sons of National Defence'), in addition to the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (the ministry charged with implementing and driving China's civil-military integration).

The same academic, in addition to one other Chinese academic at the University of Hull, has had at least one collaborative research project funded by Shanxi Jingxu Renewable Energy Co. Ltd., with other researchers from Taiyuan University of Technology (TYUT), whilst simultaneously being listed as working at both Hull and TYUT. TYUT prides itself on being the very first university in Shanxi that was authorised by the Beijing Military Region for selection and cultivation of university students for the PLA.¹⁷³

University of Kent

The University of Kent received £400,000.00 between 2018 and 2019 from two separate Chinese entities. This includes £300,000.00 from a US-sanctioned Chinese military company at the time of funding.


¹⁷⁰ Impact case study - The University of Hull - 12 - Improved energy efficiency and reduced environmental impact .pdf p.3.

¹⁷¹ Army's Solar Farms support commitment to Sustainability - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

¹⁷² DARPA looks to SAIC to develop lightweight, flexible solar panels rugged enough for military photovoltaics applications | Military Aerospace

¹⁷³ Home-太原理工大学人事人才信息网 (tyut.edu.cn)

Figure 1.1.17 University of Kent



Source: Civitas FOI request.

China Research Institute of Radiowave Propagation

2018 – £300,000.00

Investigation into innovative designs for mobile communications base stations.

China Research Institute of Radiowave Propagation is more commonly known as the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation's (CETC) 14th Research Institute; a state-owned defence conglomerate. The PLA-controlled research and development centre conducts anti-stealth research for the Chinese military, and is sanctioned by the US since 2018, with both organisations listed by the US DoD as 'Chinese military companies',¹⁷⁴ with CETC added to the US Executive Order 13959 in 2020. CETC declares that the corporation's purpose is 'leveraging civilian electronics for the gain of the PLA'.¹⁷⁵

More recently, further CETC research institutes have been subjected to US sanctions for the infamous 'spy balloon' incident over the US in 2023.¹⁷⁶

Furthermore, according to Xinhua News Agency:

'As the birthplace of China's radar industry, the 14th is known as the "eye of the three armed forces and the heavy weapon of the country." Today, the performance of China's multi-type radar products has reached the world's leading level.... [it] has successfully developed China's first quantum radar system'.¹⁷⁷

In 2020, the University of Kent's Communications Research Group was found to have conducted research concerning advanced telecommunications and radar technology with

¹⁷⁴ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

¹⁷⁵ Matthew Luce: 'A model company: CETC celebrates 10 years of civil-military integration' China Brief (Jamestown Foundation), vol 12, no. 4, 2012. In Hamilton, C. and Ohlberg, M. (2020).

¹⁷⁶ U.S. Blacklists 6 Chinese Entities Involved in Spy Balloon Programs - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

¹⁷⁷ CETC 14th Research Institute (globalsecurity.org)

Xidan University and CETC. Rated as 'Very High Risk' by ASPI, Xidan is supervised by CETC and is a partner of a PLA signals intelligence unit.¹⁷⁸


Other Chinese funding

2019 – £100,000.00¹⁷⁹

Lancaster University

Lancaster University received £503,555.00 between 2017 and 2020. This includes £103,435.00 from Huawei Technologies (£53,435 after the British government announced the ban in Huawei infrastructure), and a further £98,577.00 from Chinese entities heavily involved with military-civil fusion, and links to the PLA.

Figure 1.1.18 Lancaster University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

China University of Geosciences

2017 – £28,577.00

Isotopic provenance study of central Myanmar basin.

China University of Geosciences (CUG) gained secret-level security credentials in 2009, enabling it to participate in classified defence projects, leading to the university's defence research laboratory having a 'production license for weapons and equipment'.¹⁸⁰ In 2023, the

¹⁷⁸ Company Profile-Xidian University-Information Perception Technology Collaborative Innovation Center (archive.org)

¹⁷⁹ The university declined to disclose the name of the individual/entity, stating a breach of a person's data protection.

¹⁸⁰ Our school passed the on-site audit of weapons and equipment scientific research and production license - school office (archive.org)

US House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party reported that it believed CUG to be actively researching hypersonic missile technology on behalf of the PLA.¹⁸¹

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2019 – £50,000.00

2020 – £53,435.00

Total: £103,435.00

Quantum research and computing.

Qingdao National laboratory for Marine Science and Technology

2017 – £24,000.00

2018 – £46,000.00

Total: £70,000.00

Project title: Evolution of the region of the Bengal Basin and Western Myanmar.

The Qingdao National laboratory for Marine Science and Technology is one of five Chinese National Laboratories (NI), administered by the Ministry for Science and Technology (MOST). Whilst more accurately termed a ‘provisional’ NI, Qingdao nevertheless represents one of China’s most important centres for S&T. NIs are envisioned as the nation’s highest-level scientific research and innovation platforms, reflecting national intentions, carrying out strategic missions, and representing the highest achievement of Chinese science.¹⁸²

There is much overlap and crossover between the NIs and China’s Military-Civil Fusion – this is demonstrated by (despite Qingdao’s civilian-sounding name) military research conducted at the laboratory, which has included the development of a satellite-based laser to detect foreign submarines.¹⁸³ Launched in 2018, Qingdao’s Project Guanlan aimed to use satellite-mounted light detection and ranging technology (LIDAR) to pinpoint submarines at depths of up to 500 metres.¹⁸⁴ Naturally, this has immense military applications when applied to the PLAN’s next generation and potentially nuclear-armed submarine fleet.

Other Chinese funding

Total: £301,543.00

University of Leeds

The University of Leeds received £1,585,739.75 between 2018 and 2022 from seven separate Chinese entities. This includes £59,328.59 from two US-sanctioned entities classified as

¹⁸¹ Gallagher Opens Investigation into University with DOD-Funded Weapons Research, Partnership with Chinese Military-linked University | Select Committee on the CCP (house.gov)


¹⁸² 2022-04-11 PRC State and Defense Labs.pdf (af.edu)

¹⁸³ Security experts warn of military threat from Chinese marine project.pdf

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

military companies, and £1,081,275.00 from a company heavily involved in the CCP's military-civil fusion strategy.

Figure 1.1.19 University of Leeds



Source: Civitas FOI request.

China National Offshore Oil Corporation

2020-2022 – £19,328.59

China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was placed under US sanctions on 3 December 2020, as the US DoD designated CNOOC as 'owned or controlled by the Chinese military', listing it under Executive Order 13959; 'Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies'.

Furthermore, in January 2021, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in the US Department of Commerce added CNOOC to the Entity List, stating that the company threaten US national security, and that CNOOC helps China intimidate neighbours in the South China Sea. Highlighting this point, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross declared that:

*'CNOOC acts as a bully for the People's Liberation Army to intimidate China's neighbors, and the Chinese military continues to benefit from government civil-military fusion policies for malign purposes.'*¹⁸⁵

China Shipbuilding Power Engineering Institute Co. Ltd.

2020-2021 – £36,263.53

2021-2022 – £3,736.47

Total: £40,000.00

Project title: Development of a lubrication model for low speed marine engines.

¹⁸⁵ Commerce Adds China National Offshore Oil Corporation to the Entity List and Skyrizon to the Military End-User List | U.S. Department of Commerce

China Shipbuilding Power Engineering Institute (CSPI) is the R&D unit for marine power systems under its owner, the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC).¹⁸⁶ CSSC is listed under US Executive Order 13959 as a Chinese military company, and is listed on the US Department of Commerce's Entity List.¹⁸⁷ CSSC are at the heart of Beijing's civil-military fusion strategy, as the company proclaims itself to be the 'main force' in furthering the development of naval weapons, and equipment in support of national defence.¹⁸⁸

PetroChina Hangzhou Research Institute of Geology

2019-2020 – £37,998.09

2021-2022 – £32,213.03

2022 – £54,509.58

Total: £124,720.70

Zhejiang JIULI Hi-Tech Metals Co. Ltd.

2018-2022 – £1,081,275.00

'JIULI Corrosion and Integrity Centre' in University of Leeds.

Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals is a holdings subsidiary of Jiuli Group Co., Ltd, (publicly listed) specialising in the R&D and production of industrial stainless steel and special alloy pipes, bars, wires, bimetal composite pipes, pipe fittings and other pipeline products.¹⁸⁹ This includes metals and alloys used for both nuclear and military applications.¹⁹⁰ In 2019, members of the communist party's Central Committee visited Zhejiang Jiuli's research facilities, which included a specific emphasis to the site's civil-military integration.¹⁹¹ The company also won a government prize for its civil military integration work.¹⁹²

Other Chinese funding

£320,415.46

University of Liverpool

The University of Liverpool received £1,201,076.00 from eight separate Chinese entities, including £79,548.00 from Huawei Technologies. This also included two individual donors who gave £550,000.00, including one payment in 2021 of £500,000.00. The rest was given by

¹⁸⁶ China Shipbuilding Power Engineering Institute Co., Ltd., China | Contact China Shipbuilding Power Engineering Institute Co., Ltd. | Maritime companies (maritimeinformed.com)

¹⁸⁷ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State see also file (doc.gov)

¹⁸⁸ Our enterprise_China Shipbuilding Group Co., Ltd (cssc.net.cn)

¹⁸⁹ Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals


¹⁹⁰ Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission (europa.eu)

¹⁹¹ [People.cn] Ma Kai visited Kyuri for inspection during his research in Zhejiang and Jiangsu - Press Release - Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals

¹⁹² <https://archive.vn/wynSG>

Chinese energy companies and biopharmaceuticals. It is worth remembering that China are weaponising biotechnologies as part of Beijing's civil-military fusion strategy; the PLA is sponsoring research on gene editing and human performance enhancement, amongst other areas.¹⁹³

Figure 1.1.20 University of Liverpool



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2019 – £79,548.00

Other Chinese funding

£1,121,528.00

Manchester Metropolitan University

Manchester Metropolitan University received £73,052.00 from two separate Chinese entities between 2018 and 2022.

Weifang Medical University

2018 – £30,000.00 – Scholarship, Alzheimer's research.

Yangzhou University


2022 – £43,052.00 – Drone research.

¹⁹³ See The full text of the "Thirteenth Five-Year Plan" Special Plan for the Integration of Science and Technology and Military and Civilian Development_Love Thought (aisixiang.com) also China sprints ahead in CRISPR therapy race | Science

Newcastle University

Newcastle University received £2,877,064.00 between 2017 and 2023 from 18 separate Chinese entities. This includes £511,766.00 from Chinese military companies under US sanctions, and a further £852,718.00 from Chinese entities with links to the Chinese military, and also involved in China's military-civil fusion strategy.

Figure 1.1.21 Newcastle University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Beijing Hyde's Commerce Co. Ltd.

2017-2018 – £252,550.00

2018-2019 – £219,505.00

2019-2020 – £179,365.00

Total: £651,420.00

Short courses and workshop training.

Beijing Normal University

2017 – £20,000.00

China Productivity Center for Machinery Co. Ltd.

2017-2018 – £85,680.00

2018-2019 – £37,158.00

2019-2020 – £1,926.00

2020-2021 – £174,000.00

2022-2023 – £159,000.00

Total: £457,764.00

Testing rigs and equipment, consultancy.

This 'centre' is part of the China Academy of Machinery Science & Technology (CAM). CAM is part of SASAC, the Chinese government commission that manages all state-owned enterprises. CAM is involved in a number of dual-use research areas, including in aerospace and materials science. CAM's website publicly lists its important achievements in national defence research.¹⁹⁴ CAM has previously stated that the Productivity Centre was an institutional member of China's Technical Committee for the Standardisation of Special Military Machinery (军工专用 机械标准化技术委员会).¹⁹⁵

Guangzhou RiboBio Co. Ltd.

2017 – £18,181.00

2020 – £20,374.00

Total: £38,555.00

Harbin Marine Boiler & Turbine Research Institute

2017-2018 – £50,000.00

Consultancy provided by Newcastle.

Harbin Marine Boiler & Turbine Research Institute is also known as the 703 Research Institute of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC),¹⁹⁶ a US-sanctioned Chinese military company.¹⁹⁷ Both Harbin Marine Boiler & Turbine Research Institute and CSIC are listed on the US Department of Commerce's Entity List, prohibiting US trade and investment.¹⁹⁸ The US DoD lists CSIC as a 'Chinese communist military company'.¹⁹⁹

The 703 Research Institute (Harbin Marine Boiler & Turbine Research Institute) developed the main power unit of China's first generation of nuclear-powered submarines and guided missile destroyers, and contributed to the modernisation of the PLA Navy.²⁰⁰

Huawei Device Co. Ltd.

2017-2018 – £70,971.00

2018-2019 – £232,929.00

Total: £303,900.00

Perception for smartphone displays.

¹⁹⁴ <https://archive.vn/1mUky>

¹⁹⁵ www.mtzcz.com/upload/accessory/20199/20199211921542416.pdf

¹⁹⁶ 703rd Research Institute CSIC (globalsecurity.org)

¹⁹⁷ Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies – The White House (archives.gov)

¹⁹⁸ file (doc.gov)

¹⁹⁹ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

²⁰⁰ 703rd Research Institute CSIC (globalsecurity.org)

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2020-2021 – £42,115.00

2021-2022 – £133,204.00

Total: £175,319.00

Shenyang Academy of Instrumentation Science Co. Ltd.

2020-2021 – £8,690.00

2021-2022 – £17,517.00

2022-2023 – £15,254.00

Total: £41,461.00

International collaborative project on Pipeline integrity inspection and data management.

Shenyang Academy of Instrumentation Science (SAIS) manufactures equipment and sub-systems for China's semiconductor industry,²⁰¹ and is involved in China's military aerospace industry.

SSAIS has passed ISO9001 quality system certification and GJB9001A military industry quality system certification. As a key collaboration unit, SSAIS has:

'[R]esearched and manufactured multiple types of military products which are successfully applied to major Chinese defence projects such as manned space flight, lunar exploration program, etc'.²⁰²

Furthermore, SAIS holds a 'Subcontractor Qualification Certificate' for 'Military Electronic Components of Ministry of Information Industry, Weapon and Equipment Research and Production License of SASTIND', National Certificate in Security – Level 3, and won honorary titles of 'Collaboration Supporting Advanced Unit of SASTIND'.²⁰³

Throne Star International Ltd.

2017-2018 – £351,000.00

Consultancy.

University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

2022 – £49,950.00

2023 – £3,568.00

Total: £53,518.00

²⁰¹ Shenyang Instrument Science Research Institute Co., Ltd (hb-sais.com)

²⁰² Shenyang Academy of Instrumentation Science | Semiconductor Materials and Equipment (abachy.com)

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

Intelligent Sensing & Monitoring.

‘Intelligent sensing’ has dual-use functions, with wide military applications.²⁰⁴ The University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC) is designated ‘Very High Risk’ by ASPI, for its very high level of defence research, links to potential human rights abuses, inclusion on the US Government Entity List, and relationship with China’s defence industry and nuclear weapons program. UESTC military electronic outputs are used in missiles, aircraft carriers and aircraft, such as the JF-17 fighter, whilst staff associated with UESTC have founded at least one AI firm involved in surveillance against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang province.²⁰⁵

The university has seven major defence laboratories and 10 designated defence research areas.²⁰⁶

Xiamen University

2017-2018 – £157,783.00

2018-2019 – £82,750.00

2019-2020 – £42,000.00

Total: £282,533.00

Workshop training.

One of China’s top universities, Xiamen (XMU) came under joint supervision between the Ministry of Education and defence industry agency SASTIND, which indicated that XMU will expand its involvement in defence research. The arrangement was designed to ‘upgrade the university’s ability to innovate defence science and technology and actively integrate itself with the development of military-civil fusion.’²⁰⁷

US semiconductor manufacturer CNEX Labs Inc. claimed that in 2017 XMU conspired with Huawei to steal trade secrets, claiming that Huawei and XMU engaged in a multiyear conspiracy to steal the company’s solid-state drive computer storage technology.²⁰⁸ In 2019 a federal jury found Huawei guilty of misappropriating CNEX’s flash memory technology but refused to award damages.²⁰⁹

The university also appeared to be involved in the development of military-use heavy-duty coatings. In 2017, XMU, Fujian Normal University, Fujian Liheng Paint Co. Ltd. and People’s Liberation Army Unit 63983 jointly established the Haixi Liheng New Materials Research Institute.²¹⁰

²⁰⁴ Sensors Used in Military Applications and the Electrical Connectors That Keep Them Powered (beadelectronics.com)

²⁰⁵ Clark and Tylecote. 2021. p.36.

²⁰⁶ University of Electronic Science and Technology of China – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

²⁰⁷ Annual Report 2018 (archive.ph)

²⁰⁸ Huawei Executive Accused by U.S. Startup of Involvement in Trade-Secrets Theft - WSJ

²⁰⁹ Another Stain, Albeit an Inexpensive One, on Huawei’s Trade Secret Practices | Winston & Strawn

²¹⁰ High-quality military enterprises strong profitability|Liheng|Coatings|Military enterprises_Sina Finance_Sina.com (archive.ph)

Zhenhua (Beijing) Mechanical & Electrical Technology Co. Ltd.

2017-2018 – £47,500.00

2018-2019 – £9,450.00

2020-2021 – £98,750.00

2021-2022 – £35,500.00

2022-2023 – £68,500.00

Total: £259,700.00


Other Chinese funding

£191,894.00

Northumbria University

Northumbria University received £2,106,327.00 of funding from 11 separate Chinese entities between 2017 and 2022. This included £300,000.00 from a university with defence laboratories and military-civil fusion programs, in addition to £60,000 from a natural gas extraction company in Xinjiang province in 2022. The rest was from largely opaque science and technology companies and universities.

Figure 1.1.22 Northumbria University



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Nanjing Institute of Technology

2019-2022 – £300,000.00

The institution has five national discipline research platforms, including the 'Military-Civil Integration Innovation Platform', whilst the university has been awarded the 'Top 100'

institutions in science and technology service industry, and the Innovation Award for Technology Transfer.²¹¹

Nanjing Normal University

2017-2018 – £193,000.00

Nanjing Normal University (NNU) is rated as ‘Medium Risk’ by ASPI, for its research strengths in geospatial technology, big data, artificial intelligence, and for its links to the Xinjiang regional government.²¹²

Other Chinese funding

£1,613,327.00

Nottingham Trent University

Nottingham Trent University (NTU) received £201,768.00 from three separate Chinese entities between 2019 and 2022.

Leitu Intelligent Education Technology Research Institute Jiangsu Co. Ltd.

2022 – £65,598.00

Leitu Intelligent Education Technology Research Institute Jiangsu Co. Ltd. ceased trading under that name in 2019, and became Nanjing UK Innovation Limited,²¹³ of which there is almost no information regarding the nature of the company’s work either in the UK or in China.

Other Chinese funding

£136,170.00

Open University


The Open University received £713,723.00 from four separate Chinese entities between 2017 and 2023. This included £500,000.00 to establish an online Confucius Institute in 2021, £189,566.00 from Huawei Technologies in 2022 (two years after the British government announced a ban on Huawei infrastructure), and a university that collaborates closely with military-civil fusion entities, in addition to £14,157.00 from a university with military research links.

Figure 1.1.23 Open University

²¹¹ Nanjing Institute of Technology | ISAC Teach in China Program Jobs

²¹² Nanjing Normal University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

²¹³ NANJING UK INNOVATION LIMITED overview - Find and update company information - GOV.UK (company-information.service.gov.uk)



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Beijing Normal University

2017 – £14,157.00

Several Beijing Normal University (BNU) professors worked on national defence projects at the time of this funding. Research by ASPI found that one professor was concurrently involved in a project funded by the National Defence Basic Scientific Research Program, while another professor had recently served as the project lead for a national defence science and technology project, focused on UAV innovation.²¹⁴

Elsewhere, BNU's Changping Science and Technology Innovation closely collaborates with military-civil fusion industrial parks, including the Zhongguancun S&T Park, whilst BNU's R&D Experimental Service Base also collaborates with military-civil fusion entities, facilitating technology transfers between universities and industry.²¹⁵

Beijing Foreign Studies University

2021-2022 – £100,000.00

2022-2023 – £400,000.00

Total: £500,000.00

The Open University declared this funding thus:

'To host the world's first Online Confucius Institute, to be led by the School of Languages and Applied Linguistics (LAL). As part of the process for establishing a Confucius Institute, we will receive funding from BFSU to cover set up costs. Further

²¹⁴ Talent team - Advanced Institute of Natural Sciences (archive.ph)

²¹⁵ The signing ceremony of Changping Innovation and Technology Park of Beijing Normal University was successfully held (archive.ph) see also Beijing Normal University R&D Experimental Service Base "Hundred into Thousand" Matchmaking Meeting Successfully Held - Analysis of Industry News (archive.ph)

*monies will then be sent to us annually, to fund the OU delivering various Chinese language and culture activities’.*²¹⁶

Chinese Academy of Sciences

2019-2020 – £10,000.00

To study the ore-forming process of the porphyry ore system in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Huawei Technologies

2022 – £189,566.00



Part of a project with the Open University worth £379,123.00 up to 2025.

University of Oxford

The University of Oxford received between £36,196,226.74 – £42,652,226.74, from 37 separate Chinese entities between 2017 and 2022. This included between £5,686,912.44 – £6,582,912.44 from Chinese military companies sanctioned by the US, companies linked to the Chinese military, or companies widely suspected of being linked to the Chinese military.

Figure 1.1.24 University of Oxford (low-end bracket)

Figure 1.1.25 University of Oxford (high-end bracket)



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Baidu

2018-2019 – £100,000.00

3D machine perception for autonomous driving cars.

Baidu is the dominant internet search engine company in China. Its features and services are similar to those of Google, but its focus is on China, where it controls most of the search market. Baidu censors search results and other content in accordance with Chinese regulations.

²¹⁶ As per returned FOI.

Like Tencent, Baidu narrowly missed being placed under US sanctions in 2021, after the US DoD and State Department declared the company to be a 'Chinese communist military company' with links to the PLA.²¹⁷

In January 2018, Baidu partnered with the 28th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corp (CETC) to establish the Joint Laboratory for Intelligent Command and Control Technologies, and to collaborate on high-tech civil-military fusion projects in areas including big data, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence, in order to bolster 'national defense informatization'.²¹⁸

Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences

2018-2019 – £3,000,000.20

2020-2021 – £13,000,000.80

Total: £16,000,001.00

Creat Group Company Ltd.

2018-2019 – £500,000.00 – £749,000.00

The Creat Group is a Chinese investment firm based in Beijing. With expertise in the plasma industry, it primarily invests in healthcare and pharmaceuticals, but also in manufacturing, energy, finance, and natural resources.

Former Conservative leader Sir Iain Duncan Smith referenced the Creat Group in 2020 when highlighting 'the insertion of Chinese influence in all sorts of areas' of the UK economy whilst calling for a review into Chinese investments into strategic industries within the UK.²¹⁹ The prominent MP drew attention to the fact that Britain's leading supplier of blood plasma during the Covid-19 pandemic was BPL Group, a Creat Group subsidiary.

Guangzhou Patronus Biotechnology Co. Ltd.

2021-2022 – £466,130.60

2022-2023 – £346,247.50

Total: £812,378.10

Guilin Pharmaceutical (Shanghai) Co. Ltd.

2017-2018 – £409,635.50

Huawei Technologies Ltd.

2017-2018 – £489,269.00

²¹⁷ RWR Fact Sheet: Examples of the Chinese Military Ties of Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu - Janes IntelTrak (rwradvisory.com)

²¹⁸ Technological entanglement | Australian Strategic Policy Institute | ASPI

²¹⁹ Sabbagh. 2020.

2018-2019 – £303,112.60

2018-2019 – £100,000.00 – £249,000.00

Department of Computer Science – Huawei AI robustness.

Total: £892,381.60 – £1,041,381.60

Jiangsu Industrial Technology Research Institute

2018-2019 – £499,992.00

2020-2021 – £889,807.70

Total: £1,389,799.70

ShanghaiTech University

2019-2020 – £5,000,000.00

Oxford-ShanghaiTech University Collaboration, 2019-2024

All freshmen at ShanghaiTech are required to take part in one-weeks' worth of military training to 'grow team spirit and self-discipline'.²²⁰

In 2021, scientists from ShanghaiTech, in addition to members from China Electronics Technology Group (CETC), researched terahertz detection, which has an active application in military surveillance.²²¹

Sichuan University

2018-2019 – £10,000.00

2020-2021 – £1,800,000.00

Biomedical collaboration.

Sichuan university is designated 'Very High Risk' by ASPI for its relationship to China's nuclear weapons program, suspected links to cyber espionage, and a number of defence laboratories.

In 2012, Sichuan University was added to the US Government Entity List as an alias of the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), the PRC's primary nuclear warheads research facility.²²²

Suzhou Institute of Biomedical Engineering and Technology

2019-2020 – £450,000.00

Application of Raman spectroscopy to life science.

²²⁰ A glance at ShanghaiTech 2022 undergraduate admission

²²¹ Ultrasensitive and Self-Powered Terahertz Detection Driven by Nodal-Line Dirac Fermions and Van der Waals Architecture - PubMed (nih.gov)

²²² Sichuan University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

Suzhou Institute of Biomedical Engineering and Technology (SIBET) is controlled by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). In 2015, CAS launched the Advanced Medical Devices Industries Incubation Alliance in order to transform Chinese medical device achievements, adapt to the development direction of the industrial chain, and to create a new model of medical device achievement transformation from scientific research.²²³ SIBET was a founding member. Among the group's other members include eight military research and development institutions, 10 military engineering institutions, and a military intellectual property management institution.²²⁴

Tencent Holdings Ltd.

2017-2019 – £250,000.00 – £499,000.00

Collaboration with Oxford Statistics Department.

2017-2018 – £600,002.14

2018-2020 – £250,000.00 – £499,000.00

Research funding for Department of Computer Science.

2019-2022 – £750,000.00 – £999,000.00

Research funding for Department of Computer Science and Department of Physics.

2020-2021 – £538,208.70

2021-2022 – £46,320.00

Total: £2,434,530.84 – £3,181,530.84

In autumn 2019, Tencent collaborated with the state newspaper *People's Daily* to produce 'Homeland Dream', in which players could build 'Chinese' cities or provinces, including Hong Kong and Taiwan, more prosperous with real-life policies implemented by the CCP.²²⁵

Tencent are widely accused of seeking to suppress freedom of speech and actively supporting the CCP's draconian crack down on human rights in Hong Kong. In 2019, an NBA coach tweeted support for the Hong Kong democracy movement. The NBA had a streaming service deal with Tencent to broadcast games in China, worth \$1.5 billion to the NBA. Tencent subsequently blacklisted the team in question in future games. Due to how lucrative the sponsorship was to the NBA, both the individual in question and the league itself issued public apologies to China over the incident.²²⁶ Tencent blacklisted a second team after the individual in question moved to another team over one year later.²²⁷ This was widely believed to be over their support for the Hong Kong democracy movement. In 2022, Tencent blacklisted a further

²²³ Advanced Medical Devices Industries Incubation Alliance Chinese Academy of Sciences--Suzhou ZhongKe Medical Device Industry Development Co., Ltd (zkmedical.com.cn)

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

²²⁵ No cults, no politics, no ghouls: how China censors the video game world | Games | The Guardian

²²⁶ NBA in grovelling apology after China suspends broadcasts of Houston Rockets games over Hong Kong 'freedom' tweet | The Independent | The Independent

²²⁷ China drops Philadelphia 76ers broadcasts as Hong Kong row continues | NBA | The Guardian

NBA team after a player called for the freedom of Tibet, and referred to Xi Jinping as a ‘brutal dictator’.²²⁸

In 2021, the US Treasury blocked the US DoD’s and Department of State’s moves to add Tencent to the list of Chinese companies working with the PLA which would have barred US investors. The US DoD and Department of State both believed Tencent to have extensive links with the Chinese military, and to be entrenched in the Chinese government’s high-tech, dual-use innovation drive.²²⁹

In 2020, the Indian government declared Tencent to have links with the PLA.²³⁰

Tencent remains key to the deployment of China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, through the joint efforts of leading military and private enterprises. BeiDou is an international ground-based network developed indigenously for both civilian and military applications, allowing the Chinese military to significantly reduce reliance on foreign controlled communication and navigation networks. BeiDou terminals are currently deployed throughout the PLA ground forces, PLA Navy ships, Second Artillery Force, and the PLA Air Force.²³¹

Furthermore, Beijing Navinfo Technology, in which Tencent holds a stake and has invested significant capital, announced plans to begin mass production of semiconductors for navigation systems using BeiDou in 2020.²³²

Other Chinese funding

£6,397,500.00 – £11,708,500.00

Queen’s University Belfast

Queen’s University Belfast received £152,000.00 between 2019 and 2021, from two separate Chinese entities.

Qingdao Sankai Science & Tech. Co. Ltd.

2019 – £142,000.00

Other Chinese funding

£10,000.00

²²⁸ New NBA China Controversy: Tencent Drops Celtics Games After Kanter Calls Jinping ‘Brutal Dictator’ (forbes.com)

²²⁹ Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu spared from US investor blacklist | Financial Times (ft.com)

²³⁰ Alibaba | Tencent: Huawei, Alibaba, Tencent among 7 Chinese firms in India with links to PLA, claims govt (indiatimes.com) see also


²³¹ RWR Fact Sheet 1-12-2021 (rwradvisory.com) p.4.

²³² China is building Beidou, a \$12 billion rival to the American-run GPS | The Straits Times

University of Reading

The University of Reading received £359,498.23 between 2017 and 2021 from four separate Chinese entities, including £115,714.57 from companies banned from operating on 5G infrastructure in the UK and on US sanctions, and with Chinese companies who are themselves heavily partnered with military-civil entities.

Figure 1.1.26 University of Reading



Source: Civitas FOI request.

China Europe International Business School

2019 – £3,633.30

Research on retirees in the Chinese aerospace industry.

The China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) is located in Beijing's Zhongguancun Software Park,²³³ which is home to at least four Chinese aerospace companies with links to the PLA and/or to Beijing's civil-military fusion doctrine.²³⁴

In January 2019 – three months before the contract date between Reading and the CEIBS – the Zhongguancun Management Committee (which oversees the entire area) proposed that:

*'[T]he park will establish a special organization composed of professionals with national defense and scientific research capabilities, and set up a sound, normalized and scientific system for the integration of military technologies and civilian industries'.*²³⁵

²³³ Beijing Campus | CEIBS

²³⁴ 2020-06-14 Chinese_Aerospace_Defense_Companies.pdf (af.edu)

²³⁵ Zhongguancun facilitates development of military-civilian integration parks (chinadaily.com.cn)

In January 2021, the US DoD added the Beijing Zhongguancun Development Investment Center to its fifth tranche of 'Communist Chinese military companies'.²³⁶

EPC Natural Products Co. Limited

2021 – £243,783.66

EPC Natural Products is a Chinese food development company.

Huawei Technologies

2021 – £50,300.00

Research aimed to identify the key factors that impacted the 5G programme of Huawei (UK).

The contract date for this research funding from Huawei was 22 June 2021. The UK government announced an end to all Huawei technology in the UK's 5G infrastructure in July 2020, 11 months previously, to include no new kit added from January 2021, five months before this collaborative project's contract date.²³⁷

Sinldo Information Technology

2017 – £61,781.27

Also known in China as Xinlianda Information Technology (Beijing) Co. Ltd. Sinldo Information Technology is a subsidiary of China Merchants Group Limited, a state-owned enterprise, operating under the auspices of the Chinese Ministry of Transport.²³⁸

Operating in the field of mobile medicine and smart medical practices in China, Sinldo provides medical institutions with solutions for smart hospitals, Internet hospitals and medical alliances. This is primarily based on data integration and data sharing.²³⁹ First amongst Sinldo's partners mentioned online on its website is the 301st Hospital of the PLA.²⁴⁰

Furthermore, Sinldo lists on its website its four joint laboratories: Tsinghua University (rated 'Very High Risk' by ASPI), Beijing Institute of Technology (one of China's Seven Sons of National Defence, a state-run defence university and also rated 'Very High Risk' by ASPI), Beijing Jiaotong University (involved in military research projects since 2005,²⁴¹ and holding secret-level security credentials, allowing it to participate in classified military research projects, since 2007),²⁴² and the University of Reading.²⁴³

²³⁶ DOD Releases List of Additional Companies, In Accordance with Section 1237 of FY99 NDAA > U.S. Department of Defense > Release

²³⁷ Huawei to be removed from UK 5G networks by 2027 - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

²³⁸ China's anti-corruption campaign reaches Hong Kong - Nikkei Asia

²³⁹ Xinlianda Information Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. - official website (sinldo.com)

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ Our school passed the second supervision and audit of weapons and equipment quality system-Beijing Jiaotong University News Network (archive.ph)

²⁴² The school held the secrecy education and training and military industry secrecy qualification review and certification examination-Beijing Jiaotong University News Network (archive.ph)

²⁴³ Company Profile - Xinlianda Information Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. - official website (sinldo.com)

Lastly, Sinlido claims on its website that:

*‘Xinlianda has five information security qualifications, and its related products have passed the information security certification of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China’.*²⁴⁴

Robert Gordon University

Robert Gordon University received £50,000.00 in 2021 from one Chinese entity.

Chinese Academy of Sciences


2021 – £50,000.00

Research on spectral image processing and analysis algorithm.

Royal Holloway, University of London

Royal Holloway received £561,918.00 between 2016 and up until 2024 from two separate Chinese entities, including £490,918.00 from an ongoing collaboration with a subsidiary of a Chinese chemical conglomerate with links to the Chinese military, involved in military-civil fusion, and declared a ‘Communist Chinese military company’ by the US government.

Figure 1.1.27 Royal Holloway, University of London



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Beijing 21st Century Hospital

2016-2017 through to 2019-2020 – £71,000.00

Co-funded studentship.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Syngenta

2018-2019, 2020-2021, 2023-2024 – £490,918.00

Fully-funded studentship.

Syngenta is an agricultural research and development subsidiary of China National Chemical Corporation,²⁴⁵ commonly known as ChemChina, a state-owned chemical conglomerate, producing amongst other products equipment for petrochemical processing for both the Chinese civilian and military sectors.²⁴⁶

In 2007, before the ChemChina buyout in 2016, Syngenta came under scrutiny by the US Securities and Exchange Commission.²⁴⁷ This was due to third-party sales of products in countries including Iran, North Korea, and Syria.

Syngenta's crop protection products have also been the subject of repeated criticism; the company was accused of including the sale of highly toxic pesticides in its business model,²⁴⁸ whilst in 2012 the company was nominated for the 'Public Eye Award', which highlights companies with questionable human rights practices.²⁴⁹

ChemChina was added to the US Executive Order 13959 in 2020 as a company with links to the Chinese military,²⁵⁰ whilst the US DoD added both Syngenta and ChemChina to its list of 'Communist Chinese military companies'.²⁵¹

Salford University

Salford University received £281,400.00 between 2020 and 2021 from four separate Chinese entities. This includes China's prominent television broadcaster, and state-controlled propaganda department, complicit in repressing human rights and democracy activists in China, Hong Kong, the UK, and the US.

A University of Salford spokesperson commented: *'The payment received by the University of Salford from the China International Television Corporation was for a consultancy project that supported a film being produced in China to celebrate the 200th anniversary of Engels' birth. Filming took place across Manchester and London, in places pertinent and relevant to the time that Engels spent in England. There were also a number of interviews conducted with people from institutions where filming took place.'*

²⁴⁵ Home | Syngenta

²⁴⁶ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

²⁴⁷ sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1123661/000095010315001201/dp52748_20f.htm

²⁴⁸ Syngenta's toxic business model (publiceye.ch)

²⁴⁹ Dubious honour for Syngenta | Handelszeitung

²⁵⁰ Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies – The White House (archives.gov) see also Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

²⁵¹ *ibid.*

China International Television Corporation

2020-2021 – £126,291.00

China International Television Corporation is owned by China Central Television (CCTV), which reports to the Central Propaganda Department. Freedom House and other media commentators have accused CCTV's reporting about topics sensitive to the Chinese government and CCP of being distorted, often used as a weapon against the party's perceived enemies and used for repression.²⁵²

This included demonising peaceful Hong Kong demonstrators in 2019, and even publishing online the personal information of Hong Kong protesters and journalists, exposing them to real-world harassment.²⁵³

CCTV subsequently cancelled televising an NBA team's games in China due to their manager expressing personal support for Hong Kong democracy activists,²⁵⁴ further using their platform as a means of coercion.

The Chinese propaganda network has also been widely suspected of airing extracted forced confessions from activists, which are subsequently recounted and claimed under duress. On 21 November 2019, CCTV's international arm CGTN aired a video of a forced confession from Hong Kong activist Simon Cheng. Within a week, Cheng had filed a new complaint to the UK broadcasting regulator Ofcom over the recording.²⁵⁵

CCTV have also been instrumental in censoring Chinese debate surrounding Russia's war against Ukraine. During the 2022 Winter Paralympics, CCTV censored a speech by International Paralympic Committee president Andrew Parsons condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whilst the network promoted Russian disinformation such as unsubstantiated claims of biological weapons labs in Ukraine.²⁵⁶ Furthermore, in April 2022, CCTV repeated Russian claims that the Bucha massacre was staged.²⁵⁷

Other Chinese funding

£155,109.00

University of Sheffield

The University of Sheffield received £3,423,229.00 between 2017 and 2023 from 13 separate Chinese entities. This includes £104,729.00 from one of China's Seven Sons of National Defence, £934,157.00 from firms sanctioned in the US for being Chinese military companies, and a further £2,084,000.00 from companies involved in China's military-civil fusion strategy.

²⁵² China Central Television: A Long-standing Weapon in Beijing's Arsenal of Repression | Freedom House

²⁵³ *Ibid.*


²⁵⁴ China won't show NBA preseason games as backlash continues over Hong Kong tweet | CNN Business

²⁵⁵ Simon Cheng: UK media watchdog receives 'China forced confession' complaint - BBC News

²⁵⁶ Paralympic Body Presses China on Censoring of No-War Speech - Bloomberg see also How China Embraces Russian Propaganda and Its Version of the War - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

²⁵⁷ As the world reacts in horror to Bucha, China's state media strikes a different tone | CNN

Figure 1.1.28 University of Sheffield



Source: Civitas FOI request.

BAIC Import & Export Co. Ltd.

2021-2022 – £400,000.00

BAIC Import & Export Co. Ltd are part of BAIC Group – and a large part of BAIC Group’s sales are made from military vehicles.²⁵⁸

Beihang University

2017-2018 – £52,513.00

2018-2019 – £52,216.00

Total: £104,729.00

Beihang University is rated as ‘Very High Risk’ by ASPI for its top-secret security credentials, nine separate defence laboratories, and 38 designated defence research areas, with strong relationships with China’s defence industry and the PLA.²⁵⁹ Beihang is one of China’s Seven Sons of National Defence.

CRRC Zhuzhou Institute Co. Ltd.

2018-2019 – £175,000.00

2019-2020 – £285,000.00

2020-2021 – £175,000.00

2021-2022 – £65,000.00

Total: £700,000.00

²⁵⁸ About: BAIC Group (dbpedia.org)

²⁵⁹ Beihang University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

CRRC Zhuzhou Institute is a subsidiary wholly owned by the China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation (CRRC),²⁶⁰ which is designated as a 'Communist Chinese military company' by the US DoD, last updated in January 2021.²⁶¹ As such, it is also subjected to US Executive Order 13959 from November 2020 for having links to the Chinese military.²⁶²

Guangdong Meizhi Compressor Ltd.

2018-2019 – £150,000.00

2019-2020 – £150,000.00

2020-2021 – £150,000.00

2021-2022 – £150,000.00

2022-2023 – £150,000.00

Total: £750,000.00

Guangdong Meizhi Compressor Ltd is part of Midea Group (see below).

HiSilicon Technologies Co. Ltd.

2017-2018 – £56,000.00

HiSilicon Technologies is a semiconductor company wholly owned by Huawei, a chip design business that has become central to China's ambitions in semiconductor technology,²⁶³ and central to the PLA's modernisation.²⁶⁴

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2018-2019 – £130,600.00

Midea Ltd.

2017-2018 – £198,000.00

2018-2019 – £198,000.00

2019-2020 – £99,000.00

2020-2021 – £50,000.00

2021-2022 – £300,000.00

Total: £845,000.00

²⁶⁰ Home (crrcgc.cc)

²⁶¹ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

²⁶² Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies – The White House (archives.gov)

²⁶³ About Us | HiSilicon

²⁶⁴ Chu. 2023.

Midea Group acquired a German robotics company, Kuka, and integrated Kuka into China's military-industrial complex. This included direct work with military entities.²⁶⁵

Shanghai Aerospace Automobile Electromechanical Co. Ltd.

2017-2018 – £33,000.00

Shanghai Aerospace manufactures and sells solar products in China, and is heavily involved in China's civil-military integration.²⁶⁶

The 10th Research Institute of China

2017-2018 – £93,201.00

2018-2019 – £10,356.00

Total: £103,557.00

The 10th Research Institute of China is a research and development branch of the US sanctioned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC). CETC has stated that the corporation's purpose is 'leveraging civilian electronics for the gain of the PLA'.²⁶⁷ The 10th Research Institute primarily engages in avionics, Aerospace Electronics, communications, reconnaissance confrontation, recognition, radar and other electronic systems engineering and equipment research and production.²⁶⁸

Other Chinese funding

£300,343.00

Sheffield Hallam University

Sheffield Hallam University received £40,000.00 in 2019 from one Chinese entity.

China Railway Hi-Tech Industry Corporation

2019 – £40,000.00

University of Southampton

The University of Southampton received £5,042,762.00 between 2017 and 2023 from 10 separate Chinese entities. This includes £4,296,090.00 from US-sanctioned, PLA-controlled or PLA-affiliated military-civil companies, and a further £275,848.00 from Chinese universities heavily involved in Beijing's military-civil fusion.


Figure 1.1.29 University of Southampton

²⁶⁵ Made in Germany, Co-opted by China (fdd.org)

²⁶⁶ Approach HT (ht-saae.com)

²⁶⁷ Clark and Tylecote. 2021.

²⁶⁸ The 10th Research Institute of China electronic technology group Corporation (cetcei.com)



Source: Civitas FOI request.

China Rocket

2017-2021 – £135,000.00

Laboratory collaboration.

China Ship Scientific Research Centre

2017-2021 – £15,390.00

Vibration control in marine engineering.

China Ship Scientific Research Centre (CSSRC) is an alias of the state-owned China State Shipbuilding Corporation Limited's (CSSC) 702nd Research Institute. Both entities (CSSRC and CSSC) are listed under the US Department of Commerce's Entity List from 2020,²⁶⁹ whilst CSSC is listed by the US DoD as a 'Communist Chinese military company',²⁷⁰ and is also placed under US Executive Order 13959 as a Chinese company controlled by the PLA.²⁷¹

CRRC Qingdao Sifang Co. Ltd.

2017-2021 – £318,723.00

CRRC Qingdao Sifang is a subsidiary of CRRC Corporation Limited, which is subject to US sanctions, is placed on the Executive Administration 13959, and categorised by the US DoD as a 'Communist Chinese military company' with links to the PLA.²⁷²

Hisilicon Optoelectronics Co. Ltd.

²⁶⁹ file (doc.gov)

²⁷⁰ Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries - United States Department of State see also DOD Releases List of People's Republic of China (PRC) Military Companies in Accordance With Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 > U.S. Department of Defense > Release

2017-2021 – £2,354,652.00

Development of optical amplifiers.

Huawei Technologies

2017-2022/2023 – £1,457,325.00

Optoelectronics.

Optoelectronics are an essential part of many military and aerospace applications, from soldiers' infrared sites, the displays in military vehicles, the optical suite of the Hubble Space Telescope, and within the U.S. Air Force's Airborne Laser.²⁷³

Optoelectronic components and subsystems are an important part of these platforms and systems. Military designers today are blending optoelectronics and electronic technologies to improve the capabilities of sensors, speed the throughput of communications links, and field effective laser weapons.²⁷⁴

2018-2019 – £150,000.00

Support the electronic materials and devices research group.

State Grid Shaanxi Electric Power Research Institute

2017-2021 – £163,853.00

Power Cable Ageing and Lifetime Estimation.

Southwest University

2018-2019 – £5,000.00

Tate Exchange Project.

Southwest Jiaotong University

2017-2021 – £111,378.00

Joint Research into Noise and Vibration for High-Speed Railways.

University of Science and Technology Beijing

2017-2021 – £10,000.00

Superalloys.

University of Science and Technology Beijing (USTB) is rated as 'High Risk' by ASPI, for its high level of defence research and close relationships with the defence industry, and is known as the 'cradle of steel' for its training and research on metallurgy.²⁷⁵ Accordingly, the majority of USTB's defence related research appears to be on metallurgy and metals science, and hosts

²⁷³ Optoelectronic innovation is everywhere | Military Aerospace

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ University of Science and Technology Beijing (archive.org)

at least three laboratories dedicated to defence research, including two that are jointly run with state-owned defence conglomerates – NORINCO and CETC. Both of these collaborative defence labs concern metallurgy and metals science.²⁷⁶

Furthermore, in 2017 USTB organised a forum on civil-military fusion together with SASTIND, the Central Military, and several state-owned defence and steel companies, including NORINCO.²⁷⁷

Zhengzhou University

2017-2021 – £265,848.00

Control system architectures.

Zhengzhou University (ZZU) has extensive collaborations with the PLA Information Engineering University, having a formal research cooperation in-place since at least 2010.²⁷⁸ Since the funding for the University of Southampton started in 2017, ZZU and the PLA Information Engineering University established a joint military-civil fusion research institute.²⁷⁹

ZZU hosts the National Supercomputer (Zhengzhou) Centre, established on the university's campus in November 2020. The National Supercomputer (Zhengzhou) Centre was subsequently added to the US Entity List in April 2021, for acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.²⁸⁰

Other Chinese funding

£55,593.00

University of St Andrews

The University of St Andrews received £478,892.00 between 2019 and 2023 from two separate Chinese entities. This includes £159,570.00 from a university with strong links to China's military-civil fusion strategy.

²⁷⁶ The 59th Research Institute of China North Industries - Department of Construction Engineering (archive.ph) see also Scientific research base (archive.org)


²⁷⁷ University of Science and Technology Beijing Civil-Military Integration Collaborative Innovation Seminar Held_Huayu Education Network 【Formerly China University Network】 (archive.ph)

²⁷⁸ Zhengzhou University online information (archive.ph)

²⁷⁹ Zhengzhou University-PLA Information Engineering University Joint Construction Institute Symposium was held at Zhengzhou University-Office of the President of Zhengzhou University (archive.ph)

²⁸⁰ Federal Register :: Addition of Entities to the Entity List

Figure 1.1.30 University of St Andrews



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Chinese Academy of Sciences

2019-2020 – £55,860.00

2020-2021 – £128,394.00

2021-2022 – £87,124.00

2022-2023 – £47,944.00

Total: £319,322.00

Awarded to the Department of Geography and Geoscience for a research project entitled 'Estimation of the Glacier Mass Changes on the Third Pole since the 1960s'.

Beijing Normal University

2019-2020 – £56,821.00

2020-2021 – £60,034.00

2021-2022 – £32,647.00

2022-2023 – £10,068.00

Total: £159,570.00

School of Chemistry.

Beijing Normal University (BNU) applied for security credentials in 2013, later obtaining secret-level security credentials in order to serve the CCP's national defence development

program.²⁸¹ BNU's Changping Science and Technology Innovation Park closely collaborates with the Zhongguancun S&T Park; a well-known military-civil fusion industrial park.²⁸²


Furthermore, BNU's R&D Experimental Service collaborates with military-civil fusion entities, facilitating technology transfers between universities and industry.²⁸³

University of Strathclyde

The University of Strathclyde received £1,268,179.00 of Chinese funding between 2017 and 2020 from 10 separate Chinese entities. This includes £21,832.00 from one of China's Seven Sons of National Defence and a major defence university with extensive links to the PLA, in addition to £97,615.00 from two further entities involved in Beijing's military-civil fusion doctrine. Furthermore, there were six redacted entities with £808,992.00 worth of funding, including £600,000.00 from one redacted entity.

A spokesperson for the University of Strathclyde said: *'As a leading international technological university, Strathclyde academics work regularly with partners from across the world. All of our research collaborations are open and transparent and are subject to due diligence processes. Such exchanges are subject to UK government legislation on export control and we remain fully compliant with the UK legal framework.'*

Figure 1.1.31 University of Strathclyde



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Chinese Academy of Sciences

2018 – £40,000.00 – Knowledge exchange.

²⁸¹ The school held a mobilization meeting for on-site review of military industry secrecy qualification certification University News (archive.ph)

²⁸² Changping Park (archive.ph)

²⁸³ Beijing Normal University R&D Experimental Service Base "Hundred into Thousand" Matchmaking Meeting Successfully Held - Analysis of Industry News (archive.ph)

2019 – £50,000.00 – Research.

2020 – £54,885.00 – Research.

Total: £144,885.00

Harbin Engineering University

2020 – £21,832.00 – Research.

Harbin Engineering University (HEU) is one of China's top defence universities. A member of China's Seven Sons of National Defence and a former PLA engineering institute, it is heavily integrated into the CCP's military-civil fusion. HEU maintains four major defence laboratories and 18 designated defence research areas,²⁸⁴ and was added to the US Government's Entity List in 2020 for 'for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of programs for the People's Liberation Army'.²⁸⁵

InsightZen

2020 – £60,000.00 – Research.

Shandong Institute of Shipbuilding Technology

2017 – £134,855.00 – Research.

This Institute was jointly founded by Harbin Institute of Technology (a member of the Seven Sons of National Defence), and the Shandong local government.²⁸⁶

Tianjin Municipal Education Commission

2017 – £81,615.00 – Knowledge exchange.

The Tianjin Municipal Education Commission is the education authority responsible for overseeing and regulating the education system in Tianjin, China. It is responsible for formulating policies, regulations, and standards for the development of education in Tianjin, as well as for promoting innovation. It oversees all of these issues at both Tianjin University (TJU, rated 'High Risk' by ASPI), and Tianjin Polytechnic University (TJPU).

TJU has a high level of involvement in defence research and links to economic espionage,²⁸⁷ and is administered by SASTIND. TJU was added to the US Entity List in December 2020, for acting contrary to the national interests of the US.²⁸⁸

Defence industry agency SASTIND began overseeing TJPU in 2018 in order to support the university's development of defence disciplines, construction of defence laboratories, and

²⁸⁴ Harbin Engineering University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

²⁸⁵ Federal Register, Addition of Entities to the Entity List, Revision of Certain Entries on the Entity List

²⁸⁶ Shandong Shipbuilding Technology Research Institute Profile (archive.vn)

²⁸⁷ Tianjin University's Response to Professors' Indictment in U.S. - The New York Times (archive.org)

²⁸⁸ Federal Register: Addition of Entities to the Entity List, Revision of Entry on the Entity List, and Removal of Entities From the Entity List

training of defence scientists. Two centres at TJPU were established in 2018 as a means of incorporating the goals of military-civil fusion into the university's research.²⁸⁹

University of Science and Technology

2020 – £16,000.00 – Research.

The University of Science and Technology (USTC) has an established research centre for military-civil fusion,²⁹⁰ while many of their faculty partners with the defense industry pursue military applications of their technologies and research.²⁹¹

Other Chinese funding

£808,992.00

University of Surrey

The University of Surrey received £11,271,276.00 between 2017 and 2022. The university declined to provide the names of the Chinese entities the money came from, and for what purposes.

2017-2018 – £692,361.00

2018-2019 – £1,996,007.00

2019-2020 – £2,841,215.00

2020-2021 – £1,869,629.00

2021-2022 – £3,872,064.00

Total: £11,271,276.00

University of Sussex

The University of Sussex received £92,745.00 between 2018 and 2021 from one Chinese entity.

Jinhang Steel

2018-2019 – £21,744.00

2019-2020 – £39,454.00

2020-2021 – £31,547.00

²⁸⁹ Explore the road of civil-military integration Our school builds two "centers" in Suzhou (archive.org)

²⁹⁰ Institute of Advanced Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Recruitment Information of Civil-Military Integration Innovation Center | Recruitment Notice-Talent Recruitment-Institute of Advanced Technology, University of Science and Technology of China (archive.org)

²⁹¹ Quantum Hegemony? | Center for a New American Security (en-US) (cnas.org)

Total: £92,745.00

Postdoctoral researcher in 'Lubrication studies of vibrating systems'.

Swansea University

Swansea University received £21,478.00 in 2017 from one Chinese entity.

Guangxi University


2017 – £21,478.00

Big data mining analytics.

University of Westminster

The University of Westminster received £329,868.00 between 2018-2020 from one Chinese entity subjected to US sanctions.

Figure 1.1.32 University of Westminster



Source: Civitas FOI request.

Huawei Device Co. Ltd.

2018-2019 – £128,368.00

2019-2020 – £201,500.00

Total: £329,868.00

Chapter Two: Chinese threats on British campus – The United Front China’s ‘United Front’ Strategy

The ‘United Front’ strategy is a whole-of-government and indeed a whole-of-system approach that the CCP uses to co-opt and, importantly, neutralise, sources of potential challenge and opposition to its authority. The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) is the centralised agency charged with coordinating both internal and external influence operations, targeting potential opposition groups within China, in addition to carrying out the CCP’s influence overseas.

The UFWD sits under the CCP Central Committee, itself controlled by the General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping. One of the UFWD’s most important roles is to direct ‘overseas Chinese work’; the co-opting of Chinese individuals and communities living outside China. With up to 700,000 Chinese studying abroad, the international Chinese student diaspora is a heavily targeted demographic for the UFWD’s campaign.²⁹²

The United Front strategy of advancing the CCP’s political and ideological interests both at home and abroad has seen a rapid rise in emphasis since Xi Jinping became president in 2012, describing it as important for the ‘whole (Chinese Communist) Party’, centralising its role within China’s broader foreign policy.²⁹³

The overseas operations of the UFWD involve a number of official and quasi-official entities which conduct overseas activities guided or funded by the United Front – including Chinese government and military organisations, cultural associations, and crucially, oversees academic groups such as Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), and the controversial Confucius Institutes (CI).

In order to better control this strategy targeting China’s sprawling international student base to help further the CCP’s foreign agenda, the UFWD relies upon coordination with multiple party entities, namely the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the CSSA, the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC), and the Confucius Institutes (CI).

Whilst much excellent work has closely examined the malign influence of the CI within the UK,²⁹⁴ more work is needed to further understand the role in which other United Front entities operate in UK campuses – in particular the CSSA and the CSC, and how they target certain groups and threaten Britain’s democratic way of life.

Not just consigned to threatening and intimidating mainland Chinese students, these various UFWD-linked programmes are additionally charged with overseeing the influence operations used by the CCP to target Taiwan and Hong Kong, aiming to suppress independence movements, undermine local identity, and promote support for Beijing’s political system. These have real and demonstrable affects to students studying in the UK

²⁹² Chinese students stay local as favour falls with study abroad (nature.com)

²⁹³ Andrelini et al. 2017.

²⁹⁴ Dunning and Kwong. 2022.

from both Taiwan and Hong Kong – the latter of whom, in particular, the UK is both duty and morally bound to safeguard.

In all of these cases, the CCP's United Front work serves to further Xi Jinping's preferred alternative global narrative, in addition to pressuring individuals living in free and open societies to self-censor, and avoid discussing issues which challenge the CCP's authority, ultimately by seeking to undermine groups critical of Beijing's policies.

The following sections outline how each of these different but interlinked UFWD-linked programmes interact with UK universities, and their roles with the Chinese student diaspora in the UK.

China Scholarship Council (CSC)

Established in the mid-1990s, the CSC is a Ministry of Education's scheme to support Chinese students studying overseas. It only applies to residents of the PRC, excluding students from Hong Kong and Taiwan. In addition, the scheme provides support for international students studying in China, but such an inquiry is outside the realms of this study.

There are two important clarifications to understand with regards to the CSC. The first is that its existence is a tool of CCP statecraft, and therefore demonstrably threatens freedoms on British campuses. The second is that the scholarships are heavily subsidised by British universities themselves, and therefore in part by the British taxpayer. Thus, the CSC provides a further illuminating example of both the dependency that British universities have on China, and the inherent threats that this largely one-way relationship poses to British universities, Britain's economic independence, and to national security more broadly.

CSC as a tool of CCP statecraft

Virtually all of the British universities who engage with the CSC scholarships advise students to first refer to the CSC awarding criteria, as the Ministry of Education has the ultimate say over whether a student's application is successful or not, not the university. For instance, Lancaster University states that 'scholarships will be awarded on the basis of academic merit and CSC priorities',²⁹⁵ without referring further to what these CSC priorities are. Indeed, no university clarifies what the CSC priorities or criteria are.

So just what are these criteria? This project analysed two Chinese documents: the 'China Scholarship Fund Sponsorship Study Abroad Selection Guidelines' (known hereafter as the 'selection guidelines'), and the CSC Charter, to help clarify the nature of the CSC and what the awards precisely entail.

Chapter One Article One of the selection guidelines states that successful students are expected to:

*'Thoroughly implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a **New Era**, serve the national strategy, face national needs, provide talent support for the comprehensive construction of a modern socialist country, build a platform for*

²⁹⁵ China Scholarship Council - Lancaster University

*people-to-people exchanges between China and foreign countries for **building a community with a shared future for mankind**, and promote the country's public study abroad to play a greater role in the overall national strategy and the opening up of education in the new era'. [Emphasis added.]*

The term 'New Era' frequently appears in much official CCP discourse, used to describe the party narrative of a hegemonic China leading a new global order subservient to Beijing, and one in which China's authoritarian values permeate across this new global order. Likewise, the phrase 'building a community' refers to this new global order based around the CCP's authoritarian values, whilst the 'shared future for mankind' refers to a Chinese-led future for mankind. These terms feature heavily throughout contemporary CCP discourse, speeches, and text.

The CSC selection guidelines clearly show that successful scholars are expected to promote the CCP's agenda and foreign policy, which includes the now ubiquitous CCP slogan 'building a community with a shared future for mankind', which should be understood as the Chinese Communist Party's vision for a new global order with China as the new global hegemon. Successful CSC students must not just subscribe to this agenda therefore, but to also actively promote it whilst at British universities.

The CSC Charter also provides many illuminating if not worrying facets of the CSC doctrine that must be pursued by students overseas. Article 19 of the selection guidelines declares that 'The selection unit shall review the applicant's political ideology',²⁹⁶ and that 'If you fail to pass any of the material review and expert review, you will not be admitted'.²⁹⁷ This is a clear indication that successful scholars must share and support the CCP's political ideology, which is one of authoritarian socialism that has little respect for human rights or the freedoms of choice and expression which are fundamental pillars to liberal democracies.

The CSC Charter further instructs the 'domestic selection units' (Chinese regional centres of the CSC, that is, CSC Hong Kong and so forth) who are in effect in charge of the Chinese students to 'keep abreast of their ideological trends, and do not send those with problems'.²⁹⁸ This shows that the long tentacles of the CCP police state, one in which pervasive and intrusive surveillance practices permeate all realms of civic life, extend across borders and in to the lives of Chinese students on British campuses, almost certainly influencing how these Chinese students act, react, and integrate whilst in the UK.

Furthermore, the CSC Charter instructs,

'Before the dispatch of overseas students, pre-departure education should be carried out, ideological and political education and patriotism education should be included in the training content'.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ 2022 National Construction High-level University Public Postgraduate Program Selection Measures - Welcome to the National Study Abroad Network! (csc.edu.cn)

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.* Article 30 Section One.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.* Article 30 Section Two.

Evidently, further ideological and political indoctrination is part of the CSC scholarship, not just an educational support grant for international students but also a political training tool by the CCP for students to further Beijing's malign influence abroad.

The CSC Charter concludes, somewhat ominously, that failure to abide by (Chinese) national laws can and will result in the returning of the student to China:

'If a student does not meet the requirements of the "Selection Brochure" and these Selection Measures, or is investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with law in violation of national laws and regulations ...the China Scholarship Council has the right to take measures such as returning the application, canceling qualifications, terminating funding, and recovering compensation for breach of contract'.³⁰⁰

A full up-to-date translation of the CSC's Charter can be found at UK-China Transparency's online library. The latest version from March 2023 details a stricter enforcing of the institutions rules for Chinese scholars. For instance, the applicant's institution must perform a rigorous review of the applicant's political ideology, professional ethics, and teaching style (or conduct and research style), etc., and provide a written evaluation of the applicant's performance in these areas in the institution's recommendation column of the main application form.³⁰¹

This must undoubtedly have an effect on the student's conduct whilst in the UK (or any overseas study); taken to its extreme, this final article of the charter can ensure that Chinese students who do not further the CCP's foreign policy or act in any manner which compromises the CCP's authoritarian ideology, can be forcibly returned to China. This then clearly has an adverse impact on many Chinese students' abilities for an independent education, whilst significantly damaging educational freedoms across many UK's universities.

CSC Partnerships: The cost to British universities

Whilst the humanities are accepted for CSC scholarships, most successful scholars unsurprisingly are in science and technology. The University of Surrey specifies the fields of artificial intelligence, communication systems, space and materials, infection and immunity, sustainability, electrical and electronic engineering, computer vision, and computer science.³⁰²

Virtually all of the universities identified which collaborate with the CSC categorise it as a 'CSC partnership'. Within this 'partnership', which is a CCP financial support mechanism for CCP-politically and ideologically passable PRC students furthering Beijing's agenda abroad, British universities pay the full amount – or rather, subsidise through their own expense – the tuition fees for the Chinese students awarded a CSC scholarship.

The wording below detailing such arrangements comes directly from Lancaster University's website, but is replicated almost verbatim across other partnered universities:

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.* Chapter IV Article 32.

³⁰¹ Library - (ukctransparency.org)

³⁰² China Scholarship Council-Surrey Awards | University of Surrey

*‘For successful applicants to the scheme, the relevant **academic department/school** will fund the overseas tuition fees for the full duration, which is typically three years and the **China Scholarship Council** will provide a maintenance grant for living costs, one return flight from China to the UK and UK visa application fees subject to CSC policies’.*³⁰³ [Emphasis added.]

These scholarships are primarily (if not almost entirely exclusively) for PhD students in the science and technology sectors, at many of the UK’s most reputable research universities. The annual fees for such a course are regularly in excess of £25,000.00 per year, and sometimes reaching as high as almost £40,000.00.

Therefore, these British universities who take part in a CSC partnership are heavily subsidising some of their most expensive courses, in return for a ‘partnership’ with the Chinese Ministry of Education. The CCP usually provides the student with a stipend or allowance, usually at around £16,000.00 – £18,000.00 per year. The University of Manchester, for example, charge up to £39,500.00 per year for PhD courses.³⁰⁴ That’s a subsidised value of up to £118,500.00 per student for a three-year course, whilst the CCP will contribute between £48,000.00 and £54,000.00 per student. Although speculative, the University of Manchester award six CSC scholarships a year, so that could be up £237,000.00 per year that the university is subsidising.

Table 2.1 below summarises the UK universities which maintain a partnership with the CSC, and the number of scholarships awarded each year.

Table 2.1 List of UK – CSC partnerships³⁰⁵

University	Number of CSC scholarships
University of Bath	10
University of Birmingham	10
University of Bristol	60
University of Cambridge	30
University College London	16
University of Dundee	10
Durham University	20
University of East Anglia	20
University of Exeter	50
University of Hull	10
Imperial College London	15
Lancaster University	5
Leeds University	20
London School of Economics	2
Loughborough University	50
University of Kent	20
King’s College London	100

³⁰³ China Scholarship Council - Lancaster University bold authors own

³⁰⁴ Postgraduate research fees | Biology, Medicine, Health | University of Manchester

³⁰⁵ Full list and breakdown of figures for respective universities’ CSC partnerships see Appendix B.

University of Manchester	6
Newcastle University	10
University of Oxford	20
Queen Mary University	60
Queen's University Belfast	20
University of Reading	2
St Andrews	40
University of Surrey	10
University of Warwick	30
Total	646
Average	25

Source: Respective university websites.

As can be evidenced from their own websites, British universities provide – at their own expense – at least 646 CSC scholarships each year. The true figure is certainly far higher, as this figure does not account for the 11 additional universities identified which maintain CSC partnerships, but which do not publicly list the amount of awards offered. These can be found in Appendix B.

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)

Technically sitting underneath the CCP Central Committee and State Council, the highest entity embodying all United Front work, is the CPPCC.³⁰⁶ At the national level, the CPPCC gives China's United Front strategy a 'concrete institutional form'.³⁰⁷ It is led by a member of China's highest-level decision-making authority, the CCP's Politburo Standing Committee, and ultimately acts as a critical coordinating body bringing together representatives of China's other interest groups.

In August 2022, it was apparent that Hong Kong activists were becoming increasingly concerned about CCP infiltration of Hong Kong student societies across British universities – and specifically the work of the CPPCC on campuses. The Hong Kong branch of the CPPCC was calling on Hong Kong students in the UK to sign up for a 'mentorship' programme in partnership with several universities, including King's College London, QMUL, University College London, University of Bath, University of Leeds, Swansea University and University of Nottingham.³⁰⁸ Members of Hong Kong student associations and activists opposed the program due to their 'deep concern over its covert political objective'.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁶ China's Overseas United Front Work - Background and Implications for US_final_0.pdf (uscc.gov) p.9.

³⁰⁷ Dreyer. 2018.

³⁰⁸ Hongkongers warn of Chinese Communist Party infiltration of British universities — Radio Free Asia (rfa.org)

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Confucius Institutes (CIs)

The Confucius Institutes (CIs) are a branch of the Chinese Ministry of Education, primarily charged, ostensibly, with teaching Mandarin and promoting Chinese culture overseas. In reality, however, the CI are fully integrated into the CCP propaganda system.³¹⁰

The United Kingdom hosts 30 – more than any other country. A study last year uncovered that these 30 institutes have been funded to the tune of up to £46,000,000.00 by Chinese sources, mostly the Chinese Government.³¹¹

This previous study also uncovered a possibility that British universities are in breach of equality/employment law in respect of their CIs, due to their employment dependent on the CCP's criteria, which includes both ethnic and political background checks.

Since that report came out last year, the current UK Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, backtracked on his pledge to close all CIs in the UK during his unsuccessful leadership contest in the summer of 2022, when he declared that China was 'the biggest-long term threat to Britain'.³¹² In May 2023, Mr Sunak reneged on his campaign pledge to close all CIs, but did insist that the UK government would withdraw all funding to the centres.

A UK government spokesperson at the time said that:

'Like any international body operating in the UK, Confucius Institutes need to operate transparently and within the law, and with a full commitment to our values of openness and freedom of expression'.³¹³

Both last year's report referenced above and the research conducted during this project demonstrably shows that in fact the CIs do not operate transparently, nor with a full commitment to British values of openness and freedom of expression. They remain a persistent threat to Hong Kongers in particular, and severely impinge upon academic freedoms and student's welfare.

Chinese funding of the UK's CIs

Part of this research sought to better understand the nature of the financial relationships between the UK-based CIs and Chinese entities. FOIs were sent to all 30 universities which hosted CIs in September 2023. Fifteen had returned information by the time this report was published in November 2023. Any further returned FOIs will be added to the online version of this report, and data amended accordingly.

Table 2.2 below summarises those returned FOIs, listing Chinese entities and their funding to the CIs, since 2021.

³¹⁰ Dunning and Kwong. 2022. p.14.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

³¹² Rishi Sunak u-turns on proposed ban on Chinese institutes - BBC News

³¹³ *Ibid.*

Table 2.2 UK universities and CI funding

UK University	Chinese entity	2021 in GBP	2022 in GBP	2023 in GBP ³¹⁴	Total in GBP
University of Wales Trinity Saint David	NA	142,008.00	187,170.00	99,335.00	428,513.00
Cardiff University	Xiamen University ³¹⁵	55,850.00	64,567.00	87,861.00	208,278.00
De Montfort	University of Science & Technology Beijing ³¹⁶	5,490.00	15,156.00 31,448.56	36,535.00	88,629.56
QMUL	NA	0	35,149.77	0	35,149.77
University of Leeds	NA	0	90,873.00	27,339.86	118,212.86
University of Edinburgh	Chinese International Education Foundation ³¹⁷ Fudan University ³¹⁸	395,082.00	20,000.00	0	415,082.00
University of Glasgow	Nankai University ³¹⁹	31,060.00	4,515.51	27,222.19	62,797.70
London School of Economics	Tsinghua University ³²⁰	246,030.00	256,213.00	240,567	742,810.00
University of Liverpool	NA	128,448.55	90,607.24	75,464.31	294,520.10

³¹⁴ As of 30 September 2023

³¹⁵ Xiamen University is engaged in MCF, and hosts a PLA Air Force Institute. See Xiamen University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

³¹⁶ University of Science and Technology Beijing (USTB) is designated ‘High Risk’ by ASPI for its close relationship to the defence industry and high level of defence research. See University of Science and Technology Beijing – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

³¹⁷ The Chinese International Education Foundation (CIEF) is the overarching governing body which administrates the CIs, and is a tool of the CCP’s propaganda system. See HJS ‘China’s Confucius Institutes in the UK’ Report.indd (henryjacksonsociety.org) p.14. and 17.

³¹⁸ Fudan University engages in high levels of work for the Chinese military on materials science, including stealth technology. See Fudan University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

³¹⁹ Nankai University works to promote Military-Civil Fusion, signing a military-civil fusion strategic cooperation agreement with the Army Military Transport Academy in 2018. See Nankai University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

³²⁰ Tsinghua University is rated ‘Very High Risk’ by ASPI for its high level involvement in China’s defence industry, links to the PLA, and participation in Beijing’s continued nuclear proliferation program. See Tsinghua University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

University of Sheffield	Beijing Language and Culture University	75,485.00 13,269.67 ³²²	25,914.96 ³²³	0	186,602.63
	Nanjing University ³²¹	71,933.00			
University of Strathclyde	Tianjin Normal University	397,458.00 (2021/22)	482,105.00 (2022/23)		888,563.00
	Chinese Embassy in the UK	5,000 (2021/22)	4,000 (2022/23)		
University of Aberdeen	Wuhan University		76,134.56 (2021/22)	101,394.00 (2022/23)	177,528.56
Gold's University of London	Beijing Dance Academy	219,560	169,097	219,680	608,337
University of Huddersfield	East China University of Science and Technology	79,474.00 (2021/22)	123,118.66 (2022/23)		202,592.66
Coventry University	Han Ban / Confucius Institute Headquarters	145,970.00			133,490
	Jiangxi University of Finance & Economics		76,168.00	57,322.00	

Source: Civitas FOI returns.

The University of Hull replied to the FOI request regarding funding from Chinese entities. The university declined to provide information regarding 2023, and instead provided a link to a prior FOI where the university clarified that,

³²¹ Nanjing University is home to at least two defence laboratories, and has committed to deepening its involvement in military-civilian fusion. See Nanjing University – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI

³²² Amount received was in US dollars in FOI.

³²³ Amount received was in US dollars in FOI.


*‘Since 2017 we have had a CI in Partnership with Tianjin Normal University. Funds come from TNU and their funds from the Chinese Ministry of Education. Total sum to date - £388,803.79’.*³²⁴

In addition, London South Bank University refused to provide the information, citing Section 43 (2) of the Freedom of information Act – Commercial Interest, and replied that they did not view the CI as a risk to any of their students from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, or Xinjiang. Additionally, Bangor University replied that the information is exempt under Section 43(2) of the FOIA.

Of the 15 listed sources for Chinese funding to CIs in the UK, 12 either have links to the PLA, are engaged in military-civil fusion and China’s defence industrial base, or are a tool of CCP propaganda (applicable to the Chinese International Education Foundation, the body governing CIs, and the Confucius Institute Headquarters).

As can be seen in Figure 2.1 below, 40 per cent of all declared Chinese funding for UK CIs derives from either PLA-linked entities, or entities engaged in MCF.

Figure 2.1 Confucius Institute funding



The safeguarding of students?

A further avenue of this research’s enquiries was to determine whether universities which hosted CIs in the UK had carried out any risk assessments on their students who may be subjected to adverse political or other pressures from the CCP. Of the 30 universities contacted regarding funding for their CIs, only the University of Edinburgh responded that any risk assessments for the safeguarding conducted with regard to the impact of CIs on students from Taiwan or Hong Kong, pro-democracy Chinese students, Uyghur students,

³²⁴ 2585-Confucius-Institute (hull.ac.uk)

Tibetan students and others at particular risk of being targeted by pro-CCP actors on campus were in place. This was one more than a previous study into the CIs in the UK, published in October last year.³²⁵

The University of Edinburgh's response was as follows:

'Risks and potential risks associated with all international partnerships, including the Confucius Institute for Scotland which is a partnership with Fudan University, are assessed thoroughly, regularly and as a matter of course. The most recent specific assessment of risks relating to the University of Edinburgh's hosting of the Confucius Institute for Scotland was undertaken in July 2022. This included consideration of the impact of the Institute on University students and staff, and consideration of political influence on campus. While we cannot confirm a specific risk assessment of precisely the categories you have designated, we have undertaken a specific assessment of risks for students and staff which robustly addresses the areas you have identified'.

Separately, the London School of Economics hosts the Confucius Institute for Business London (CIBL). Prior research uncovered that the CIBL's deputy director, Dr Lu Hong, is the chair of the advisory board of the Confederation of Guangxi Chinese Association UK (CGAUK).³²⁶ CGAUK has expressed support and affinity for branches of the CCP, whilst the CGAUK works with subsidiaries of the UFW. In July 2020, when China introduced the National Security Law (NSL) in Hong Kong, effectively making protest illegal, CGAUK was one of a number of British organisations and charities which signed a statement in support of the law. The statement invoked a warm celebration of the 23rd anniversary of Hong Kong's 'return to the motherland', and supported the NSL's passage and implementation.³²⁷

The CIBL replied to us that the organisation is 'externally facing, and CIBL staff teach business people and those who use Mandarin in commercial settings'. LSE accepted 366 students from Hong Kong in 2022,³²⁸ and 73 students from Taiwan.³²⁹ It raises the question as to whether the institution sufficiently acknowledges that it has a duty of care to ensure that these 439 new students weren't at risk of political censorship from the CCP-controlled CI, in the same year that the CIBL accepted £240,567.00 in funding from one of China's largest defence universities.³³⁰

A spokesperson for the CIBL at LSE told us that; *"The Confucius Institute for Business London (CIBL) is a non-profit, educational institute which teaches Mandarin for use in business and commercial contexts. Courses are aimed at professionals who often work for businesses and organisations that trade with China. It does not teach LSE students."*

Similarly, to the LSE the University of Wales Trinity Saint David, stated in their returned FOI reply that 'There are no students from these areas on the Swansea campus of the University

³²⁵ Dunning and Kwong. 2022. p.21.

³²⁶ The Confederation of Guangxi Association UK <http://web.archive.org/web/20201124201807/>

³²⁷ Dunning and Kwong. 2022. p.23.

³²⁸ Hong Kong (lse.ac.uk)

³²⁹ Taiwan (lse.ac.uk)

³³⁰ See Table 2.2.

where the CI is based'. Despite this, the university openly declares that there are PhD students from Hong Kong at the university.³³¹

Finally, Cardiff University replied that the university did not include an assessment of the impact of CIs on their students, because 'there is no evidence or reason to believe that there is a risk'. Despite this, Cardiff University stated in 2023 that 'We have a long history of welcoming students from Hong Kong with around 200 students studying with us this year',³³² in addition to welcoming Taiwanese students, and hosting both Hong Kong and Taiwanese student societies.³³³

Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA)

A further branch of the CCP's United Front work overseas are the various CSSA's across most of the UK's universities. Sitting underneath the Chinese Ministry Foreign Affairs and administered by respective Chinese embassies abroad, the stated aim of the CSSA is to look after and support Chinese students abroad.

In reality, however, the organisation also reports Chinese students to the embassy and respective Chinese authorities for any wavering from the party official line, whilst trying to stop discussion of sensitive topics, including the Hong Kong democracy movement, Taiwan, and Tibet. The CSSA takes far more direct guidance from the Chinese embassy. For instance, in 2014, the CSSA was widely suspected of attempting to silence Chinese protestors during a Downing Street visit by then-premier Li Keqiang.³³⁴

China's now disgraced former Consul General in Manchester, Zheng Xiyuan, was recorded championing the 'remarkable advantages' of China's socialist system to University of Manchester students in December 2022, days before he was recalled back to Beijing. A University of Manchester student symposium posted the incident on a WeChat social media account used to share information with the university's CSSA. Zheng subsequently returned to China later that month after his involvement in the assault of a Hong Kong activist in the grounds of the Chinese consulate in Manchester, in October 2022.³³⁵

The video recorded Zheng as saying:

'Students are invited to fully understand and believe in the great significance behind every decision made by the party and the government, and consciously resist distorting and discrediting China's epidemic prevention and control policies, so as to jointly win this regular epidemic prevention and control battle'.³³⁶

³³¹ Research and Innovation | UWTSD

³³² Hong Kong - Study - Cardiff University

³³³ Hong Kong Society (cardiffstudents.com) see also Taiwanese Society (cardiffstudents.com)

³³⁴ Chinese embassy accused of recruiting people to 'drown-out' protesters as Premier visited Downing Street | London Evening Standard | Evening Standard

³³⁵ Chinese diplomat involved in violence at Manchester consulate, MP says | Manchester | The Guardian

³³⁶ Chinese students in UK told to 'resist distorting' China's Covid policies | China | The Guardian

Chinese protestors at the scene reported that they took Zheng's remarks to be an attempt to stamp down debate in the UK regarding China's Covid restrictions. One said that:

*'It is put as a request but that is not how things work in China. It is threatening. They should not be trying to influence the way international students act, to tell them what to do and say. Where is the freedom of expression?'*³³⁷

Chen Wei, a counsellor at the Manchester consulate who was also at the scene alongside Zheng when Hong Kong activist Bob Chan was beaten, also addressed the symposium in December 2022 to welcome the work of the CSSA. Counsellor Wei pointed out that:

*'[F]or a long time, the CSSAs in the (Manchester) consulate have assisted the consulate general to actively carry out preventive consular propaganda and consular protection'.*³³⁸

These comments provide further evidence that the CSSA is being used as a tool of the CCP, and used to effectively monitor and police student dissent on British campuses.

In 2019, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select committee highlighted the role of the CSSA as an 'instrument of political interference',³³⁹ whilst in that same year, Human Rights Watch (HRW) called for closer monitoring of the CSSA in response to threats to academic freedom.³⁴⁰ The same HRW report called for the banning of Confucius Institutes due to the demonstrable threats that they pose to academic freedoms.

The CSSA are not only actively curbing sensitive issues to the CCP at UK universities, having long sought to further Beijing's authoritarian agenda in the United States. The CSSA vehemently protested the University of California at San Diego's invitation to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, when invited to give the 2017 commencement address.³⁴¹ Elsewhere, the CSSA encouraged students at the University of Miami to welcome Xi Jinping to Mar-a-Lago in 2017, whilst simultaneously counter-protesting pro-Tibet and pro-Taiwan demonstrators – offering transportation, banners, and signs, allegedly subsidised by a local China-funded Confucius Institute.³⁴²

³³⁷ *Ibid.*

³³⁸ *Ibid.*

³³⁹ Autocracies and UK Foreign Policy (parliament.uk) p.6.

³⁴⁰ China: Government Threats to Academic Freedom Abroad | Human Rights Watch (hrw.org)

³⁴¹ Dreyer. 2018.

³⁴² <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/college/2017/06/17/dalai-lama-speaks-at-ucsd-commencement-amid-chinese-student-objection/37433131/>

Chapter Three: Recommendations

Align UK sanctions list with the US' Entity List

- The current UK sanctions list requires urgent attention. As can be evidenced from this research, up to 33 per cent of all Chinese funding declared from the universities that returned FOI replies derives from entities which are either linked to the Chinese military, are complicit in the CCP's MCF strategy, or are defence entities themselves. That isn't merely one or two minor slip ups or anomalies; that's a third of all Chinese funding to UK universities that traces back to the Chinese military in one form or another. At present, none of these entities are subject to UK sanctions; only Huawei is subject to a UK ban, and that's only to end the company's role in the UK's broadband infrastructure.
- The UK government should begin drafting up export control bans – to include research (classified as an export) – to prohibit the exploitation of the UK by Chinese companies complicit in the modernisation of the world's largest military which threatens the security of not only some of the UK's closest allies and partners, but also our own. To allow UK universities to continue accepting millions of pounds each year from Chinese companies complicit in furthering the CCP's agenda, which is drastically at odds to the UK's, is extreme strategic incoherence. Aligning the UK's sanctions list, export controls, and control orders with the US, which far better understands the inherent risks in dealing with these Chinese defence entities, would be a step in the right direction.
- In line with strengthening UK sanctions lists, the Department for Education and the Department for Business and Trade should ban all university funding, donations, and research collaborations with Chinese defence companies on the US Entity List. Receiving millions of pounds a year from the CCP's defence industry, including hypersonic missile testing centres, military jet manufactures, and PLA research institutions, is not in the national interest, and it is remarkable that it needs clarification.

End UK collaboration with members of China's Seven Sons of National Defence

- The UK cannot afford to continue entering into research collaborations, or accept funding from, China's Seven Sons of National Defence: Beihang University; Beijing Institute of Technology; Harbin Engineering University; Harbin Institute of Technology; Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics; Nanjing University of Science and Technology; and Northwestern Polytechnical University.

These defence universities are engaged in some of China's most sophisticated military programmes, including their ongoing nuclear proliferation. Three quarters of

university graduates recruited by Chinese defence related state-owned enterprises come from the Seven Sons,³⁴³ whilst they all devote at least half of their research budgets to military products.³⁴⁴

It is the extreme height of strategic incoherence to allow continued collaborations with such dangerous entities. All seven defence universities have direct collaborations and shared institutional access with the PLA. The US has banned all graduate students from these entities.³⁴⁵ The UK should follow suit and ban all graduates from studying at British universities, end accepting financial donations, and terminate all research collaborations.

Revise the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act

- There is clearly an overwhelming case now to make for the financial levels to be decreased regarding funding transparency for foreign donations and payments. The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill will ask the Office for Students to monitor overseas funding of either universities or their student unions, for declarations of external funding over £75,000.00. As can be evidenced throughout this research, funding amounts regularly go below the proposed £75,000.00 threshold for declarations, yet come from sources which cause grave concern for the UK's national security. In particular, the University of Glasgow received £10,000.00 from the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center – China's largest hypersonic missile technology testing institute – which has been subject to US sanctions since 2009. Evidently, £75,000.00 is too high an amount to declare external funding. A revised lower limit of at most £10,000.00 is clearly required.
- The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act should further consider labelling certain foreign entities as ones which carry an inherent risk to students. In the same way that Prevent frames radicalisation as a safeguarding issue, so too should the Act consider designating entities which carry political risk and threats to student welfare and freedoms.

Removal of Confucius Institutes from British universities

- Whilst the Prime Minister campaigned in 2022 on a promise to remove CIs, the government's promise to end all government funding to the centres does not go far enough. As can be evidenced from this research, the CIs draw millions of pounds worth of funding from Chinese sources. In the wake of an end to British funding, Chinese funding will almost certainly rise. As can be further evidenced from this research, most of the Chinese funding comes from entities with links to the PLA, or are heavily involved in the CCP's MCF strategy.

³⁴³ Microsoft Word - Universities and the Chinese Defense Technology Workforce_Final v2.docx (georgetown.edu)

³⁴⁴ How TU Delft unintentionally helps the Chinese army

³⁴⁵ US Ban on Chinese Students With Military Links Divides Experts on Impact (voanews.com)

The CCP and western academia – steeped in critical thought – hold opposing and irreconcilable values. Any partnership between the two is unsustainable, threatens British university students’ welfare, academic freedoms, and harms national security.

Removal of the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations

- As a tool of CCP propaganda, charged with the surveillance of Chinese, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese students through the embassy networks, there is no place for the CSSAs on British campuses. Already long-branded an ‘instrument of political interference’ by the influential House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, the organisation Human Rights Watch are correct in calling for their closure due to the threats to academic freedoms which they pose.

Removal of the China Scholarship Council

- The CSC has been shown to be a one-way only transaction. UK universities are haemorrhaging millions of pounds a year in subsidised student fees for ideologically acceptable Chinese students to study in the UK – only to return straight back to the PRC once their studies are finished. The UK gets little out of this relationship, except welcoming CCP agents on to British campuses. If the UK government is insistent that these party-loyal agents of the regime in Beijing must remain in the UK, then at the very least UK universities should cease subsidising their fees, and in the process recoup millions of pounds each year lost to further Xi Jinping’s hegemonic aspirations.

Establish new Mandarin centres on British universities

- With the saving of £27 million made by the government ending its funding of CIs, the government should devote that resource to friendly Mandarin-speaking entities, such as the Taiwan Centre for Mandarin Learning, and the Overseas Community Affairs Council, both established language training centres in Taiwan.³⁴⁶ Mandarin is, of course, and will remain, an important language to study, but training should be done by friendly institutions which share British values of openness, liberal democracy, academic freedoms, and critical thought. This would be of immeasurable benefit to the UK, as compared to leaving this task to authoritarian regimes that seek to undermine liberal democracies, and particularly those who subvert the UK government and British sovereignty.

Reduce the number of Chinese students

- Nearly one quarter of all international students in the UK are from the PRC. This is unsustainable both financially and as a national security consideration. A reduction in overall Chinese post-graduate students especially, and particularly in science and technology-based courses, will help alleviate this financial overdependency upon one

³⁴⁶ Taiwan Centers for Mandarin Learning”, Overseas Community Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), 27 July 2022, <https://english.ocac.gov.tw/OCAC/Eng/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=5894&pid=26496783>.

single country – and a country which is increasingly at odds with the UK’s national security concerns.

Establish an independent review into university safeguarding

- It has been established since at least 2019 that CCP influence on British campuses harms student welfare, and academic freedoms. In particular, this troubling influence is against students from Hong Kong, and also Taiwan. Our research found that only one university out of the 30 which host Confucius Institutes had a specific risk assessment in order to safeguard students from CCP influence. Some of these universities have several thousand students from Hong Kong, and have no established safeguarding place to mitigate against the already well-known adverse effects of allowing CCP propaganda entities on campus. An independent review must now urgently be conducted to better ensure that these inherent risks are more adequately protected against in order to defend academic freedoms and student welfare.

Review international student fees

- In order to offset against the dependency on international student fees from the PRC, the UK government should incentivise students from Taiwan and Hong Kong, in addition to the Commonwealth of Nations.

In January 2021, the Home Office launched the BN(O) visa, enabling BN(O) status holders and their family members to live, work, and study in the UK. In April 2021, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) launched a new UK-wide Welcome Programme to support those on the BN(O) visa settle into the UK. In March 2023, DLUHC announced the continuation of the Welcome Programme. In June 2023, DLUHC announced the successful grant recipients across the voluntary, community, and social enterprise (VCSE) sector for Year 3 of the grant scheme.

The UK therefore needs a reconsidered higher education policy on how it approaches Hong Kong families and students, including lowering tariffs of tuition fees for those who form part of the BN(O) visa route, to connect to wider changes, including the visa scheme, that have already been implemented in government.

In addition, reviewing international fees, bursaries, grants and other such assistance for members of the Commonwealth would help incentivise students from some of the UK’s strongest allies and partners, further helping to de-risk the current over-reliance on Chinese student tuition fees and funding. A special Commonwealth Nations International Fees Programme would studiously help in this regard, in addition to strengthening some of the UK’s strongest partnerships.

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Appendix A: Universities receiving funding from Chinese entities under US Sanctions regimes at time of funding (key examples)

This information came from the FOIs to universities asking for details regarding the Chinese entities funding them. All of this information can be found on the online version of this report.

University of Aberdeen

China National Offshore Oil Corporation

US BIS 2019

2020 – £135,000,00

Aston University

Huawei and Hisilicon

2019 – £200,287.64

Huawei

2019 - £50,000

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

Hisilicon Optoelectronics Co. Limited.

2020/21 – £752,624.60

University of Cambridge

BIACD

US BIS 2010 under CALT affiliation

2017-2018 – £48,488.00

2018 -2019 – £23,196.00

2019-2020 – £9,179.00

2020-2021 – £14,825.00

2021-2022 – £15,351.00

2022-2023 – £21,278.00

Total: £132,317.00

Huawei Devices

2018-2019 – £259,094.00

2019-2020 – £186,170.00

2020-2021 – £289,173.00

2021-2022 – £135,095.00

2022-2023 – £73,205.00

Huawei Technologies

2018-2019 – £248,029.00

2019-2020 – £293,871.00

2020-2021 – £287,667.00

2021-2022 – £334,113.00

2022-2023 – £156,351.00

2019-2022 – £4,200,000.00

Tianjin University

US BIS Entity List 2020

2020-2021 – £19,850.00

2021-2022 – £25,205.00

2022-2023 – £12,011.00

Total: £57,066.00

Cardiff University

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2019 – £65,000.00

University of Edinburgh

Huawei Technologies

2019 – £2,319,109.00

2019 – £100,000.01

2020 – £5,453,877.00

2020 – £500,000.01

2020 – £100,000.01

2021 – £495,558.00

2022 – £222,257.00

2022 – £200,000.01

University of Glasgow

China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center

US BIS 1999

2019 – £10,000.00

Heriot-Watt University

Huawei Technologies

2021 – £50,000.00

University of Kent

China Research Institute of Radiowave Propagation

US BIS 2018 as 14th Institute CETC

2018 – £300,000.00

Lancaster University

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2019 – £50,000.00

2020 – £53,435.00

Total: £103,435.00

University of Leeds

China National Offshore Oil Corporation

US BIS 2021, EO 13959 2020

2020-2022 – £19,328.59

China Shipbuilding Power Engineering Institute Co. Ltd.

Subsidiary of CSSC – US BIS & EO13959 2020

2020-2021 – £36,263.53

2021-2022 – £3,736.47

Total: £40,000.00

University of Liverpool

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2019 – £79,548.00

Newcastle University

Huawei Devices

2019 – £232,929.00

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2020-2021 – £42,115.00

2021-2022 – £133,204.00

Total: £175,319.00

Open University

Huawei Technologies

2022 – £189,566.00

University of Oxford

Huawei Technologies

2019 – £303,112.60

2018-2019 – £100,000.00

University of Reading

Huawei Technologies

2021 – £50,300.00

Royal Holloway, University of London

Syngenta

US BIS & EO13959 2020

2020-2021, 2023-2024 – £490,918.00

University of Sheffield

CRRC Zhuzhou Institute Co. Ltd.

Subsidiary of CRRC, US BIS 2020 & EO13959 2020

2019-2020 – £285,000.00

2020-2021 – £175,000.00

2021-2022 – £65,000.00

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.

2018-2019 – £130,600.00

The 10th Research Institute of China

Subsidiary of CETC, US BIS 2018, EO12959

2017-2018 – £93,201.00

2018-2019 – £10,356.00

Total: £103,557.00

University of Southampton

CRRC Qingdao Sifang Co. Ltd.

2017-2021 – £318,723.00

China Ship Scientific Research Centre

Alias od CSSC, US BIS 2020 & EX13959

2017-2021 – £15,390.00

Hisilicon Optoelectronics Co. Ltd.

2017-2021 – £2,354,652.00

Development of optical amplifiers

Huawei Technologies

2017-2022/2023 – £1,457,325.00

2018-2019 – £150,000.00

Zhengzhou University

US BIS 2021

2017-2021 – £265,848.00

University of Strathclyde

Harbin Engineering University

2020 – £21,832.00 – Research.

University of Westminster

Huawei Device Co Ltd.

2018-2019 – £128,368.00

2019-2020 – £201,500.00

Total: £329,868.00

Appendix B: List of UK – CSC partnerships

The following universities openly display their partnerships with the CSC, and the number of scholarships which they subsidise the tuition fees for.

- **University of Bath** – 10 scholarships.³⁴⁷
- **University of Birmingham** – 10 scholarships. Maintains over 300 Chinese PhD students p.a.,³⁴⁸ at £6,750,000.00 p.a.
- **University of Bristol** – 60 scholarships.³⁴⁹
- **University of Cambridge** – 30 scholarships.³⁵⁰
- **University College London** – 16 scholarships.³⁵¹
- **University of Dundee** – 10 scholarships.³⁵²
- **Durham University** – 20 scholarships.³⁵³
- **University of East Anglia** – 20 scholarships.³⁵⁴
- **University of Exeter** – 50 scholarships.³⁵⁵
- **University of Hull** – 10 scholarships p.a.³⁵⁶
- **Imperial College London** – 15 scholarships.³⁵⁷
- **Lancaster University** – 6 scholarships.³⁵⁸
- **Leeds University** – 20 scholarships.³⁵⁹
- **Loughborough University** – 50 scholarships.³⁶⁰
- **LSE** – 2 scholarships.³⁶¹
- **University of Kent** – 20 scholarships.³⁶²
- **King's College London** – 100 slots.³⁶³
- **University of Manchester** – 6 scholarships.³⁶⁴
- **Newcastle University** – 10 scholarships.³⁶⁵
- **University of Oxford** – 20 scholarships.³⁶⁶

³⁴⁷ [Applying for the China Scholarship Council: University of Bath PhD programme](#)

³⁴⁸ [China Scholarship Council – University of Birmingham PhD Scholarships - University of Birmingham](#)

³⁴⁹ [China Scholarship Council | Current students | University of Bristol](#)

³⁵⁰ [CSC Cambridge Scholarship - Postgraduate Funding Search](#)

³⁵¹ [China Scholarship Council-UCL Joint Research Scholarship | UCL Scholarships and funding - UCL – University College London](#)

³⁵² [China Scholarship Council \(CSC\) Programme | University of Dundee](#)

³⁵³ [Chinese Scholarships Council - Durham University](#)

³⁵⁴ [China Scholarship Council PhD Studentships - Research - Research \(uea.ac.uk\)](#)

³⁵⁵ [CSC Scholarships | Postgraduate Study - PhD and Research Degrees | University of Exeter](#)

³⁵⁶ [China Scholarship Council PhD Scholarships | University of Hull](#)

³⁵⁷ [China Scholarship Council | Study | Imperial College London](#)

³⁵⁸ [China Scholarship Council - Lancaster University](#)

³⁵⁹ [Fully Funded University of Leeds, UK for PhD 2023 China Scholarship Council for Chinese Students - PickAScholarship.com](#)

³⁶⁰ [China Scholarship Council | Postgraduate study | Loughborough University \(lboro.ac.uk\)](#)

³⁶¹ [ChineseGovernmentScholarshipApplicationInformation2017 \(lse.ac.uk\)](#) see also [Scholarships \(lse.ac.uk\)](#)

³⁶² [Scholarships search - University of Kent](#)

³⁶³ [King's-China Scholarship Council PhD Scholarship programme \(K-CSC\) \(kcl.ac.uk\)](#)

³⁶⁴ [University of Manchester-China Scholarship Council joint scholarship](#)

³⁶⁵ [csc-nu-phd-scholarships-regulations-22-23.pdf \(ncl.ac.uk\)](#)

³⁶⁶ [China Scholarship Council-University of Oxford Scholarships | University of Oxford](#)

- **QMUL** – 60 scholarships.³⁶⁷
- **Queen's University Belfast** – 20 scholarships.³⁶⁸
- **University of Reading** – 2 scholarships.³⁶⁹
- **St Andrews** 40 slots, 30 full-time, 10 part-time.³⁷⁰ One current Chinese PhD student is researching emerging global governance patterns at the UN and other institutions under Xi Jinping.³⁷¹
- **University of Surrey** – 10 scholarships.³⁷²
- **University of Warwick** – 30 scholarships.³⁷³

The following universities publicise their partnerships with the CSC but do not disclose how many scholarships are awarded:

- **University of Aberdeen.**
- **Bangor University.**
- **Cardiff University.**
- **Coventry University.**
- **University of Edinburgh.**
- **University of Glasgow.**
- **Heriot-Watt University.**
- **University of Liverpool.**
- **University of Nottingham.**
- **Plymouth University.**³⁷⁴
- **University of Sheffield.**
- **University of Southampton** maintains a CSC-funding partnership with Xiamen University.³⁷⁵
- **University of Strathclyde.**³⁷⁶
- **York University.**³⁷⁷

³⁶⁷ [Items - Queen Mary University of London \(qmul.ac.uk\)](https://qmul.ac.uk)

³⁶⁸ [Queen's University/China Scholarship Council PhD Scholarships 2023 | Study | Queen's University Belfast \(qub.ac.uk\)](https://qub.ac.uk)

³⁶⁹ [China Scholarship Council - prestigious or precarious? \(thepienews.com\)](https://thepienews.com)

³⁷⁰ [China Scholarship Council – University of St Andrews Scholarships \(PhD Programmes\) \(st-andrews.ac.uk\)](https://st-andrews.ac.uk)

³⁷¹ [Ruoxi Wang – Centre for Global Law and Governance \(st-andrews.ac.uk\)](https://st-andrews.ac.uk)

³⁷² [China Scholarship Council-Surrey Awards | University of Surrey](https://universityofsurrey.ac.uk)

³⁷³ [China Scholarship Council \(CSC\) / University of Warwick Scholarships, University of Warwick, United Kingdom | scholarshipdb.net](https://scholarshipdb.net)

³⁷⁴³⁷⁴ Plymouth University's CSC partnership is a collaboration with the Ocean University of China, see [Joint Education of the Innovative Student in Marine Renewable Energy - University of Plymouth](https://ocean.univ-plymouth.ac.uk) which has deep links with both the PLA and the CCP's military-civil fusion strategy, see [Ocean University of China – Chinese Defence Universities Tracker — ASPI](https://aspi.org)

³⁷⁵ [China Scholarship Council Scholarships | University of Southampton](https://universityofsouthampton.ac.uk)

³⁷⁶³⁷⁶ [Funding your postgraduate research | University of Strathclyde](https://universityofstrathclyde.ac.uk)

³⁷⁷ [China Scholarship Council Scholarship | Scholarships and Awards | Current Students | Students | Faculty of Graduate Studies \(FGS\) | York University](https://york.ac.uk)

This study by Robert Clark investigates two overarching aspects of the dependence of UK universities on China. The first is the ability for UK higher education institutions, universities and academics, to financially de-risk from the People's Republic of China (PRC), in order to end the reliance on Chinese funding (in terms of international student fees, research grants and donations) made from Chinese entities which will often have the capacity to harm or compromise national security.

The second aspect of this research is concerned with highlighting how this over-reliance on the PRC negatively affects British campuses, including academic freedoms and high risk research collaborations with Chinese entities linked to the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Whilst the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) attempts to extend its overseas intelligence gathering and foreign policy agenda on to UK campuses, it is the CCP's 'Military-Civil Fusion' (MCF) strategy which further endangers national security, through attempts to rapidly expand its military modernisation programs, and ambitions for regional military hegemony across the Indo-Pacific – a critical region for UK foreign policy and national security.