Eurosceptics must consider Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership
Jonathan Lindsell, 19 May 2015
As we begin to consider the EU referendum in earnest, the international context of trade and sovereignty must not be forgotten. This has been highlighted in US media by President Barack Obama’s battle to get ‘fast track’ powers from Congress. The deal he wants to rush through is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
The TPP is essentially TTIP but for the Pacific rim economies including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico and Malaysia. It includes free trade but focuses on wider issues like product regulation, intellectual property protection, positive investment conditions, free movement of business people, and origin rules – in short, the complex structure of international commerce.
Obama is likely to win his fast-track battle, so all 12 TPP countries could conclude an agreement by mid-June according to Australia’s trade minister. That will harmonise export conditions for British sales to 40% of the world economy. There will be rules and minimum standards agreed in Washington and Tokyo that our factories, consultants and lawyers need to conform to for the right to sell.
TTIP is designed to achieve the same harmony between European and American businesses. Left-leaning critics argue this is a two-pronged corporate strategy to outmanoeuvre China (and Russia) into submitting to economic governance on the West’s terms: the WTO with less consent. Most of China’s neighbours will participate, while South Korea is already a US partner.
The Cameron government is a leading supporter of TTIP. Indeed many Eurosceptic groups also argue Britain could join the deal as a third party. That is true, but voters must understand that this implies huge swathes of ‘red tape’ agreed at intergovernmental level, with no referendum. While parliament would be freer to decide domestic rules, Britain would still be part of a hegemony directed from Brussels and Washington.
Indeed, TPP-TTIP rules will affect the UK considerably whether it remains an EU member and becomes party to TTIP, or Britons vote out of the EU, fail to join TTIP, but still trade with the G20. To prevent the inefficiency of one factory following multiple rules regimes, large businesses and many SMEs will conform to the American-led system. Likewise, these norms would probably be included in British-negotiated free trade deals. They could affect issues as diverse as hormones in food imports, safety levels of endocrine disruptors, and health checks for cosmetics.
Britain is currently straining at the bounds of various international systems. It looks set to leave the ECHR, and Sajid Javid’s proposals on union action may break International Labour Organisation rules. Concerns over Mediterranean irregular migration cover non-EU treaties like the Geneva and Vienna Conventions. After exit, it is in these sorts of bodies that Britain would need to flourish to keep influence on trading rules, especially if in conflict with American-Pacific or European policies.
The issues that we face when weighing European integration are usually writ large on the international stage. How willing is the public to forfeit degrees of sovereignty in return for degrees of trade access and promised prosperity?