Civitas
+44 (0)20 7799 6677

The immigration question is much more complex than many dare to admit

Daniel Bentley, 1 August 2014

We live in a GDP-fixated age. If something promotes economic growth, it’s got to be a good thing, right? Well immigration is a case in point, and – as Robert Rowthorn’s report for Civitas today illustrates – it is one example of how limited a picture the latest GDP stats provide.

Yes, a larger population will lead to a larger economy, but almost entirely in proportion to the additional headcount. That is to say, there is a bigger cake but more people taking a slice of it. Rowthorn calculates, on current population forecasts, per capita growth of 3% between now and 2087, a tiny advance over so many decades – and even that is predicated on most people being productively employed. From that point of view, on average, nobody’s really any better off.

But perhaps having more people here is a good thing for the profile of the population? Most immigrants are of working age and pay taxes, so don’t we need them to rejuvenate our ageing population, supporting our swelling ranks of pensioners? It is certainly a popular argument. The problem is, with the scale of immigration anticipated over the coming decades, the impact on our infrastructure – already creaking in terms of housing and transport for example – will be that much greater. If per-capita growth is marginal, as Rowthorn demonstrates, it is this extra strain on infrastructure that will be decisive in terms of standards of living.

There is an additional point here, which is that if we pursue population growth via immigration to pay for our older citizens, there will be no end to that process. Because in time that additional population will age too and need supporting in turn. It is a “never ending treadmill”, in Rowthorn’s words: “To maintain a once-and-for-all reduction in the dependency ratio requires a never ending stream of immigrants. Once the inflow stops, the age structure will revert to its original trajectory.”

He concludes that the UK could get much the same benefits from immigration with a net intake of 50,000 a year – and with much less pressure on infrastructure. Of course, the government can’t even get net migration below 200,000 a year at the moment. David Cameron’s “tens of thousands” target is pie in the sky, largely because the government is unable to limit EU immigration, currently running at about 130,000. Naturally, as the prime minister plans to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU, many eyes are on those free movement of labour rules.

But Rowthorn frames the debate around the longer term, stressing that the principal driver of immigration is the wealth inequality between nations. For as long as poor countries remain poor, large numbers of their citizens will want to move to rich countries like the UK. In this context, Britain’s embrace of a highly-selective immigration policy, in which we pick and choose the best applicants from less developed nations, risks making matters worse by denuding those places of the professionals they need to prosper.

He floats a couple of ideas, including Dani Rodrik’s proposal to introduce temporary immigrant work visas for a period of, say, five years. Such a scheme would not be without difficulties, but Rodrik reckons this could give the world economy a boost worth hundreds of billions of dollars while allowing immigrants to develop skills, know-how and savings before they return to their home nations.

Rowthorn also proposes a massive system of student bursaries for youngsters from poorer nations, helping to circulate talent and enabling those countries to benefit from the educational opportunities on offer in the UK and elsewhere. The bottom line is that immigration policy should be considered in tandem with our wider international aid and development work.

The answers to these questions are not all immediately apparent. There is no obvious solution that suits rich and poor alike. At every turn in the debate additional considerations arise. This is why we need more discussion about immigration, not less, and one that is both respectful towards those people who want to come here – the vast majority with perfectly honourable ambitions – but also rational in its assessment of what actually works.

1 comment on “The immigration question is much more complex than many dare to admit”

  1. The replacement of the native British population presently runs at a rate of 400k a year – that is the number of native Britons leaving added to the number of immigrants coming in not net immigration – means that 4 million non-native will be added in a decade while around 1-2 million native Britons will be removed from then total of native Britons at the same time. .

    The British elite since 1945 has been programmed to attack the very idea of nations. Mass immigration has been the tool they have chosen to attain that end in Britain. We have the word of Andrew Neather, a special adviser to the Blair government that the massive immigration (over 3 million net) during the Blair years was a deliberate policy to dilute the native culture of the UK:

    ” I [Neather] wrote the landmark speech given by then immigration minister Barbara Roche in September 2000, calling for a loosening of controls. It marked a major shift from the policy of previous governments: from 1971 onwards, only foreigners joining relatives already in the UK had been permitted to settle here.

    “That speech was based largely on a report by the Performance and Innovation Unit, Tony Blair‘s Cabinet Office think-tank.

    “The PIU’s reports were legendarily tedious within Whitehall but their big immigration report was surrounded by an unusual air of both anticipation and secrecy.

    “Drafts were handed out in summer 2000 only with extreme reluctance: there was a paranoia about it reaching the media.

    “Eventually published in January 2001, the innocuously labelled “RDS Occasional Paper no. 67″, “Migration: an economic and social analysis” focused heavily on the labour market case.

    “But the earlier drafts I saw also included a driving political purpose: that mass immigration was the way that the Government was going to make the UK truly multicultural.

    “I remember coming away from some discussions with the clear sense that the policy was intended – even if this wasn’t its main purpose – to rub the Right’s nose in diversity and render their arguments out of date. That seemed to me to be a manoeuvre too far.

    “Ministers were very nervous about the whole thing. For despite Roche’s keenness to make her big speech and to be upfront, there was a reluctance elsewhere in government to discuss what increased immigration would mean, above all for Labour‘s core white working-class vote.

    “This shone through even in the published report: the “social outcomes” it talks about are solely those for immigrants.

    “And this first-term immigration policy got no mention among the platitudes on the subject in Labour’s 1997 manifesto, headed Faster, Firmer, Fairer.

    “The results were dramatic. In 1995, 55,000 foreigners were granted the right to settle in the UK. By 2005 that had risen to 179,000; last year, with immigration falling thanks to the recession, it was 148,000.

    “In addition, hundreds of thousands of migrants have come from the new EU member states since 2004, most requiring neither visas nor permission to work or settle. The UK welcomed an estimated net 1.5 million immigrants in the decade to 2008.

    “Part by accident, part by design, the Government had created its longed-for immigration boom.”

    (http://www.standard.co.uk/news/dont-listen-to-the-whingers–london-needs-immigrants-6786170.html)

    Read more at http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2014/01/01/the-non-economic-costs-of-mass-immigration-to-the-uk/

Newsletter

Keep up-to-date with all of our latest publications

Sign Up Here